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Abstract 
 
This thesis considers the impact that ideas about disability and disabled people have had 
on debates about euthanasia in Britain and the United States since the end of the Second 
World War. I demonstrate that the debate has long been characterized by a deeply 
paternalistic attitude, in which assumptions and stereotypes about disabled people are 
held to be of such truth and relevance that the idea of having disabled people contributing 
to the debate simply does not occur. To this end, the thesis looks at the debates through 
the prism of Disability Studies, and shows that the stereotypical and outdated ideas about 
disability and disabled people with which these debates abound are not simply down to a 
chance shared inclination amongst the participants exhaustively to discuss some aspects 
of the issue whilst not even acknowledging others, as might easily be assumed. Instead 
they are based upon the assumption that, when „euthanasia‟ is debated, the impairment of 
the individual(s) concerned is the only relevant issue. Though pervasive and often 
unquestioned, these ideas are now being challenged by such people as disability theorists, 
campaigners, and academics in the new field of Disability Studies. I will discuss this in 
greater detail in my Introduction. The thesis begins with the Nuremberg Medical Trial of 
1946-47, at which the perpetrators of Nazi medical crimes were prosecuted. These crimes 
included the „euthanasia‟ programme. Despite being cruel, systematic and totally non-
consensual, the programme was not treated properly as a crime, the judgment stating that 
a state was perfectly at liberty to subject classes of its citizens to euthanasia – in other 
words to subject them to non-consensual killing.. The thesis then explores the reactions 
of outsiders to the Nuremberg Medical Trial. This reveals that the judges‟ view of the 
programme was unchallenged by observers in the UK and US press, and by medical and 
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legal commentators, who saw the Trial as solely concerned with the prosecution of Nazi 
perpetrators of human vivisection.  Chapters Three, Four and Five continue to explore 
these themes of paternalism and moral inconsistency. This is done by looking at 
historians‟ perceptions of the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme (Chapter Three), cases of 
individual euthanasia and how they are dealt with in English and US law (Chapter Four), 
and the use of the Nazi analogy in bioethical debates on the subject (Chapter Five). I 
conclude that, though paternalism and dismissive attitudes are still problematic, things 
are beginning to change, thanks to such factors as greater civil rights, greater scope for 
participation in society as a whole, and new academic disciplines such as disability 
studies and disability history.  
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Introduction 
 
 
 
„Whether or not a state may validly enact legislation which imposes euthanasia upon 
certain classes of its citizens is a question which does not enter into the issues. 
Assuming that it may do so, the Family of Nations is not obligated to give 
recognition to such legislation when it manifestly gives legality to plain murder and 
torture of defenceless and powerless human beings of other nations‟.1  
 
This statement was made by the United States judges who presided over the 
Nuremberg Medical Trial (also known as the Nuremberg Doctors‟ Trial – or NMT) 
which began in December 1946 and delivered its judgment in August of the 
following year. The statement demonstrates – in a very stark way – that those who 
had been made victims of the „euthanasia‟ programme had also become victims of 
the Nuremberg Medical Trial judges, who actually stated that killing them had just 
been something which a state was entitled to do. It did not constitute a crime, and 
would not attract international censure, unless the policy were to be applied in a 
manner which was racist, or threatening to inhabitants of nations other than the one 
which introduced it. This moral inconsistency regarding the question of non-
consensual killing is the enduring theme of my thesis. I demonstrate that the 
dismissive and paternalistic assumptions and stereotypes about disabled people on 
display in the Nuremberg Medical Trial judgment are certainly not unique to the 
time in which the Trial took place, or to the judges presiding over it. Though those 
who either advocate, or simply remain unperturbed by, the practice of non-
                                                 
1 FO 646, Case 1 Medical, (U.S. v. Karl Brandt et al), Vol. 23, p.11395. 
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consensual „euthanasia‟ have not always expressed themselves so chillingly, it 
remains true that there is a widespread assumption that (a) people subjected to non-
consensual „euthanasia‟ are not in possession of any characteristics bar that of 
irredeemable suffering; (b) killing such people is simply not the same as the murder 
of another sort of person would be; and (c) the person or people in question do not 
suffer from being killed. The various chapters show this in a number of different 
ways. Chapter One exposes the way in which the prosecution team and the judges 
at the Nuremberg Medical Trial were trying the perpetrators of the Nazi 
„euthanasia‟ programme whilst clearly not believing that the programme had really 
been wrong. Chapter Two continues this theme, showing how prominent 
newspapers, legal journals and medical journals from both countries understood the 
Trial as being exclusively devoted to the prosecution of Nazis who had performed 
medical experiments upon concentration camp inmates. Chapter Three looks at how 
historians have written about the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme, and finds that, until 
recently, the programme was treated as a dry ethical issue and the victims were 
rendered invisible by a preoccupation with the protests against the programme. 
Chapter Four considers the legal situation in both England and Wales and the US, 
and shows that though the types of „euthanasia‟ under discussion have widened 
considerably, the underlying problems of how „other‟ lives are perceived have still 
not been solved. Chapter Five draws similar conclusions with regard to bioethical 
debates. 
 All the chapters draw extensively on the contributions of participants in such 
debates, linking primary sources to the secondary literature on „euthanasia‟. The nature of 
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the enquiry means that the thesis relies largely on published sources. This is because I am 
not investigating events as such, but rather how those events have been perceived by 
other people. The aim of this approach is to show the extremely widespread and 
tenacious nature of stereotypes and assumptions about disabled people in the distinct but 
connected debates of lawyers, historians, philosophers, medics and, where it stood in 
close relationship to academic discourse, the press. Inevitably, such an approach crosses 
boundaries between disciplines and requires analysis of very different types of discourse. 
It is justified by the interconnectedness of the different debates. Indeed, it is that very 
interconnectedness of vision which is so remarkable   As a consequence, my aim is to 
examine the transfer, reception, convergence and evolution of certain conceptions of 
disability and „euthanasia‟ within much broader sets of discourses rather than to do full 
justice to those discourses as a whole. The juxtaposition and comparison of the debates of 
lawyers, historians and bio-ethicists reveals a widespread and alarming continuity and 
acceptance of common and – one would have hoped – outdated stereotypes. These do not 
simply stand alone, but, as this thesis will show, have served to disseminate and 
perpetuate flawed and incomplete understandings both of historical events, and of the 
value and possibilities of the lives of others. This study seeks to investigate such common 
conceptions. This will be done within a particular framework, which it is now time to 
outline. 
 
The Standpoint of the Thesis 
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This thesis has a rather wide scope. Nevertheless, both the thesis as a whole, and the 
conclusions I have drawn fit snugly into the academic discipline of Disability Studies. 
This is a relatively new, interdisciplinary subject, which has been defined as „an emergent 
field with intellectual roots in the social sciences, humanities, and rehabilitation 
sciences‟.3 More particularly, disability studies seeks to change the way in which 
disability is viewed by the public and the academic community. As opposed to the 
„traditional‟ view, in which disability is seen as an individual „limitation‟ or „tragedy‟, 
disability studies takes a much more societal approach, with disability understood as 
encompassing factors which prevent an impaired individual from making the most of his 
or her life, but which are not caused directly by his or her impairment.  This will include 
the attitudes towards impairment demonstrated by the family, friends, and wider society 
in which the impaired person lives. They will also include such factors as the 
accessibility of the built environment, the possibilities for getting „out and about‟, the 
related effects upon the impaired person‟s opportunities to gain education and 
employment, and consequent satisfaction with his or her life. Both in disability studies 
and in the disabled people‟s movement more generally, this approach is known as the 
social model of disability.
5
 This term is in many ways the polar opposite of the more 
traditional „medical model‟, which predominates in much of mainstream society and 
mainstream academic discourse, as I will demonstrate throughout the course of this 
thesis. The medical model has been defined by the World Health Organization as follows: 
 
                                                 
3
 Gary L. Albrecht, Katherine D. Seelman and Michael Bury, (eds.), The Handbook of Disability Studies (Thousand Oaks, California; 
London; New Delhi: Sage Publications, Inc., 2001), p.2. 
5
 Bill Hughes, „Disability and the  Body‟, in Colin Barnes, Mike Oliver and Len Barton, (eds.) Disability Studies Today (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2002), p.59.  
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„The medical model views disability as a  problem of the person, directly caused 
by disease, trauma, or other health condition, which requires medical care 
provided in the form of individual treatment by professionals. Management of the 
disability is aimed at cure or the individual‟s adjustment and behaviour change. 
Medical care is viewed as the main issue, and at the political level the principal 
response is that of modifying or reforming healthcare policy‟.6 
   
Throughout this thesis, I will be arguing that, in effect, scholars' reactions to both the 
Nazi 'euthanasia' programme, and their general ideas and assumptions regarding the 
potentiality of impaired people, demonstrate that they have failed to take any kind of 
societal approach at all to the questions which are – or should be – raised when 
considering this important and topical subject. I will also demonstrate that academics and 
others involved in both the disabled people‟s movement have not only considered these 
problems, but that their ideas and conclusions differ greatly from the „traditional‟ view 
taken by the scholars whose views we will encounter throughout the majority of the 
thesis. An appreciation of these ideas is vital in order to gain a full understanding of the 
issues surrounding „euthanasia‟, but, at present, they are often overlooked. Before we do 
this, however, we must consider disability studies as an academic discipline. How and 
why did it originate? Why have disability studies scholars identified a need for their field 
of study?  With regard to this problem within the discipline of sociology, the sociologist 
Carol Thomas has written that  
 
                                                 
6
 World Health Organization (WHO), ICF: Introduction (Geneva: World Health Organization, 2001), p.20. Quoted in Sheila A.M. 
McLean and Laura Williamson, Impairment and Disability: Law and Ethics at the Beginning and End of Life (Abingdon, Oxon.: 
Routledge-Cavendish, 2007) p.12. 
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„the development of  ideas in disability studies in the 1980s and 1990s amounted to a 
head-on challenge to medical sociologists‟ claim to sole jurisdiction in any sociology of 
disability. The existence of a disciplinary „divide‟ soon became apparent, one not 
characterised by a polite „agree-to-disagree‟ arrangement‟.7  
 
Thomas suggests that this situation is particularly acute in medical sociology because of 
the way in which the discipline has developed, and its tendency to regard illness and 
disability as not only interchangeable, but also as conscious or unconscious 
manifestations of social deviance. Thomas has written that „that medical sociology has at 
its heart such a pathologising, victim blaming and problem-infused view of the 
„chronically ill and disabled‟ is not generally highlighted in medical sociology 
textbooks‟.8 This may be true for sociology, but this thesis will be arguing that the 
problem is far more widespread. In addition, the more general explanation for this state of 
affairs is actually rather a lot simpler. The British disability studies scholar Michael Bury 
has written that  
 
„As with gender, it should be noted that many mainstream sociologists have paid little or 
no attention to the implications of disability for their analyses of the body in late modern 
or postmodern cultures … „the body‟ is all too often regarded as self-evident‟.9 
 
We have here two different explanations for the relative absence of disability as an area 
of study. Both, however, agree that this is something which has unquestionably occurred. 
                                                 
7
 Carol Thomas, Sociologies of Disability and Illness: Contested Ideas in Disability Studies and Medical Sociology (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p.4.  
8
 Ibid, p.19. 
9
 Quoted in ibid, p.38. 
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But we are still left with a fundamental problem: how to explain the simultaneous 
presence and absence of disability as a term of reference, and of impaired people as equal 
contributors to debates which undoubtedly concern them? Why is this absence so wide-
ranging, and how has it endured for so long? These questions must be addressed before 
the real business of the thesis can begin. 
 History is an area of academia in which disability studies has managed to make 
particularly large strides, as well as proving an intrinsically rewarding research area. 
Much has been written by disability historians about the reasons why, until they came 
along, their research had not previously been considered worth doing. As well as telling 
us about the attitudes which past societies took to impaired people living in their midst, 
looking at the ways in which historians have written about historical examples of good or 
bad treatment of impaired people, also shows us the attitudes that those historians 
themselves take towards impairment. This is what my „historians‟ chapter will be devoted 
to, and I will take a similar approach with regard to my other chapters, looking at the 
fields of law; philosophy; the Nuremberg Medical Trial itself - as revealed in the 
transcript; and the reactions of the Press and the wider Anglo-American world, to the 
revelations emerging from the Trial. I shall be arguing that those studying the Nazi 
„euthanasia‟ programme, and also those within academia who consider wider and more 
contemporary issues of „euthanasia‟ and „assisted dying‟ have, and are continuing to 
demonstrate the attitude described above by Michael Bury – that of „the body‟ being 
„self-evident‟. Essentially, the practical implication of this, for the study of anything to do 
with disability and impairment, is that, no matter how obvious it should be that an 
impaired person who is, say, sterilized, murdered, or subjected to some non-lethal but 
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damaging form of discrimination, is suffering from the actions of members or institutions 
of his or her society, it will still be widely assumed that the individual‟s impairment is the 
sole root cause of his or her sufferings. It is now time to take a brief look at examples of 
this, taken from the sections of academia I will be looking at. This will help to lay the 
foundations for the context in which the chapters of my thesis should be read. 
 
The Bourne Identity 
 
 The disability historian Douglas Baynton has showed the kind of problems faced by 
pioneers in the field by demonstrating the case of Paul Longmore, an American academic 
of whom Baynton says  
 
„Probably more than anyone, Longmore has been responsible for bringing disability 
studies into the field of history‟.10 
 
Baynton goes on to explain that, in 1985, Paul Longmore published a revolutionary 
review of a new book about the early twentieth century US intellectual Randolph Bourne. 
Bourne had had various impairments which, though they caused him little functional 
disability, had resulted in a significant amount of facial and bodily disfigurement.
11
 
Longmore‟s review of the new Bourne biography traced what academics over the years 
had written about Bourne, concluding that they had got him all wrong, as they had never 
                                                 
10
 Baynton, Douglas, „Disability History: No Longer Hidden‟, Reviews in American History 32 (2004), p.282. 
11
 Ibid, p.283. 
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understood his disability in any terms other than that of individual deficit. Indeed, in 1965 
a biographer had even written that Bourne‟s 
 
„disappointments and frustrations were the inevitable result of [his] deformity … and they 
tell us nothing, therefore, about the society in which Bourne lived‟.12 
 
Longmore‟s response - that Bourne‟s whole identity was based upon his experiences as 
an impaired person in a deeply hostile society - is based upon Bourne‟s own writings. 
Prior to Paul Longmore, biographers had failed utterly to consider this: 
 
„The problem with it, as with all Bourne biographies, is its fundamental misunderstanding 
of his experience and identity as a disabled man in a society that intensively stigmatized 
him‟.13  
 
Bourne lived at a time when the eugenics movement – both in the US and internationally 
– was gaining momentum. In addition, institutionalization of disabled people in the US 
was increasing; discrimination meant that employment opportunities were conspicuous 
by their absence; cities such as Chicago prevented persons who were „diseased, maimed, 
mutilated, or in any way deformed‟ from begging.14 On top of all this, Longmore points 
out the casual cruelty and prejudice to which Bourne had been subjected by other 
people‟s reactions to his appearance. This did not come solely from people who did not 
know him, Bourne‟s instinctive feminism was not repaid in kind by his female friends, 
                                                 
12
 Ibid. 
13
 Paul K. Longmore, „The Life of Randolph Bourne and the Need for a History of Disabled People‟, Reviews in American History, 
vol.13, no.4 (December, 1985), p.581. 
14
 Ibid, p.584. 
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who were disconcerted that he considered himself entitled to engage in romance. 
15
 All of 
this led Longmore to conclude that historians would continue to 
 
„misunderstand individuals like Randolph Bourne as long as the history of disabled 
people as a distinct social minority remains largely unwritten and unknown‟.16 
 
Longmore also came across this problem when he wrote about the famous US case of 
Elizabeth Bouvia, which will be covered more fully in the legal chapter of this thesis. 
Briefly, Bouvia had severe cerebral palsy and, following a series of devastating personal 
blows – miscarriage, marriage breakdown, the tragic death of a sibling, and having been 
forced to abandon her master‟s degree due to her university‟s refusal to make adaptations 
required by law - had requested the right to die. The judge hearing the case determined 
that Bouvia‟s request was reasonable, and the California Supreme Court based its 
decision entirely upon what Bouvia was supposed to be suffering from – her disability: 
 
„She, as the patient, lying helplessly in bed, unable to care for herself, may consider her 
existence meaningless. She cannot be faulted for so concluding … Her mind and spirit 
may be free to take great flights, but she herself is imprisoned … subject to the ignominy, 
embarrassment, humiliation and the dehumanizing aspects created by her helplessness‟.17  
 
This is not a problem which is pertinent only to the case of Elizabeth Bouvia, or one 
which is applicable solely to the situation in the United States of America. The legal 
                                                 
15
 Ibid. 
16
 Ibid, p.586. 
17
 Bouvia v. Superior Court of State of California, Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appelate District, Division Two, 
2d Cir. No., BO19134  (1986, April 16), pp.19, 21). 
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chapter will show the extent to which attitudes similar to the one quoted above are easy to 
find when one looks at even recent cases of „euthanasia‟ from England and Wales, such 
as the killing by his father of ten-year-old Jacob Wragg in 2006.The field of bioethics is 
possibly even more tainted by such dismissive and prejudicial attitudes. Particularly in 
recent years, people in the disability movement have become extremely concerned by the 
way in which their lives, experiences and potential are devalued by philosophers in the 
field of bioethics.
18
 This will be discussed more fully in my „philosophy‟ chapter, but a 
flavour of the problem be seen by taking a brief look at the main grounds for 
disagreement. The disability studies scholar Adrienne Asch has accused bioethicists of 
both over-simplifying and failing properly to understand the questions raised by the 
existence of impairment: 
 
„Bioethics writing, like the medical model of disability now being replaced by a social 
model, has failed to question traditional understandings of impairment, illness or 
disability … bioethics insists that individuals should be able to determine the situations 
under which they find life intolerable but has never challenged them to ask themselves 
what they found intolerable. Nor has bioethics suggested that what was unacceptable 
might not be inherent in quadriplegia, stroke, or a degenerative neurological condition but 
instead could result from the social arrangements facing people living with such 
conditions‟.19 
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 Asch, Adrienne, „Disability, Bioethics and Human Rights‟, in Albrecht, Seelman and Bury, (eds.), The Disability Studies 
Handbook, (Thousand Oaks, California; London; New Delhi; Sage Publications, Inc., 2001), pp.300-311.  
19
 Ibid, p.299. 
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Bioethicist John Harris, of the University of Manchester, successfully (although 
presumably unwittingly) exemplifies the attitudes which Asch criticises. In an article 
written in 2001, Harris repeatedly states that he is committed to equal rights for all, but 
when discussing „disability‟, he asks a narrow range of questions which make it difficult 
to regard the issues involved with any kind of depth. Harris asks: 
1. What is disability? 
2. Is it better not to have a disability or not to be a person with disabilities? 
3. Is it better to avoid bringing people with disabilities into existence where possible? 
20
 
 
The tenor of Harris‟s questions leads both him, and anyone with whom he might be 
debating these ideas, into an assumption that questions of impairment are not at all multi-
faceted, but simply involve, as Harris says: 
 
„Like the loss of the end joint of a little finger, the point is not that life is not worth living 
without such things but that we have reasons not to start out in life with any unnecessary 
disadvantages however slight‟.21 
 
In response to this, one might simply say that it is not very practical. It does not offer any 
explanation for, say, what a person, who lost „the end joint of a little finger‟ in an 
accident when already an adult, might be able to do about his or her changed 
circumstances. More than this, though, it attempts to squeeze questions about disability 
and impairment into narrow definitions of whether or not such-and-such a life is „worth 
living‟. This not only gives the impression that these are the only relevant questions, but 
                                                 
20
 John Harris, „One Principle  and Three Fallacies of Disability Studies‟, Journal of Medical Ethics vol. 27, (2001), p.384. 
21
 Ibid. 
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also makes it very difficult to turn the debate around and demonstrate the wider societal 
implications of impairment and disability.  In many ways the contested ideas between 
bioethicists and disability studies academics are exemplified by the context in which 
Harris made his remarks. The Journal of Medical Ethics held an „Equality and Disability 
Symposium‟, in which a number of Anglophone scholars (including Harris) contributed 
papers discussing such topics as treatment withdrawal, the definition of a „worthwhile 
life‟, and whether or not it was justifiable to prevent disability on the grounds of 
suffering. Where appropriate, the participants also responded to each other‟s remarks. 
Disability studies and disability theory were well-represented by Tom Koch, a visually-
impaired activist and academic bioethicist from the Hospital for Sick Children in 
Toronto, Canada. Nevertheless, the extremely „medicalized‟ context of the debate was 
underlined by the fact that Harris‟s fellow contributors to the symposium all hailed from 
the worlds of medicine or medical law: R.B. Jones is a retired consultant paediatrician; 
S.D. Edwards is a senior lecturer in the philosophy of health care; Tom Koch is based at a 
hospital for sick children; and Kate Diesfield is a senior lecturer at the National Centre 
for Health and Social Ethics in Auckland, New Zealand. Their discussion, and my 
philosophy chapter, will show that the field is still far away from a properly wide-ranging 
consideration of the lives and possibilities of impaired people. As Mark Kuczewski, first 
editor of the American Journal of Bioethics, wrote: 
 
„The profession that was born to give voice to the sick and dying and to thereby empower 
patients will have the opposite effect. That is, a failure to give a prominent place to the 
consideration of disability issues does not only mean that that important areas of 
healthcare go unconsidered; it also means that many issues bioethicists consider will be 
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distorted. Since many of the fundamental concerns of persons with disabilities are not 
about medicine at all but about the living of life, they point the way to transcend medical 
ethics and restore the original meaning to bioethics‟.22 
 
The ‘Social Model of Disability’ and its Origins 
 
What these concerns have in common is that they show a deep alarm that the majority of 
the population – both inside and outside academia - still regard impairment and disability 
as private, individual matters, which have little or no bearing upon wider society – for 
example on the way it can or should operate. 
Academic disability studies has sought to show that this is not the case, and in so doing it 
is really a natural progression of the disability rights movement which, from its 
beginnings in the early 1970s, sought to disseminate this knowledge in terms not of 
academic argument, but of the needless obstacles which impaired people faced in their 
daily lives. The activists who advanced the movement‟s cause did so because they 
wanted to draw attention to particular physical and attitudinal barriers which meant that 
they were prevented from making the most of their lives and playing a proper role in 
society. For example, UPIAS (Union of the Physically Impaired) was the first real 
political organization of disabled people in the United Kingdom. At the organization‟s 
inception, one of its founders, Vic Finkelstein, wrote that  
 
„Oppression takes many forms and I guess that our group will need to discuss the variety 
of ways so that we will clarify our views on all aspects of our condition.  However, we 
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 Mark G. Kuczewski, „Disability: An Agenda for Bioethics‟, American Journal of Bioethics, vol.1, no.3, (Summer, 2001), p.37. 
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have agreed that the most pressing is the isolation of physically impaired people in 
institutions. It seems to me that this is no accident. Institutionalization involves a process 
which typifies our condition. It reveals the nature of our oppression in its most pure form 
and in struggling to change this we are bound, provided we insist on being thorough, to 
understand what disability really is. This, I feel, should be an integral part of what we set 
out to do. That is, while we struggle to change society in such a manner that people will 
no longer wish to isolate physically impaired people in institutions we should, at the same 
time, seek to clarify the nature of the condition. Theory and practice should be united‟.23   
 
Finkelstein‟s statement shows a number of things. Institutionalization of physically 
disabled people is his primary concern. This is because it is, in his view, the wellspring 
from which all other societal problems experienced by disabled people flow. Eradicate it, 
and you will immediately have members of society who must have their needs catered 
for, not objects of care who are kept safely out of the way. Finkelstein also, it is clear, 
regards the practice of segregation as one of social control. Institutionalization had begun 
during the nineteenth century as a result of both increasing interest in scientific 
explanation and classification, and also of the large-scale exclusion of impaired people 
from the labour market, which had been a result of Britain‟s increasing industrialization . 
Such factors as the speed of factory work meant that many impaired people were now 
largely excluded from the labour market, leading to concerns that they were a potential 
problem, and a drain on state resources.
24
 Continued reliance on institutions well into the 
twentieth century led to the growth of a whole industry of rehabilitative medicine, as well 
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 Vic Finkelstein, „Contribution to the Discussion on the Nature of our Organization‟, extract from UPIAS circular 3,(December, 
1972), p.1. Downloaded from http://www.leeds.ac.uk/disability-studies/archiveuk/finkelstein/Extraction/fromUPIASCircular.   
24
 Barnes, Mercer and Shakespeare, (eds.), Exploring Disability: A Sociological Introduction (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), p.20. 
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as the unquestioned assumption that an impaired person‟s life was governed by his or her 
impairment, not by any interplay between that impairment and the rest of society.
25
 The 
importance of this as an explanation for the attitudes we will encounter in this thesis – 
particularly in the historians‟ chapter – cannot be underestimated. As the Nazi 
„euthanasia‟ programme targeted those living in institutions, I would argue that 
historians‟ attitudes to the programmes victims have, in the main, been significantly 
coloured by the unquestioned assumption mentioned above. 
 
 
Impairment versus Disability 
 
One of the results of the paradigm shift in thinking which disability studies has 
spearheaded and sought to disseminate amongst both the public at large and the wider 
academic community is that those in the field have drawn attention to the way language 
is used, and to the descriptive terms employed to elucidate various concepts. This has 
resulted in a distinction being made between terms which may often have been 
considered as being largely interchangeable. Pre-eminent amongst these are the terms 
„impairment‟ and „disability‟. The disabled people‟s movement defines these terms rather 
differently from the national and international legal documents dealing with the issue. 
Indeed, to a significant extent, the definition used and favoured by disability academics 
and activists is entirely at odds with those utilised by people in other fields and in society 
at large. Disability theorists first drew the distinction in the early 1970s, when the 
movement was still in its infancy. The Union of the Physically Impaired Against 
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Segregation (UPIAS)  published a monograph in which they defined the terms 
„impairment‟ and „disability‟, based upon the lived experience of disabled people.26 
According to this monograph, the two terms were quite distinct. „Impairment‟ meant: 
 
„the lack of all or part of a limb; or having a defective limb, organ or body mechanism. In 
other words it tends to emphasize the individual‟.27 
 
By contrast, „disability‟ encompassed the problems with which impaired individuals were 
presented by the shortcomings of the society in which they lived: 
 
„the disadvantage or restriction of activity caused by a contemporary social organization 
which takes no or little account of people who have physical impairments and thus 
excluding them from the mainstream of social activities‟.28 
 
The perceived need to define these terms in a new and constructive way had come about 
due to a document issued by the World Health Organization (WHO), in which the terms 
„impairment‟, „disability‟ and „handicap‟ were defined „in the context of health 
experience‟, and in which all problems an impaired individual might face were 
considered to arise solely from his or her impairment, never from the interaction between 
the individual and his or her society.
29
 Definitions of „disability‟ and related terms which 
take into account the fact that an impaired individual does not inhabit a societal vacuum 
have continued to underpin both the disability movement and the „social model‟ of 
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disability. As far as academic disability studies is concerned, Lennard J. Davis shows that 
the two terms are defined in the same way: 
 
„Disability scholars make the distinction between impairment and disability. An 
impairment involves a loss or diminution of sight, hearing, mobility, mental ability and so 
on. But an impairment only becomes a disability when the ambient society creates 
environments with barriers – affective, sensory, cognitive or architectural‟.30 
  
In recent years, some disability academics and theorists, such as Liz Crow and Tom 
Shakespeare, have expressed dissatisfaction with what they see as the limits of the social 
model, and its inability to take into account bodily limitations and problems which cannot 
be mitigated by anything the wider society might try to do to alleviate them. Examples 
given by Shakespeare include a blind person who still cannot see a sunset, and a deaf 
person who cannot hear birdsong.
31
  Nevertheless, as my thesis will show all too clearly, 
the view of disability and impairment demonstrated by those in academic fields other 
than that of disability studies, is in many ways, still light years away from acknowledging 
that there are any societal considerations at all to be taken into account when the question 
of „euthanasia‟ is debated. In addition, national legal documents dealing with disability 
continue to offer definitions which suggest that disability is wholly a problem of the 
individual, and that, consequently, an impaired individual‟s social circumstances are 
irrelevant. For the purposes of this thesis, the national legal documents under 
consideration are, firstly, the Disability Discrimination Act 1995, and secondly, the 
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Americans with Disabilities Act 1990. The former has been decried as a „masterpiece of 
ambiguity‟, whilst the latter has been admiringly described as „a powerful testimony to 
the campaigning zeal of disabled people‟.32 However, this may have more to do with the 
ways in which the respective pieces of legislation came into being (as I will show in my 
legal chapter) rather than any particular clarity of expression, or forward-thinking intent, 
which characterized the Americans with Disabilities Act, but was absent from the 
Disability Discrimination Act. This is because the definition of „disability‟ contained in 
the  two documents is strikingly similar and, unlike the definitions favoured by the 
disability rights movement, takes no account of the societal circumstances of a person 
with an impairment. According to the Disability Discrimination Act 1995, a disability is 
 
„a physical or mental impairment which has a substantial long term adverse effect on his 
(or her!) ability to carry out normal day to day activities‟.33 
 
The Americans with Disabilities Act takes a similar approach, once again placing the 
impaired individual in a societal vacuum: 
 
„a disability is a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of 
the individual‟s major life activities‟.34 
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There can be no more significant „major life activities‟ than that of continuing to remain 
alive. To this end, it is interesting to note that neither the Disability Discrimination Act 
1995 nor the Americans with Disabilities Act have anything to say on the subject of 
„euthanasia‟. One might argue that this is not surprising: they are after all documents 
which aim to set out the rights of impaired persons and facilitate their greater 
participation in the labour market and in society as a whole. However, it is this 
assumption, or perhaps one might even call it pretence, that the topic of „euthanasia‟ 
exists in isolation from any aspect of societal living, which is significantly more 
dangerous. It means that, whilst „euthanasia‟, and latterly, assisted suicide, are officially 
regarded as individual decisions, there is no legal acknowledgement of the factors that 
may have a bearing on a person‟s decision. I will go into greater detail about this in my 
legal chapter. For the time being it is sufficient to say that, as my thesis as a whole will 
demonstrate, it is entirely unsatisfactory for the topic of „euthanasia‟ to be treated, as it all 
too often is, as being completely divorced from all areas of human experience save that of 
individual medical problems. 
 
Disability and Illness 
 
The question of „individual medical problems‟ leads us back to a distinction between 
sufferings that can be assuaged by improvements in society‟s accommodation of 
impaired people in everyday life, and those sufferings which may be the direct and 
unavoidable result of a medical condition. As shown above (footnote 13), some theorists 
and academics have criticised the social model of disability for a perceived over-focus on 
 28 
society‟s shortcomings, which can sometimes culminate in its adherents refusal to 
acknowledge that some people may be suffering from problems which are entirely 
biomedical in nature. This distinction is particularly important when considering ethical 
issues such as that of „euthanasia‟. As should now be quite obvious, my thesis argues that 
a more societal approach to „euthanasia‟ urgently needs to be explored. I also believe, 
however, that many of the problems experienced by people with chronic and/or life-
limiting illnesses can be considered to come under the umbrella of „disability issues‟. 
This is because a chronic illness, the effects of which may change or worsen over time, is 
inevitably something that one lives with – it is not a simple matter of living one day and 
dying the next. This approach is recognized by the Disability Discrimination Act 2005, 
which contains certain amendments to the 1995 Act. Amongst these amendments is the 
statement that cancer, HIV and multiple sclerosis are now to be considered „disabilities‟ 
in terms of the Act.
35
 It is easy to see how this idea can be applied to any chronic illness 
which, though it affects the life of the person who has it, may not cause death, either at all 
or for a prolonged period. A person with such an illness might consider death to be 
preferable to life, but my thesis will demonstrate that such a person does not inhabit a 
vacuum, and that their potential in whatever span of life remains to them, cannot be 
entirely divorced from their societal circumstances. 
 
Disability and Euthanasia: Concepts through Time 
 
I have chosen to begin my thesis by showing how the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme was 
perceived in the immediate post-war period. I made the decision to begin at this point due 
                                                 
35
 The Disability Discrimination Act 2005, s. 18(3)(i), downloaded from www.legislation.gov.uk. 
 29 
both to the enormity of the events under discussion at the Nuremberg Medical Trial, and 
to the long, but perhaps not very enlightening, shadow which the example of the Nazis 
casts over contemporary debates. The fact that the Tribunal could not treat the systematic 
murder of tens of thousands of innocent people with any real degree of seriousness did 
not bode well for other discussions of „euthanasia‟ taking place during the same period.  
A good deal has been written about the history of eugenic thought in Britain and the 
United States, and there is still no unanimous agreement concerning the extent to which 
members and institutions of  the Allied powers who fought against Nazism can be said to 
have been receptive to some of the ideas which the ideology espoused. Writers such as 
Stefan Kühl and Henry Friedlander have, as I will show in my „Historians‟ chapter, 
discussed the U.S. responses to Nazi ideas in terms of the wide use that was made of 
eugenic sterilization in the United States, over a period of several decades. Ian 
Dowbiggin has also considered the crossover (or otherwise) between eugenic sterilization 
and „euthanasia‟, particularly when it is involuntary. He has concluded that  
 
„The origins of Nazi euthanasia, like those of the American euthanasia movement, 
predate the Third Reich and were intertwined with the history of eugenics and social 
Darwinism, and with efforts to discredit traditional morality and ethics.‟.36 
 
Much has been written about the enthusiasm for eugenics in the United States in the early 
years of the twentieth century, but a lot of this scholarship has focused on race. It would 
be ridiculous to deny that race was an important factor, but the relationship which there 
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was perceived to be between race and disability has often been overlooked. Nevertheless, 
this link does exist, as can be shown by a survey submitted to Congress in 1924, which 
purported to show the relative levels of „inferior intelligence‟ amongst soldiers of 
different racial groups, and was supposed to be particularly pronounced amongst Negroes 
and amongst „new immigrants‟ from Southern and Eastern Europe. This survey helped to 
implement the 1924 Johnson Act, which restricted immigration from areas found to have 
high levels of „feeble-minded‟ inhabitants. Three years later, the U.S. Supreme Court 
affirmed, in the case of Buck v. Bell, that a state had the right to sterilize people with 
intellectual disabilities.
37
 This, as we shall see in the next chapter, was a strange 
harbinger of the pronouncement that the three U.S. judges would make at the close of the 
Nuremberg Medical Trial, exactly twenty years later, affirming the right of a state to 
subject classes of its citizens to „euthanasia‟.  The high levels of immigration to the 
United States, consistently conflated with real or manufactured concerns about high 
levels of hereditary illnesses and disability, plus the lesser timidity exhibited by U.S. 
politicians vis-à-vis their British counterparts, helps to explain why eugenics and, the 
idea, at least, of „euthanasia‟ retained such a tenacious and prolonged hold on U.S. 
domestic policy.    
The situation in the United Kingdom is somewhat more complicated. Though Britain 
never had state-sanctioned sterilization programmes (on either eugenic or other grounds), 
this does not mean that there had never been discussion or approval of it, or of the 
possibility of implementing „euthanasia‟. The British debate about „euthanasia‟ really 
began in earnest in 1870, with the publication of a small book entitled Essays of the 
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Birmingham Speculative Club. This contained an essay entitled „Euthanasia‟, written by 
a schoolteacher, Samuel Williams. Williams advocated quasi-voluntary „euthanasia‟ for 
persons suffering from terminal illness. Though his professed concern was the 
curtailment of futile suffering, Williams also phrased his arguments in Social Darwinist 
terms, maintaining that modern medicine was counter-selective, endangering society by 
ensuring the survival of the weak.   Williams‟ views might not have had much impact, 
published as they were in an obscure text with no coherent theme. However, the book in 
which Williams‟ essay appeared was reviewed in various influential journals. Though 
some reacted with alarm to the ideas expressed, Williams‟ essay was widely considered 
to be the most impressive of the collection, and corresponded well to the mood of the 
times – the sensation caused by Darwin‟s recently published theory of evolution, and the 
associated theory that, if evolution was achieved by the triumph of the strong, society 
might now be in a sufficient technological position to enable it to determine how it 
should deal with the weak. In addition, the nineteenth century was a time when Britain 
had become highly industrialized, as discussed above. In both Britain and the United 
States, physicians were slower to adopt this way of thinking than were philosophers and 
other non-medical persons. In the last decades of the nineteenth century, British doctors 
were still using drugs to achieve „euthanasia‟ in the classical sense, while, in 1885, fifteen 
years after its original appearance, the Journal of the American Medical Association was 
condemning Williams‟ article as „an attempt to make the physician don the robes of an 
executioner‟.   The difference between physicians and non-physicians might be explained 
by the philosophical tendency to regard problems in abstract terms, contrasted with the 
realisation amongst physicians that their patients were real human beings, for whom the 
 32 
physicians ought to try to do the best that they could. An important exception to this, 
however, is the case of defective infants. Since the 1870s, physicians in both Britain and 
the United States had been advocating the non-treatment or active killing of defective 
newborns, and a number of scholarly journals cited ancient and classical precedents for 
infanticide.  In the United States, however, 1915 was the year in which the infanticide of 
disabled infants really came into its own, at one point being considered more newsworthy 
than the First World War.  This was the year in which Dr. Harry Haiselden, a senior 
Chicago surgeon, made the decision not to operate upon a newborn baby boy who 
presented a large number of physical deformities, including the absence of one ear and 
the neck, deformities to the shoulders and chest, and two correctible intestinal defects, 
including a membrane blocking the lower bowel. Dr. Haiselden consulted the baby‟s 
parents, who agreed that the blockage in the lower bowel should not be removed, and the 
child died five days later.  The story caused an immense national debate. It was revealed 
that Haiselden had ended the lives of other deformed or disabled babies, and that many 
other doctors had done likewise.  Haiselden received many letters of support from parents 
of disabled children, and a feature film was made, based loosely on the case, written by 
and starring….Harry Haiselden.  The film was a huge success, and it has been estimated 
that it was being shown as late as 1942.  A huge number of other films recommending the 
„safeguarding of the race‟ through the destruction of the „unfit‟ were produced right up 
until the late 1930s. 
 1901 saw the first full-scale recommendation of „mercy-killing‟ by a British doctor, C.A. 
Goddard.  Goddard recommended that „euthanasia‟ should be carried out when requested 
by terminally ill people but, crucially, he also recommended non-voluntary „mercy-
 33 
killing‟ for those deemed „mentally handicapped‟, an idea that, stemming from concerns 
about the counter-selectivity of modern society, persisted right up until the Second World 
War.  It has also been suggested that the developing cultural climate for safeguarding 
one‟s own health contributed to this, leading to growing concern about „mentally 
handicapped‟ people who might not be able to cope with such responsibility, and would 
become a disproportionate drain on national resources.  A recurring feature of 
„euthanasia‟ and eugenics discussions in Britain before World War II is not race, as in the 
United States, but utilitarian factors concerning cost-benefit analyses of impaired people, 
from which they generally emerge rather badly. When race is mentioned, it tends to be in 
social Darwinist terms as we have seen before, as opposed to being conflated with 
immigration. Although it is highly probable that such concerns did exist, they were not 
conflated with other issues to the extent that they were in the United States.   
 Given the history of eugenicist and Social Darwinist discourse in both Britain and 
the United States, it is important to ask what the relative
55
 reactions were, in these two 
countries, to revelations of Nazi „euthanasia‟ atrocities which emerged during the war 
itself. Though these revelations were limited, it is instructive to note the effects that they 
had when they did appear. By 1941 news was reaching the States of a programme in Nazi 
Germany to kill those with „lives not worth living‟.56 That the revelations had some 
impact is clear, for the Euthanasia Society of America felt bound to make a public 
announcement differentiating between its beliefs and the newly-reported Nazi 
programme. Nevertheless, the Society‟s president, Dr. Foster Kennedy, made a clear 
distinction between „euthanasia‟ of the terminally ill, of which he did not approve, and 
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that of disabled people (in particular, „mentally disabled‟ people), of which he was 
wholeheartedly in favour: „Now my face is set against the legalization of euthanasia for 
any person who, having been well, has at last become ill … But I am in favour of 
euthanasia for those hopeless ones who should never have been born … the completely 
hopeless defective should be relieved of the burden of living‟.57 This makes it clear that, 
for some people at least, the genetic qualities of the person in question are the 
determining factor in the decision whether or not „euthanasia‟ is justifiable. This 
demonstrates concerns in the States about race „pollution‟, as discussed above. 
 The British Voluntary Euthanasia Society held its annual general meeting for 
1941 in May, seven days after news of the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme was first 
reported of the British press, but made no mention of it.
58
 Five months later, however, the 
head of the Voluntary Euthanasia Legalisation Society, C. Killick Millard, took a similar 
step to that of the Euthanasia Society of America. Millick published a pamphlet, entitled 
Merciful Release, designed to demonstrate that the Society believed only in voluntary 
euthanasia for the terminally ill. However, the Society‟s report for 1942 acknowledged 
the existence of support for the non-voluntary „euthanasia‟ of „mentally handicapped‟ 
people, who were assumed to be „poor human derelicts‟ for whom life held no possibility 
of happiness.
59
 The conflation in Britain between the idea that impairment entailed 
intolerable suffering, and the theory that other, perfectly solvable problems were an 
inevitable result of the impairment in question, will recur regularly throughout the whole 
of this thesis. This is particularly important, because the following chapters will all show 
that the „euthanasia‟ debate is so very often advanced on supposedly compassionate 
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grounds, but with a paternalistic failure to involve those on whose behalf the 
„compassion‟ is supposedly being expressed. 
In both Britain and the United States, in the period just prior to the Second World 
War, a number of public opinion polls were taken to try to gauge the public‟s attitude to 
the question of „euthanasia‟. The polls taken in the States were conducted on November 
13, 1936, and January 20, 1939. They both asked the question: „Do you favour mercy 
deaths under government supervision for hopeless invalids?‟60 In both cases, forty-six per 
cent of the respondents answered yes, with fifty-four per cent answering no.
61
 In the first 
British poll, taken on January 14, 1937, the respondents were asked to consider the 
following question: „Do you consider that doctors should be given the power to end the 
life of a person incurably ill?‟ In this instance, sixty per cent answered yes, thirty-one per 
cent answered no, and two per cent had no opinion.
62
 In the second British poll, taken in 
April of 1939, the question had changed yet again: „Should those suffering from an 
incurable disease be allowed the option, under proper medical safeguards, of a voluntary 
death?‟ Seventy-four per cent of those questioned answered in the affirmative, twenty-six 
per cent in the negative, and a further sixteen per cent had no opinion.
63
 
 Though these polls all revolve around the subject of „euthanasia‟, it is no easy 
task to evaluate them all together, as the differences between the questions are so marked. 
Both of the polls from the United States speak of „mercy deaths‟ as involving some kind 
of „government supervision‟, whereas the first British poll emphasizes doctors‟ rights and 
the second, the wishes of patients themselves. Consequently, it is not really possible to 
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use these polls to make sweeping statements about differing attitudes to „euthanasia‟ in 
Britain and the United States in the pre-war period. In addition, the polls referred to all 
suggest that „euthanasia‟ would only be a consideration in the case of a formerly healthy 
person who had become seriously, and, usually, terminally ill. Nevertheless, in relation to 
this enquiry, the question does arise of whether attitudes to „euthanasia‟ changed 
markedly (or at all) in the immediate post-war period and, crucially, the period during 
and after the Nuremberg Medical Trial. A poll conducted by the American Institute of 
Public Opinion on June 21, 1947, asked the following question: „When a person has a 
disease that cannot be cured, do you think doctors should be allowed by law to end the 
patient‟s life by some painless means if the patient and his family request it?. In this 
instance, thirty-seven per cent of respondents answered yes, whilst fifty-four per cent 
answered no. Nine per cent did not know. When the respondents were grouped by age, 
the proportion of respondents answering yes dropped from forty-six per cent amongst 
those aged from twenty-one to twenty-nine, to only thirty-three per cent amongst those 
aged fifty and over. The proportion of those answering no rose correspondingly, from 
forty-seven per cent amongst the twenty-one to twenty-nine age group, to fifty-eight per 
cent amongst those respondents aged fifty and over.
64
 Three years later, a report 
published in the medical journal The Lancet stated that „Public opinion, it is clear, has not 
yet reached that certainty which is indispensable to the success of the campaign to change 
the law‟,65 though no sources or statistics are provided for this. 
Opinion polls do not quite tell the whole story, however. Whilst they do give a 
reliable indication of the views of a cross-section of the population of a particular country 
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upon a certain issue, they do not indicate any reasons why such opinions may have been 
held. Nonetheless, it is startling to note, particularly in relation to the polls conducted in 
the United States, that pre- and post-war opinions on „euthanasia‟ did not differ nearly as 
markedly as one might expect, given the Nazi atrocities and the revelations thereof which 
had occurred in the intervening period. This strongly suggests that, though „euthanasia‟ as 
an interesting moral problem was a topic worth discussing in opinion polls, it was not 
seen as a subject upon which discussion and reform might urgently be required. 
 I hope that, by opening up discussions about the history of disability, and about the 
possibilities of living, we will be able to bring the whole debate into a more humane, less 
blinkered state. The following chapters establish that there is an alarmingly widespread 
and persistent willingness to assume that a disability leads directly to irremediable 
suffering (experienced of course in a societal vacuum), as well as that, not having been 
properly alive, a disabled person does not suffer from being murdered.   By making this 
deliberate differentiation, I am also echoing a view expressed by the medical ethicist D. 
D. Raphael in his 1988 article „Handicapped infants: Medical Ethics and the Law‟.66 
According to Raphael, „the dilemma [about whether or not to prolong life] is more acute 
in the first type of case [that of severely disabled neonates] than the second [that of 
terminal illness]. The most important reason for this is that a terminally ill patient may be 
able and ready to declare his or her choice in the matter, and that should clearly count for 
more than the opinion of relatives or, often, of doctors. … Most of the people who are 
terminally ill have had a fair span of life; the little extra that exceptional measures can 
procure is like a drop in a pool‟.67 Of course, a person who is actually terminally ill may 
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feel acutely the unfairness of his or her position, and not agree at all that he or she has 
had „a fair span of life‟. Nevertheless, I hope this thesis can make a contribution to the 
possible resolution of what is an increasingly important ethical problem.  
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Chapter One 
 
 
‘A Question Which Does Not Enter into the Issues’:  
The Nuremberg Medical Trial and the Nazi ‘Euthanasia’ Programme 
 
Introduction  
   
 The Nuremberg Medical Trial (NMT) was one of twelve trials held in Nuremberg, by the 
United States, after the end of the main Nuremberg Trial (the so-called Trial of the Major 
German War Criminals). The purpose of these twelve trials was to try specific groups of 
Nazis, such as the industrialists of IG Farben and the physicians convicted of what were 
termed „medical crimes.69 These fell into two categories: the Nazi „euthanasia‟ 
programme, and the infliction of brutal medical experimentation upon concentration 
camp inmates. Paragraph 9 (War Crimes) of the NMT Indictment makes the criminal 
nature of the „euthanasia‟ programme clear, accusing the defendants‟ of: „participation in 
the so-called euthanasia programme of the German Reich, in the course of which the 
defendants herein murdered hundreds of thousands of human beings, including nationals 
of German-occupied countries. This programme involved the systematic and secret 
execution of the aged, insane, incurably ill, of deformed children and other persons, by 
gas, lethal injections and divers other means, in nursing homes, hospitals and asylums. 
Such persons were regarded as „useless eaters‟ and a burden to the German war machine. 
The relatives of these victims were informed that they died of natural causes such as heart 
failure. German doctors involved in the „euthanasia‟ campaign were also sent to the 
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Eastern occupied countries to assist in the mass extermination of Jews‟.70  In 1946, to 
assist those participating in the prosecution of those Nazis charged with the commission 
of „medical crimes‟, a chart was produced detailing the functions of, and connections 
between, those who had facilitated and participated in the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme. 
Though undoubtedly of great value in terms of its elucidation of the participants‟ 
respective responsibilities in connection with the programme, the chart may perhaps have 
been less successful in indicating the criminal nature of the defendants‟ activities, for it 
was headed: „Mercy Killings‟. For the purposes of this enquiry, the importance of the 
Trial lies in the startling mismatch between the enormity of the crimes supposedly being 
tried, and the abject failure of the prosecution to even recognize their criminal nature. 
This failure will be fully shown in this chapter. In addition, the Trial‟s failure to consider 
enforced and systematic „euthanasia‟ to be worthy of criminal sanction if an additional 
racist motive was not present stored up problems for future debates, as the following 
chapters will show. It will also be unsurprising that the judges‟ dismissive attitudes 
towards the victims of the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme were not some temporary 
aberration, but reflected the fact that 
 „the Germans are not „different‟ from Americans in any critical sense. … How they treated 
their insane, handicapped and retarded was certainly extreme behaviour, but there is no 
reason to believe … that the attitudes of the Germans in the 1930s toward the disabled and 
chronically ill were different in any essential way from the prevailing attitudes 
elsewhere‟.71  
This chapter will demonstrate the truth of this statement. 
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   The Nuremberg Medical Trial was a US trial, its official title being United 
States of America versus Karl Brandt.
72
  Despite this, it is unwise to see the Nuremberg 
Medical Trial (NMT) as a purely US affair, in which nationals of other Allied countries 
took no part. There are a number of reasons for this. In my view, one of the most 
important of these is the concern, shared by the British and American Medical 
Associations, that knowledge of Nazi medical crimes would serve to make the public 
suspicious of legitimate medical progress.
73
 This point will take on particular importance 
later in the chapter, when we consider the formulation of the Nuremberg Code. Other 
factors which show greater Allied involvement in the preparations for the Trial include 
the fact that the twelve post-IMT trials, though run by the US, relied for their legitimacy 
on the principles of international law developed for the Trial of the Major War 
Criminals.
74
 In addition, crimes to be prosecuted were recognised by their inclusion under 
Allied Control Council Law No.10. Based upon the international London Agreement, 
Law No. 10 recognised four categories of prosecutable crime: war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, crimes against peace (the invasion and occupation of other countries), and 
membership of a group or organization (the SS – Schutzstaffel or protection echelon, 
created as Hitler‟s personal bodyguard and later given charge of extermination 
programmes) which had been declared criminal by the International Military Tribunal.
75
 
This last point will assume greater relevance later in the chapter, when it is time to 
consider how, in their discussions of „euthanasia‟, the Nuremberg Medical Trial tribunal 
took pains to link „euthanasia‟ to the waging of an aggressive war. For the moment, 
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however, the US use of Law No.10 demonstrates their concern that „their‟ trial should, in 
many ways, not deviate from the international trial which had recently ended.  
          Some indication of the importance, or lack thereof, which those who convened the 
Nuremberg Medical Trial placed upon the issue of „euthanasia‟, is given by the fact that 
Hermann Pfannmüller was only appearing as a witness. This was in spite of the fact that 
Eglfing-Haar, the institution of which Pfannmüller had been the director, had been one of 
the places in which disabled and mentally ill children and adults were killed by various 
means. These included starvation, and overdoses of Luminal, a sedative which will 
induce fatal breathing difficulties if consumed in excessive quantities.  The two principle 
defendants actually charged with implementation of, and participation in, the „euthanasia‟ 
programme were Karl Brandt, Hitler‟s personal physician; Viktor Brack, the Chief 
Administrative Officer in the Chancellery and a high-ranking officer in the SS and the 
Waffen SS. Though undoubtedly instrumental in the implementation and running of the 
programme, neither of these men were in charge of an institution or of killing its inmates. 
Leaving Pfannmüller as a mere „witness‟ was a grave, but sadly telling, error. 
           This chapter, in which the Trial transcript will be closely analysed, will provide 
evidence that the „euthanasia‟ programme was not taken at all seriously by the 
prosecution. There are four areas that will be considered. Firstly, the defendants‟ reliance 
on the portrayal of themselves as caring medical men wishing to alleviate the suffering of 
people for whom nothing more could be done. Secondly, the defendants‟ insistence that 
their victims were „incurably insane‟, and were thus incapable of either giving or 
withholding consent for „euthanasia‟ to be performed upon them. Finally, there will be a 
discussion of the interlinked problems of the Tribunal‟s focus on non-German victims, 
 43 
and their drawing-up of the Nuremberg Code. This document, set out by the trial judges 
after the verdicts had been given, laid down ten general principles relating to informed 
consent in human experimentation. Thus, it indicates that the judges regarded this to be 
an ethical problem with implications far beyond the Medical Trial. Why did they not 
have similar concerns regarding the issue of euthanasia?   
 
‘A mercy death for terribly sick persons’   
 
 
The defendants‟ efforts to portray themselves as progressive, caring men, motivated 
solely by their compassion for suffering individuals, are highly consistent. Viktor Brack 
claims that he was introduced to the problems surrounding chronic suffering and the 
possibility of „euthanasia‟ whilst still only a young adult. Brack‟s father, a physician, was 
unable to drive, and this meant that Brack junior would act as his father‟s driver when he 
made his home visits. After visits to various patients, Brack senior made various remarks 
to his son along the lines of „For him it would really be a release if he could die soon‟.76 
During his direct examination, Brack tells his counsel Dr. Froeschmann that „the relatives 
of a chronically sick person were often not able to cope spiritually with the length and 
extent of the sickness‟.77 In this way, the ground is being prepared for the consistent 
portrayal of Brack as a kindly, forward-thinking and disinterested man. Nevertheless, 
Brack claims not to have given serious thought to the question of euthanasia until 1939, 
when the Reichsleiter, Philipp Bouhler, asked him to participate in the T4 Programme.
78
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Eager to educate himself on the subject in hand, Brack visited various large mental 
institutions. The „cases‟ he saw there included  
 
„[A] child. It was a girl of three or four years of age. It was simply a torso. It had no arms, 
no legs, a big head, albino, red inflamed eyes…It was a terrible sight – simply a body with 
a head and no possibility that a human being could develop from this creature‟.79 
  
Michael Burleigh tells us that nobody in the courtroom asked Brack whether such „cases‟ 
were typical of the victims of the „euthanasia‟ programme.80 Judging from the trial 
transcript, this is quite true. This, for the purposes of this enquiry, is problematic. It 
means that, at the Nuremberg Medical Trial, what may have been allowed to happen is 
that defendants and defence witnesses may merely have demonstrated the existence of 
people who differed luridly from the norm, used this as a basis for a lengthy discussion of 
their own allegedly compassionate motives, and remained relatively unchallenged 
thereon. It is, as we shall see, undeniable that the „compassionate‟ motives of the 
defendants – and of others, such as Hermann Pfannmüller, do take up a very large part of 
the relevant sections of the trial transcript, and it is this that we shall consider next. 
 The first part of the direct examination of Viktor Brack is contained in Vol. 15 of 
the trial transcript. At one point here, Dr. Froeschmann announces that he will „leave 
aside the question of euthanasia‟, 81 and he does, before returning to it right at the 
beginning of Volume 16. Here, Brack is being questioned concerning the connections 
between the T4 Programme and the extermination of the Jews – not so much regarding 
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any ideological connection, but rather about the transfer of personnel between the two 
operations. However, Brack does make it clear that as far as he is concerned, the motives 
behind the two programmes were as different as could be: „The one was euthanasia, 
mercy death for people whose existence could not be called living any longer, and the 
other meant the murder of hundreds of thousands of Jews‟.82  
 Unfortunately for the purposes of this study, Brack‟s counsel does not challenge 
him on this alleged distinction, although this is perhaps something which is more likely to 
occur under cross-examination. It does seem, however, that this is consistent with the 
problem that we have identified already – namely, the simplistic assumption that the 
victims of the „euthanasia‟ programme were suffering intolerably, and a consequent 
reluctance, by the Tribunal and the prosecution, to mount particularly strong challenges 
to the claims of people such as Brack that their motives for involvement in T4 were 
altruistic.  
 A short time later, Brack is yet again telling the court about the purity and 
disinterestedness of his motives. The subject under discussion in this case is the question 
of whether or not the term „euthanasia‟ was merely a smokescreen to enable the Nazis to 
rid themselves of all political and ideological opponents, as well as racial „undesirables‟. 
Brack denies this, stating:  
 
„This assumption … is definitely mistaken …When euthanasia was introduced, we 
welcomed it, because it was based on the ethical principle of sympathy, and had humane 
considerations in its favour, of the same sort that opponents of euthanasia claim for their 
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own ideas. I admit there were imperfections in its execution, but that does not change the 
decency of the original idea, as Bouhler, Brandt and myself saw it‟.83 
 
Again, no attempt is made here to challenge the distinction that Brack has made between, 
on the one hand, the killing of innocent people in general, and on the other, the killing of 
people who were disabled or mentally ill. 
 Reading this, one might legitimately begin to wonder about the question of 
consent. This will be discussed in greater detail later, in relation to the defendants‟ claim 
that many of the victims were „incurably insane‟. However, towards the end of his direct 
examination, Brack‟s counsel suggests to him that the „will to live‟ of an insane person is 
broken by the doctor‟s actions in committing „euthanasia‟. Unsurprisingly, Brack denies 
this, stating: 
 
„When one saw these sick persons one could readily see that there was no will to live in 
them, but one had to remember that at one time these people had been healthy and had a 
will of their own and this, their former will, had to be the basis for the decision…No 
healthy person, when he sees these wretched creatures, would wish to become such a 
person himself, and what we want for ourselves I believe we can assume is a wish also on 
the part of the sick person…‟.84 
  
Here, we can see that Brack is arguing to the effect that “There was no point my asking 
these people whether or not they wished to die. I, in my infinite wisdom, could see 
perfectly well that they did wish it, and so felt under no obligation to trouble them with 
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the question”. As we saw, it was suggested to Brack that a doctor who commits 
„euthanasia‟ may be breaking a patient‟s will to live, but there is very little in the way of 
in-depth discussion of the problem. 
 After Brack‟s cross-examination finally begins, on page 7684, Dr. Hochwald, for 
the prosecution, asks Brack whether he does not believe it to be possible that some insane 
people are not, in fact, suffering. This follows on from Brack‟s implied assertion that 
insanity and torment are, of necessity, synonymous.
85
 Surprisingly, Brack, having waxed 
so very lyrical in his descriptions of the torments of insanity, replies tersely: „Well, I 
really cannot judge that. Please ask a physician‟.86 One does not have to:  
 
„The wildest scenes imaginable are reported to have taken place then, as some of those 
people … did not board the bus voluntarily and were therefore forced to do so by the 
accompanying personnel‟.87  
 
This quotation is a report – possibly from the town of Absberg - of a group of patients 
from an institution boarding a bus which would take them to one of the extermination 
centres. In relation to this report, Dr. Hochwald asks Brack if he does not agree that this 
would appear to indicate that the potential victims (or beneficiaries, if you are Viktor 
Brack) of T4 did not want to die, and that they could and did resist when they knew what 
was going to befall them. Brack retorts that the report is either an „exaggeration‟, or an 
example of patients who „had been locked into those so-called strong-houses and who 
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constituted severe danger for entire humanity‟.88 Dr. Hochwald then proceed to ask a 
number of nuts-and-bolts questions regarding such matters as the selection of the doctors 
to carry out the killings, and the question of who had the last judgement on whether 
„mercy death‟ should be administered. 
 Dr. Froeschmann‟s final submission on behalf of his client, following his direct 
and cross-examinations was as follows:  
 
„I have tried to establish that the defendant Brack …was not involved in the murder of 50-
60,000 insane persons, but that it could only have been- and was – euthanasia‟.89 
  
As his direct examination gets underway, Pfannmüller is asked by Dr. Froeschmann to 
explain to the court what exactly is meant by the term „children with serious hereditary 
and congenital diseases‟.90 He replies:  
 
„This means children who are completely incapable of taking a place in human 
society…who are so ill that any social care of the child outside of a specialist in an 
institution is quite impossible. That these children have a lifespan which is limited, and 
may I add something else, this includes serious physical deformities, for example the lack 
of members … I had a child with an open heart, and a deformity of the bones so that the 
brain is exposed, and spinal deformities with paralysis as a result; of congenital blindness 
and deafness and dumbness‟.91  
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 Having elucidated this term, Pfannmüller answers questions concerning the public 
tours of Eglfing-Haar that he conducted in his capacity as director of the institution. In 
Pfannmüller‟s own words, the purpose of these tours was to educate and  
 
„inform the public about the necessity of preventing various diseases … and the 
misfortune which falls upon humanity when such children are born … I showed 
conditions and I told the people how important it is to pass a law like the hereditary 
health law to carry it out thoroughly and openly…I only pointed out the horror of 
this condition and the necessity of relieving those poor creatures and their relatives 
of pain and the child of suffering‟.92 
  
One can see here that, in many ways, Pfannmüller is portraying himself in a very similar 
way to Brack. While both men refer to the victims of T4 as „creatures‟, they both do so in 
terms of expressing pity and sorrow for the supposed physical and mental state of 
institutionalised people. In addition, both Brack and Pfannmüller give lurid examples of 
very severely disabled people, and then jump straight into a discussion of their own, 
supposedly altruistic motives. At this point with Pfannmüller, there is, again, no 
discussion of the actual victims of the T4 programme – no-one enquires of Pfannmüller 
how typical these seriously disabled children were, whether they really were experiencing 
intolerable suffering which could not be alleviated except by killing them, or indeed 
whether they had any distinguishing features other than their impairments. Very much of 
the remainder of Pfannmüller‟s direct examination is taken up with the kind of nuts-and- 
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bolts questioning that we saw with Brack – about the organisation of the killing, for 
example, and about the questions which had to be filled out about patients in institutions. 
  During the cross-examination of Hermann Pfannmüller, the prosecutor, Mr 
Hardy asks Pfannmüller a great many questions concerning the meetings he had with 
Philipp Bouhler, and with other people, concerning the beginnings of, and motivation for, 
the T4 programme. Mr. Hardy then questions Pfannmüller concerning a statement he 
made during an interrogation on 21
st
 September 1946, claiming that the aim of the 
programme was to create beds for wounded soldiers. Pfannmüller has no recollection of 
having said this.
93
  
 Extensive questioning ensues regarding the aforementioned questionnaires, the 
meetings that were held to facilitate the inception of the T4 programme, and the question 
of how Pfannmüller became an „expert‟ with the right to give medical opinions on the 
people to be killed (he had been asked to do so by the Ministry of the Interior).
94
 Towards 
the end of his cross-examination, Mr. Hardy finally turns his attention to the killing of 
children which took place at Eglfing-Haar, during Pfannmüller‟s directorship. In 
particular, Mr. Hardy‟s questions relate to the killing of children by means of overdoses 
of the sedative Luminal. On page 7391 of the transcript, Pfannmüller is asked by Mr. 
Hardy how he would „be able to afford these sick children a mercy death without too 
much suffering‟, to which Pfannmüller replies that this would be done by administering 
Luminal. Asked how much Luminal would actually be required to give „one of these 
terribly sick persons a mercy death‟, Pfannmüller replies that the dosage would vary, but 
that „after a few days the child just quietly goes to sleep, the child simply dies of a certain 
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congestion in the lungs … if there is anything such as putting a person to sleep gently 
then this is certainly it, to accord a mercy death‟.95 It should be emphasized here that the 
person referring to Pfannmüller‟s „giving one of these terribly sick persons a mercy 
death‟ is Mr. Hardy, the prosecutor. Michael Burleigh has remarked that Mr. Hardy‟s use 
of irony and understatement was presumably lost on Hermann Pfannmüller. I must say 
that, if Mr. Hardy was being ironic in the passage quoted above, his efforts were lost on 
me as well. He seems merely to have failed rather badly to mount any kind of effective 
challenge to Pfannmüller‟s repeated assertions that his actions were merciful. 
 As Pfannmüller was a witness and not a defendant - a fact that speaks for itself - 
his case is not „summed-up‟ in the same way that Viktor Brack‟s was by Dr. 
Froeschmann. Nevertheless, before Pfannmüller leaves the witness box, Dr. Froeschmann 
conducts a short redirect examination, which he concludes with the following eloquent 
passage: 
 
You were specifically instructed to refuse to answer questions that might incriminate you. 
You have made no use of that right … as to how many of these children there were whose 
lives you shortened by the use of Luminal, and … answered in a most credible way that 
you gave a mercy death to 100 or 120 of these wretched creatures.
96
     
 
At least for the time being, Hermann Pfannmüller did not have to worry that his 
pronouncements would incriminate him. Despite having admitted, at the Nuremberg 
Medical Trial, that he had killed a large number of people, Pfannmüller was convicted 
only in 1951, by a West German court. Viktor Brack was hanged, although one may infer 
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from the Trial judgement that his role in T4 may not have had a great deal to do with this. 
The historian Michael Marrus has described the following statement as „forthright, if 
chilling‟:97 
 
Whether or not a state may validly enact legislation which imposes [my italics] euthanasia 
upon certain classes of its citizens is a question which does not enter into the issues. 
Assuming that it may do so, the Family of Nations is not obligated to give recognition to 
such legislation when it manifestly gives legality to plain murder and torture of defenceless 
and powerless human beings of other nations.
98
 
 
 This reference to „beings of other nations‟ will be discussed in greater detail 
presently. For now, it is to be hoped that the present writer has successfully demonstrated 
that the Nuremberg Medical Trial defendants charged in connection with T4 were 
steadfast in their insistence that they had acted out of compassion. It is also to be hoped 
that the prosecution‟s effectual failure to challenge these arguments has been 
demonstrated, showing that in terms of offering an in-depth analysis of what may or may 
not be considered „intolerable suffering‟, the Nuremberg Medical Trial was sadly lacking.    
 
 
 
‘The patient cannot decide about himself’ 
 
 
This section will demonstrate that the definition of „incurable insanity‟ for the victims of 
the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme was of great importance, as it allowed the defendants 
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ample opportunity to demonstrate their „altruism‟, as discussed above. However, the 
definition also permitted the NMT defendants to at least attempt to bypass the problem of 
the non-consensual nature of the „euthanasia‟ killings, by arguing that the victims did not 
know what they wanted or what was best for them, rendering it necessary that decisions 
about their future should be made for them. One might argue that the claim  that patients 
who were killed were all insane does sit rather awkwardly alongside such things as Nazi 
propaganda against the „hereditarily ill‟, the text of the Law for the Prevention of 
Hereditarily Diseased Offspring, and the children‟s „euthanasia‟ programme, none of 
which confined themselves solely to discussions of people with mental disorders.
99
 In 
addition, the children mentioned by Hermann Pfannmüller clearly had physical 
impairments, as discussed above (page 30). 
 As might be expected from what has been seen so far, the NMT defendants 
preface their discussions of „incurable mental patients‟ with extreme descriptions of 
institutionalised people whom they had allegedly encountered, either in a professional 
capacity or whilst „educating themselves‟ about the „problem‟ of chronically ill people. 
This is a subject upon which Viktor Brack waxes particularly lyrical. Asked by his 
counsel, Dr. Froeschmann, to explain the development of his own ideas on the subject, 
Brack responds as follows:  
 
„Immediately after the Reichsleiter [Philipp Bouhler] told me he had received this order I 
visited some of the big mental institutions in Berlin and in the neighbourhood of Berlin to 
find out what these people looked like who were to be relieved from suffering…In the 
institution Buch I saw a woman who…bared her teeth at people when they came near and 
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was absolutely incapable of any contact. She took her food like an animal. She did indecent 
things with her excrement‟.100  
 
When asked by Dr. Froeschmann to give his reaction to the charge that his participation 
in „euthanasia‟ amounted to a crime against humanity, Brack responds that: „in my 
actions and my attitude the definitive consideration was pity for the sick person‟.101  
Similarly, Karl Brandt, Hitler‟s personal physician, uses the picture he has already 
painted of the lives of hypothetical psychiatric patients to underline what he claims were 
his own compassionate motives. Asked by the prosecuting counsel, Mr. McHaney, 
whether it is true that an insane person may not, in fact, be suffering pain, Brandt replies: 
„We weren‟t concerned with pain in the case of these insane patients. We were concerned 
with their condition, their entire condition, their mental condition‟.102 
 It is worth mentioning that it is at this point that Mr. McHaney questions Brandt 
about his insistence that it was „only‟ people who were incurably insane who were 
murdered under the adult „euthanasia‟ programme, and that “other persons were always 
exceptions”.103. Mr. McHaney notes Brandt‟s repeated insistence on this point, which is, 
he says, in stark contrast to the Hitler decree, which makes reference only to „incurable 
persons‟. He then asks Brandt: „The programme was not limited to insane persons, was 
it?”.104 Brandt replies that  
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“Individual cases of individual patients who were not insane did occur, and did actually 
come to my knowledge. It did not come to my notice on the other hand that they were 
subjected to euthanasia‟.105 
  
Pressed on the subject, and asked by Mr. McHaney if he is ready to swear that „only‟ 
insane persons were included, Brandt replies that this is „exactly what he wishes to 
express‟.106  
 Thus far, Brandt and Brack‟s reliance on the description of their victims as 
„mental patients‟ has been established, as has the prosecution‟s degree of scepticism 
about the term. Nevertheless, we have not really discovered why the claim was so 
important to the defence. After all, if Brandt and Brack wished to demonstrate their 
alleged altruism,  could they not have done so just as effectively by giving lurid 
descriptions of, say, physically disabled people? Does not their emphasis upon the 
mentally ill mean merely that most of the adult victims of T4 were mentally ill? 
 Perhaps the answers to these questions can be provided most adequately by 
further investigation into the reasons for Brandt and Brack‟s emphasis on the T4 victims‟ 
alleged insanity. Following on from the „descriptions‟ given by Brandt and Brack of the 
conditions of the insane people they had allegedly encountered, come claims from both 
defendants that people who were insane had no will to live. Closely connected with these 
are allegations that this was easy to see, and that there was, consequently, no need to 
question the potential victims about their own feelings on the subject, or about any 
objections they might have had concerning the possibility of being killed without their 
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consent. Finally, this leads on to perhaps the most egregious use, by Brandt and Brack, of 
the term „mental patient‟ - the two defendants will argue both that the victims‟ alleged 
mental conditions meant that they had no understanding of concepts of life and death, and 
that they did not suffer any terror prior to being gassed, as they were simply too insane to 
understand what was happening to them. First, however, we must look at Brandt and 
Brack‟s discussion of the T4 victims „loss‟ of the will to live on the basis of their 
„insanity‟. 
 A good example of this comes during Viktor Brack‟s direct examination. Dr. 
Froeschmann asks why the decree mentions „incurably ill‟ but not, specifically, 
„incurably insane‟ people. Brack replies: 
 
„I never received any instruction about incurably sick persons being included in euthanasia, 
only incurably insane. Only cases where the mental condition had led to a complete 
destruction of personality and the life expectation – physical life of the insane is not of any 
importance in that connection‟.107 
  
Similar comments are made by Karl Brandt. Being questioned by his counsel, Dr. 
Servatius, about the „euthanasia question‟ and how Hitler viewed it. Brandt says that „He 
[Hitler] gave me general directives of how he imagined it, and the fundamental, insane 
persons, who were in such a condition that they could no longer take any conscious part 
in life‟.108 
 Following almost naturally on from this is the opinion, voiced by both Brandt and 
Brack, that the condition of the „insane‟ people in question was so self-evidently hopeless 
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that it was quite justifiable for someone else to take the initiative and „put them out of 
their misery‟. Brandt gives a good example of this when he says, in reply to a question 
from Dr. Servatius:  
 
„If anybody wants to judge the question of euthanasia he must go into an insane asylum 
and he should stay there with the sick people for a few days. Then we can ask him two 
questions: the first would be whether he himself would like to live like that, and the 
second, whether he would ask one of his relatives to live that way – perhaps his child or his 
parents. The answer cannot be connected with the concept of demonic order but it will be 
deeply felt gratitude for his own health and the question of whether it is more humane to 
help such a being find a peaceful end or to care for it further‟.109  
  
Brack makes a number of similar remarks. For example, he is asked by his counsel, Dr. 
Froeschmann, whether an insane person might not still have some will to live, and 
whether the physician does not break this by undertaking euthanasia?  Brack replies: 
  
„…what we want for ourselves, I believe we can assume is a wish on the part of the sick 
person were he as he was formerly, healthy, so that he could form a healthy judgement. If 
the sick person was in a position to recognise the situation in which he finds himself, he 
himself would beg to have that condition shortened … I decided that these people should 
be released from their tormented condition‟.110  
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One can see here that Brack‟s aims are twofold. Firstly, he is attempting to demonstrate 
that the sight of the „pitiful creatures‟ he allegedly encountered in mental hospitals 
convinced him that killing them was the correct thing to do. Secondly, he is claiming that 
if the patients were to see themselves as they had become, they would also beg for 
euthanasia to be carried out upon them. This leads us on to the final and, perhaps, most 
important use by Brack and Brandt of their victims‟ alleged insanity. 
 I demonstrated above how Viktor Brack argued that, if a mental patient could see 
himself as he had become, he would beg to be „put out of his misery‟. Under cross-
examination (carried out by Mr. McHaney), Karl Brandt goes even further, and argues 
that this decision must be taken by somebody knowledgeable and competent – somebody 
rather like Karl Brandt, in fact. Asked by Mr. McHaney whether he believes that all the 
patients who were killed wanted to die, Brandt is not lost for words:  
 
„That is a question which I cannot answer in this form. I am of the conviction that the 
patients did not have a clear concept of their actual condition because they were insane and 
among them were certainly cases which, in excess of that, certainly were suffering. It is 
quite possible that a human being, who might be described by the simple word „crazy‟ 
might under such circumstances not even realise the difference between life and death. In 
this form you cannot even include such people as to the question if they want to die or if 
they do not want to die‟.111 
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 This is a theme that Brandt also pursues in his direct examination by Dr. Servatius. 
Asked about the approval of the insane (regarding their imminent destruction), Brandt 
states:  
 
„The question of the approval of the insane was disregarded. The point of view was that the 
insane person himself is in no condition to judge his situation…For this reason, since the 
patient lacked understanding of his own situation, there could be no question of approval. 
If one were to say that the patient gave his approval, that means exactly if one says he did 
not approve…the patient cannot decide about himself…for one can judge only on the basis 
of the diagnosis, and considering the condition and the prognosis, only the doctor can reach 
the decision. It cannot be left to the patient himself”.112 
  
This demonstrates eloquently the great importance to the defendants of the claim that 
their adult victims were insane, and thus, supposedly, incapable of understanding 
anything about their condition or what was in their „best interests‟. 
 Perhaps the final words should be left to Viktor Brack. Asked by Dr. 
Froeschmann to describe the reactions of „insane‟ people being led to the gas chambers, 
Brack says: „I don‟t believe they had any idea where they were going at all‟.113 Dr. 
Froeschmann, requiring further elucidation as to why this was so, asks: „Do you mean 
because they were insane or incapable of having an idea or simply if they had some 
degree of intelligence they did not know what was going to happen?‟ Brack: „I meant the 
former‟.114 Brack‟s aim in this instance could hardly be much more explicit – by 
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highlighting the alleged insanity of the victims, he essentially sought to absolve the 
perpetrators from any possibility of blame, not by claiming innocence, but by alleging 
that the condition of the victims was such that they could neither make decisions about 
their own lives, nor understand that those lives were about to be ended. 
 The aim of this section was to demonstrate that the claim that the victims of T4 
were „incurably insane‟ was of great importance to the defence, and most especially to 
Brandt and Brack. Given the importance placed on it, versus its incongruity with other 
aspects of the Nazis‟ opinions on the „hereditarily ill, there is room for at least some 
doubt that all the adult victims of T4 were insane. This question will be considered in 
greater depth in the chapter dealing with historians. 
 
 
 
‘The dereliction of the defendant contributed to their extermination’  
 
  
The final problem which this chapter will consider is that of why, when they formulated 
the Nuremberg Code to govern future medical experiments upon human beings, the 
Nuremberg Medical Trial judges manifestly refused to countenance the possibility that 
„euthanasia‟ was a similarly difficult ethical problem, requiring the formation of similar 
general guidelines. Intimately connected with this is the attention which the Tribunal paid 
to non-German victims. This section will argue that, in this regard, the Nuremberg 
Medical Trial was utterly inconsistent in its pronouncements. As we saw above, the 
judges declared that they would not consider the question of whether a state might 
legitimately impose „euthanasia‟ upon certain classes of its own citizens. This would 
 61 
become a matter of international concern only if a state began to attempt to impose 
„euthanasia‟ upon nationals of other sovereign states. 
 This approach – the claim that the Tribunal were not entitled (or did not want to) 
– consider crimes committed by the Nazis against their own citizens, should never have 
arisen. It had already been solved by the inclusion of „crimes against humanity‟ in the 
IMT indictment.
115
 This inclusion was the result of lobbying by Jewish and other anti-
Nazi émigrés who were concerned that their suffering might come to be overlooked.
116
 
Though the US Chief Prosecutor Robert Jackson insisted that all crimes must be linked to 
the waging of an aggressive war, the text of the definition of „crimes against humanity‟ 
was not qualified.
117
 Even if it had been, linking „euthanasia‟ with this would have been 
easy – if the Tribunal had wanted to do it. 
 The NMT Tribunal were, not surprisingly, extremely concerned that a person 
participating in a medical experiment should not only consent to it, but should have been 
thoroughly informed about all aspects of the experiment to allow his or her choice to be a 
fully enlightened one. Furthermore, the Tribunal stipulated that a subject of such an 
experiment must be free from coercion, and that the experiment should be such as to 
yield fruitful results for the good of society [which are] inprocurable by other means or 
methods of study”.118  
 One can see from this that the Tribunal is greatly concerned with promoting the 
principle of „informed consent‟, and this aim becomes even more apparent when we see 
that this is, in fact, the very first of the ten principles comprising the Nuremberg Code. Of 
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course, the Tribunal‟s reasons for accentuating this requirement were more than apparent. 
In the Tribunal‟s own words, „In every single instance appearing in the record, subjects 
were used who did not consent to the experiments‟.119 
 I showed above that, during the course of the Medical Trial, the issue of the 
consent of people subjected to „euthanasia‟ was occasionally touched upon. Though the 
defendants persistently argued that the victims were incapable of consenting to anything, 
but would have consented had they been able to do so, the prosecution did attempt to 
highlight the victims‟ lack of consent, albeit on only one or two occasions. Consequently, 
as regards those sections of the judgement relating to „euthanasia‟, we shall now see the 
degree of importance which the Tribunal attaches to the question of consent under these 
circumstances. The Judgement mentions „euthanasia‟ particularly as regards Karl Brandt 
and Viktor Brack. The question of consent in relation to euthanasia, however, is 
discussed in two passages, all of which are contained within the judgement relating to 
Karl Brandt. Firstly, the Tribunal states that „the consent of the relatives [my italics] of 
the „incurables‟ was not even obtained; the question of secrecy being so important‟.120 
The fact that the word „incurables‟ appears in inverted commas does suggest that the 
Tribunal was not entirely convinced by the defendants‟ assertions regarding the pitiful 
state, complete incapacity, and bleak prognosis of the victims. Nevertheless, why was no 
mention made of the victims‟ own lack of consent? It had not been established that they 
were incapable of giving (or of refusing) consent, merely that their consent was not 
sought.  
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 The second example appears a little further on, when the Tribunal is considering 
the inclusion in the programme of non-German nationals. The Tribunal states that „The 
evidence is conclusive that…non-German nationals were selected for euthanasia and 
exterminated. Needless to say, these persons did not voluntarily consent to become the 
subjects of this procedure‟.121 [My italics]. One can see here that a remarkable 
transformation has occurred. When the Tribunal were speaking in more general terms of 
the (overwhelmingly German) victims of the T4 Programme, it was noted that the 
consent of their relations had not been sought. By contrast, when making reference to the 
non-German victims, the Tribunal is careful to note that the victims own consent was not 
sought. In addition, it was shown that Karl Brandt and Viktor Brack were adamant that 
„only‟ adults who were incurably insane (whatever this means), were subjected to 
„euthanasia‟. We also saw that Brandt claimed that their alleged insanity was the reason 
why their consent was not sought.
122
 While it is unwise to regard Brandt‟s 
pronouncements as constituting the unvarnished truth, one may infer from them that 
consent was not sought from anybody subjected to „euthanasia‟. 
 As well as the question of the importance of consent, the Tribunal‟s previous 
remark concerning the consent of non-German nationals also points to another problem. 
Namely, throughout the judgement, the Tribunal repeatedly stresses the suffering of non-
German nationals, even though the victims of the T4 programme, for example, were 
overwhelmingly German. This emphasis upon non-German victims weakens the impact 
of the Nuremberg Code, and, of course, how this emphasis affects the Tribunal‟s view of 
„euthanasia‟. Above, a quotation was given from Michael Marrus‟ article on the 
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Nuremberg Medical Trial, and he has also identified this emphasis on non-German 
victims, regarding it as one of the Trial‟s major failings.123 He has argued that, due partly 
to a desire on the part of the Allies to punish crimes which could be connected with the 
waging of an aggressive war,
124
 the focus was deliberately shifted away from crimes 
committed against German civilians. This meant that “the Trial suffered grievously as a 
chronicle of the medical crimes of the Third Reich”.125 
 In terms of „euthanasia‟, Marrus is largely correct in his assertions. When giving 
judgement upon Karl Brandt, the NMT judges make one particularly telling comment, 
aside from those already given concerning non-German victims of „euthanasia‟. When 
criticising Brandt for his desertion of the T4 programme after its inception, the judges 
remark:  
 
“The evidence is conclusive that persons were included in the programme who were not 
German nationals. The dereliction of the defendant contributed to their extermination. That 
is enough to require this Tribunal to find that he is criminally responsible in the programme 
…whatever may have been the original aim of the program, its purposes were prostituted 
by men for whom Brandt was responsible, and great numbers of non-German nationals 
were exterminated under its authority”.126 
  
One can see in this bizarre accusation a clear concentration by the Tribunal on the 
sufferings of non-Germans. This supports earlier comments made by the Tribunal, which 
demonstrate a deep reluctance to consider the potential moral and ethical implications of 
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the T4 programme fully, except when the programme resulted in the killing of non-
Germans. 
 It is now time to look again at the Nuremberg Code, and see if its principles seem 
similarly circumscribed by a desire on the part of the Tribunal to protect foreign 
nationals, but not a state‟s own citizens. Upon reading the ten principles forming the 
Nuremberg Code, it is obvious that they are intended to be of general applicability, and 
not for the sole benefit of foreign nationals undergoing medical experiments. The 
Tribunal does state very frequently that many of the victims of medical experiments in 
concentration camps were non- German nationals.
127
 Nevertheless, it is also very anxious 
to condemn the extreme cruelty of the experiments, and their totally non-consensual 
nature. In addition, the Code‟s concern to promote „informed consent‟ for those taking 
part in medical experiments makes it appear that its primary purpose was, as was 
claimed, the advancement of the doctrine of informed consent. 
 In relation to this, one final question needs to be answered. Namely, to what 
extent was the Nuremberg Code drawn from already existing laws and principles? Might 
the extensive, but wholly inadequate discussion of „euthanasia‟ at the Nuremberg 
Medical Trial be explained by saying that the Tribunal, whilst being willing to base new 
principles upon existing practises, was reluctant to lay down completely new guidelines? 
Although few concrete sources are given, the NMT judgement does state that, if 
conducted properly, certain medical experiments will “conform to ethics of the medical 
profession generally, when carried out on human beings. 
128
 Those performed in 
concentration camps, by contrast, were performed in „complete disregard of international 
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conventions, the laws and customs of war, the general principles of criminal law…and 
Control Council Law No. 10‟.129 
 But what of „euthanasia‟? The subject of existing laws is mentioned once in this 
regard, concerning Hitler‟s decree of September 1939. This authorised Brandt and 
Bouhler to “grant a mercy death to incurably ill persons”, and is generally regarded as 
being the „authorisation‟ for the T4 programme. In relation to this decree, the Tribunal 
states: „The foregoing order was not based on any previously existing German law, and 
the only authority for the execution of euthanasia was the secret order issued by 
Hitler‟.130  This would suggest that currently existing legislation was of great importance 
to the Tribunal. The problem, for the purposes of this enquiry, is twofold. Firstly, the 
discrepancy between „being granted a mercy death‟, and being subjected to a non-
consensual killing programme for which one‟s consent was neither sought nor desired. 
Secondly, there is the whole problem of consent itself. Even if the decree had been based 
on existing German law, that does not alter the fact that the patient‟s consent to the 
„mercy death‟ is not actually mentioned in the decree.131 In addition, the creation of new 
safeguards in response to recent crimes does not, in this regard, appear to be of any 
concern to the Tribunal. This means that, despite the creation of much new post-war 
human rights legislation, there was no desire to offer guidance of any kind on what, if 
anything, constitutes real euthanasia, or, equally importantly, to protect vulnerable people 
from lethal decisions made on their behalf, but without their consent. 
 In relation to its formation of the Nuremberg Code, the Tribunal states that its 
concerns are purely legal, and the requirements it has laid down are those which will be 
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of service in determining criminal culpability.
132
 To go beyond this would, the judgement 
states, be beyond the judges sphere of competence.
133
 The Tribunal exhibited, it seems, 
both a general unwillingness to consider crimes committed against German civilians and 
a strong feeling that, while it was acceptable to draw general principles from existing 
legislation, inventing new laws on the basis of what had gone wrong was a step too far. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
If the Nuremberg Medical Trial judges had been a little bolder, it is more than possible 
that less controversy over euthanasia might exist today. This may be too dramatic a 
statement, as there are (one would hope), many differences between the Nazi „euthanasia‟ 
programme, and euthanasia debates and legislation which exist today. Nevertheless, 
future chapters will demonstrate that, for good or ill, the Nazi experience casts a very 
long shadow. As this chapter has demonstrated, many of the arguments employed by the 
perpetrators would not be out of place in any defence of euthanasia, no matter how well-
meaning. Of course, the NMT defendants may have used such arguments disingenuously, 
but in view of their relevance to other debates about euthanasia, it is unwise to proceed 
without taking the Nuremberg Medical Trial into account. The following chapters will 
show that this is just what many scholars have failed to do. They will also show the ways 
in which scholars have attempted to solve these problems. Among the issues to be 
discussed will be that of „race‟. As mentioned above, there is not complete agreement 
amongst historians concerning the extent to which the „euthanasia‟ programme was 
utilitarian, versus its connection with „racial biology‟. The following chapters will 
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consider both what implications this has for study of the „euthanasia‟ programme itself, 
and the effect that this problem has had on later debates. First, however, we need to 
discover how the Nuremberg Medical Trial was portrayed in the British and U.S. media, 
and also how it was viewed by professionals in various relevant academic fields, such as 
medicine and law. This is very important, as this chapter has shown that the Nazi 
„euthanasia‟ programme was not taken seriously by anyone at the Nuremberg Medical 
Trial. The defendants‟ claims to have been motivated by „compassion‟ met with little or 
no resistance and the Tribunal actually announced that the prospect of a state imposing 
„euthanasia‟ upon classes of its citizens (as had already happened in Germany) did not 
concern them. We need to discover if this attitude was unusual, or if it was widespread in 
Britain and the United States. Was the Tribunal‟s chilling indifference to the victims of 
the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme condemned, or even commented upon, by anyone 
outside the Tribunal? If not, can we gain any insights as to why this was so? The next 
chapter will show that no such comments were made. In both countries, the press, as well 
as journals in the fields of law and medicine persistently described the Trial as one solely 
concerned with the prosecution of Nazis who had subjected concentration camp inmates 
to brutal medical experiments. In one sense, this leaves us none the wiser as to how the 
wider societies in the United States and Britain regarded the Nazi „euthanasia‟ 
programme. However, I will argue that the silence speaks for itself. Given the dismissive 
attitude to victims of systematic murder which has been catalogued in this chapter, this 
should not be entirely surprising. 
This chapter has demonstrated the toxic mixture of expediency, indifference and 
paternalism with which both prosecution and defence at the Nuremberg Medical Trial 
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treated the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme and its victims. Four different but intimately 
connected matters were discussed. The chapter opened with evidence to show that Viktor 
Brack, Karl Brandt, and the defendant Hermann Pfannmüller were consistent in their 
portrayals of themselves as caring medical men whose sole motivation was the 
amelioration of suffering. At the same time, I also showed that this portrayal was 
inadequately challenged by the prosecution. The chapter then moved on to consider 
Brandt and Brack‟s insistence that the victims of the „euthanasia‟ programme were 
incurably insane, a claim which they relied upon to allow them to sidestep the issue of 
consent – an issue which could hardly be said to have been rigorously pursued by the 
prosecution anyway. The third section of the chapter dealt with the Nuremberg Code and 
the fact that the Tribunal did not consider the possibility of implementing any similar 
guidelines with regard to „euthanasia‟. The final section of the chapter considered the 
prosecution‟s focus on non-German victims of „euthanasia‟. While this was clearly 
explicable in terms of the aims and basis of the Trial, it does mean that the Trial failed to 
shed a great deal of light on the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme. What the Trial did, as 
anybody who cares to read the transcript can clearly see, is to show with dismaying 
clarity the pre-existing ideas of the Court with regard to „euthanasia‟. Above all, it reveals 
the paternalistic assumption that the problem could be solved without any attempt to 
solicit the views of those who would be subjected to „euthanasia‟, and certainly without 
recognising them as full human beings, individuals or indeed as any thing very much. 
This chapter has shown that in this particular instance, the victims of „euthanasia‟ were 
dismissed because they were German, and dismissed because of their impairments. As 
further chapters will show, this egregious paternalism has continued in different forms, 
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into discussions of „euthanasia‟ in many fields. The next chapter, however, will consider 
how, in both the United States and the United Kingdom, public discussion of the case 
focused overwhelmingly on the medical experiments carried out by the defendants, and 
the „euthanasia‟ programme was virtually ignored. Although one might argue that such 
an absence of discussion leaves us none the wiser with regard to the prevailing societal 
attitudes of the time, it is in fact extremely telling, particularly when considered in 
conjunction with individual „euthanasia‟ cases of the time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 71 
Chapter Two 
 
‘German Doctors Accused of Atrocities’: How the Outside World Saw the 
Nuremberg Medical Trial 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
This chapter will consider the reception of the Nuremberg Medical Trial in both the 
United States and Britain. This consideration will begin with the reception of the Trial in 
US and British legal journals, during and shortly after it had taken place. This section will 
show that there was very little discussion in either country of the Nuremberg Medical 
Trial itself – in contrast to the earlier Trial of the Major German War Criminals. Such 
discussions as did take place portrayed the NMT as having been convened for the 
exclusive purpose of prosecuting Nazis accused of medical experimentation upon inmates 
of concentration camps. These journals do debate non-Nazi „euthanasia‟, particularly 
with regard to legal cases which occur, but it is striking that the revelations concerning 
the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme do not impinge in the slightest upon these debates. This 
shows that the chilling indifference to the „euthanasia‟ revealed in the last chapter cannot 
be merely explained away by making reference to, for example, the NMT tribunal‟s lack 
of sympathy for German victims of Nazi atrocities, or their need to link the crimes they 
tried to the waging of an aggressive war. On the contrary; this section will show that this 
dismissive attitude pervaded both societies. This theme will be pursued in the second 
section of the chapter, which will provide an overview of the reactions to the NMT which 
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are to be found in medical journals of the time from both the United States and Britain. 
These journals also portray the Nuremberg Medical Trial as a trial in which the sole 
crime of the defendants was that of human vivisection. Probably as a result of this, there 
is much discussion of the ethics of using data obtained in such experiments. This 
discussion is particularly prevalent in the Lancet, and it is quite clear that, though medical 
professionals of both countries identify that the medical crimes of the Nazis give rise to 
ethical problems which need to be considered by the worldwide medical community, 
„euthanasia‟ is emphatically not one of these problems. The final section of the chapter 
will demonstrate how the Trial was reported in newspapers and news magazines.
134
 I will 
show that, although some reports of Nazi „euthanasia‟ are to be found, the Trial was 
reported overwhelmingly as being solely concerned with the prosecution of perpetrators 
of medical experiments upon human beings in concentration camps. Brief reference will 
also be made to a number of pre- and post-war opinion polls from both countries, the 
existence of which indicates that there was interest in „euthanasia‟ as a hypothetical 
moral problem.  The message of the chapter as a whole is, however, that, influenced in 
part by the portrayal of the Trial in the popular press, the post-war period is notable for its 
failure to consider the relationship between Nazi „euthanasia‟, and wider debates on the 
issue. Whatever interest was taken in the discussion of largely hypothetical ethical 
problems did not translate into either a desire for law reform, or a sea-change in attitudes 
towards „euthanasia‟ and the people who might be subjected to it. 
                                                 
134
 The newspapers consulted are The New York Times, the Washington Post, the London Times, the Daily Telegraph, and the 
Manchester Guardian. News magazines consulted are Time, Newsweek, The Economist, and the Spectator. As these last two contain 
no real discussion of the Nuremberg Medical Trial, they have not been discussed in this chapter. They do contain numerous 
discussions pertaining to the post-war situation, and  these can be found by consulting the 1946 and 1947 volumes of the two 
periodicals. Similarly, the Manchester Guardian‟s main report of the Trial came on the day the sentences were announced, with no 
announcement of the Trial‟s commencement. 
 73 
There were, as we shall see, a number of hotly debated cases of „mercy-killing‟ in 
both Britain and the States in the immediate post-war period, Nazi „euthanasia‟ appears to 
have had surprisingly little impact on discourse in either country. There may have been a 
number of reasons for this, such as the sheer number of reports of Nazi atrocities which 
were received by the British and United States authorities and public in the post-war 
period, as a recent book has argued.
135
 However, I do not believe that this alone is an 
adequate explanation of why the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme received so little attention 
in the British and U.S., particularly during the period in which the Nuremberg Medical 
Trial was taking place. It is at this time when one would have expected the topic of 
„euthanasia‟ to have occupied at least a relatively important place in British and U.S. 
public discourse. As this chapter will show, this did not happen. Why was this? 
There would appear to be two main reasons. The previous chapter showed the 
Nuremberg Medical Trial Tribunal‟s distinct unwillingness to acknowledge the fact that 
the overwhelming majority of the victims of the „euthanasia‟ programme were Germans. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, there were a number of reasons for this. In their 
judgement against Karl Brandt, the Tribunal even made the bizarre statement that, by 
deserting the „euthanasia‟ programme after its inception, Brandt had allowed „abuses‟ 
(the killing of non-Germans) to occur. This demonstrates very strongly that the Tribunal 
failed to view the „euthanasia‟ programme in its entirety as „an abuse‟. So, one might 
argue that the programme received little attention in the United States and Britain 
because there was simply little or no public sympathy for German victims of Nazi 
atrocities. Whether there is truth in this assertion is difficult to establish, as the dearth of 
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newspaper references to „euthanasia‟ during the period of the Nuremberg Medical Trial 
does not point to any particular antipathy towards the victims of the programme; rather, a 
lack of interest in them. The reasons for this lack of interest remain elusive, but a number 
may be suggested.  Firstly, many writers have suggested that, in the immediate post-war 
period, there were simply so many reports of Nazi atrocities of varying kinds that some of 
these simply failed to have much impact upon the public imagination in either Britain or 
the United States.
136
 Further, it has been suggested that, over time, the public grew 
increasingly accustomed to the apparently endless tide of „atrocity stories‟ and began to 
develop some degree of compassion fatigue, particularly when, as in the case of Britain, 
they were grappling with the massive reconstruction needed in their own country.
137
  
There is, however, a somewhat darker explanation for the general silence on the 
subject of Nazi „euthanasia‟, and it will be a task of this chapter to demonstrate this. Two 
recent books have discussed the post-war perceptions of disabled people, and it has been 
remarked that they were viewed in a paternalistic way - seen as helpless recipients of 
care, not as possessors of rights, or as people who had the potential to achieve at least 
some degree of autonomy, success and happiness.
138Of course, „rights talk‟ in relation to 
any minority group would be somewhat anachronistic when applied to the late 1940s, as 
civil rights movements did not really begin until two decades afterwards.
139
 Nevertheless, 
it is clear from histories of the various eugenics and „euthanasia‟ movements of the 
earlier decades of the twentieth century that debates about disabled people and their 
future took place both without their input, and without any consciousness that their 
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opinions should be sought, or even that they might have opinions.  One of the most 
remarkable examples of this was seen in the previous chapter, in the total absence of 
institution inmates called as witnesses to the trials of perpetrators of the Nazi „euthanasia‟ 
programme at the Nuremberg Medical Trial. This problem has been little identified by 
historians, who have tended to discuss eugenics and „euthanasia‟ movements in terms of 
the effects which they produced (numbers of people sterilised, for example), as opposed 
to the attitudes which may have made them possible. One historian who has considered 
this problem, however, is Stefan Kühl. He has written that, in the immediate pre-war 
period, international criticism of the Nazis‟ racial policies focused upon concerns that 
they might be „misapplied‟ to groups such as political opponents and ethnic minorities. 
There was little or no criticism of measures such as the Law for the Prevention of 
Congenitally Diseased Offspring in their entirety.
140
 This does demonstrate that, whilst 
different countries had differing legal frameworks, and differing attitudes to the extent to 
which this perceived problem ought to be dealt with, there was, internationally, a 
widespread perception that „different rules apply‟ when considering what ought to be 
done about impairments and people with them. Again, this attitude was demonstrated in 
the previous chapter. The Tribunal, in a rare moment of condemnation of Karl Brandt‟s 
participation in the „euthanasia‟ programme, commented that the consent of the victims‟ 
relatives had not been sought prior to the killings. This indicates that there was no 
appreciation that any of the potential victims had opinions to which it might have been 
worthwhile to listen.
141
 Such an attitude does at least partially explain why disabled 
people were regarded so much as a problem to be dealt with (in whatever way) as 
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opposed to people with something to contribute. Consequently, the parts of this chapter 
concerning cases of the commission of „euthanasia‟ will demonstrate how, once the 
existence of an impairment had been established in someone who had been subjected to 
„euthanasia‟,  the conclusion was quickly reached that the person in question must be 
suffering intolerably (and irredeemably) and would, as a consequence, be better off dead. 
In addition, such people were held to exert an intolerable strain upon their relatives, who 
might understandably reach the end of their tether. It will be shown that these 
assumptions cannot easily be disentangled from the mood of the time, in which, in Britain 
and the United States as well as in Germany, saw large-scale institutionalization of  
disabled people, and helped to foster a sense of their „otherness‟. This was manifested in 
a number of different ways.  
The use made by the Nazis of propaganda films, for example, is well-known, and 
those of the propaganda films which portray institutions and their patients make it clear 
that „defectives‟, who are unable to appreciate their surroundings, are living in virtual 
palaces whilst „normal‟ children languish in slums.142 However, the existence of similar 
films making similar points regarding asylums in the United States is not so well 
known.
143
 In addition, in both the United States and Britain, poor conditions in 
institutions (which would seem to conflict with the complaint that „defective‟ people 
were living in virtual palaces) were often used as a justification for the acceptability of 
„euthanasia‟.144 Aside from the economic rationale regarding the cost-benefit analysis of 
patients in institutions, on which a wide literature exists, one can also see how 
                                                 
142
 Michael Burleigh, Death and Deliverance: Euthanasia in Germany 1900-1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 
p.183. 
143
 Martin S. Pernick: The Black Stork: Eugenics and the Death of Defective Babies in American Medicine and Motion Pictures since 
1915 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p.95.  
144
 For an example of this in the United States, see Pernick, The Black Stork, p.95, p.10. For a British example, see Kemp, Merciful 
Release, pp.131-2. 
 77 
institutionalization helped to create a sense of how the difficulties experienced by 
disabled people were irredeemable and attributable entirely to their impairments. This 
chapter will show that large-scale institutionalization, involving containment of disabled 
people as opposed to involvement in society, is likely to have been instrumental in the 
perception that they were unable to enjoy life to any appreciable degree and that killing - 
even non-consensual killing - was a quite understandable reaction to them. For example, 
a woman visiting a British institution in 1943 wrote to the Minister of Health expressing 
her support for „euthanasia‟ on the basis of the many distressing „cases‟ which she had 
seen there, including „a little child who would not be normal if she lived for years‟.145 
Similar remarks are easy to find, and will be demonstrated in this next section, when 
legal cases concerning defendants accused of committing „euthanasia‟ are discussed, 
particularly the case of Repouille, a man accused of the murder of his disabled son. 
Firstly, it is time to see the limited view, and limited interest, with which legal 
professionals in both the United States and Britain regarded the Nuremberg Medical 
Trial.  
 
 
 
 
 
‘Criminal responsibility for cruel and murderous experiments’ 
  
 
In the Nuremberg Medical Trial judgement, the illegality of the „euthanasia‟ programme 
was briefly referred to, and the Tribunal noted that Hitler‟s famous order of September 1, 
1939, was the only authority for it, and it „was not based on any previously existing 
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German law‟.146 There is, of course, an abundance of literature discussing the legality of 
the trials themselves, and the attempts made by those organizing them to ensure that the 
crimes prosecuted were within the jurisdiction of those who were prosecuting them.
147
 In 
this section, however, the focus will not be on the legal basis of the charges, but on the 
question of how „euthanasia‟ was viewed at the time by its respective practitioners in 
Britain and America. It will be shown that, whilst there certainly were debates about 
euthanasia during the period in which the Nuremberg Medical Trial was taking place, it 
was often the case that the Nazi experience did not seem to impinge greatly on these. 
Though very few legal journals of the day discussed the Nuremberg Medical Trial (as 
opposed to the Trial of the Major War Criminals), those which did so were unanimous in 
describing the Trial as one concerned with the prosecution of Nazis who had carried out 
medical experiments upon concentration camp inmates. An example of this can be seen 
in the extensive article „War Crimes Trials and the Laws of War‟, which appeared in the 
British Yearbook of International Law in 1949. This was not an article devoted to a 
discussion of the legal issues arising from the Nuremberg Medical Trial, but a 
comprehensive view of the laws of war, their foundation and their use in the varied and 
numerous trials of those accused of war crimes committed between 1939 and 1945. This 
article mentions the Nuremberg Medical Trial only once, in a short paragraph discussing 
the extent to which the defendants should have attempted to discover whether the actions 
of their subordinates were legal.
148
 For the purposes of this chapter, it is particularly 
interesting to note that this requirement concerns the commission of medical experiments 
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performed in concentration camps by subordinates of Karl Brandt, the principle 
defendant.
149
 The previous chapter showed that the Tribunal at the Nuremberg Medical 
Trial did make reference to a very limited number of legal issues which they identified as 
arising from the Nazis‟ „euthanasia‟ programme. The most notable of these apparently 
was that, save for the authorization from Hitler authorizing Brandt and Bouhler to grant a 
„mercy death‟ to people deemed „incurably ill‟, „euthanasia‟ was not legal in Germany. 
This view of the legal issues surrounding the „euthanasia‟ programme is highly 
inadequate, as discussed in the previous chapter. Nevertheless, the fact that the article in 
the British Yearbook of International Law makes no reference at all to discussions of 
„euthanasia‟ at the Nuremberg Medical Trial indicates that either the writer (one G. 
Brandt) did not himself consider the issue at all, or that he did not mention it as he felt 
that it was not an important topic of legal discussion, or one that raised any questions to 
which answers were badly needed. In any event, it is clear that this writer does not view 
the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme as a topic in need of discussion. It is also interesting to 
note that no mention is made of the inadequate way in which the subject was handled by 
the Tribunal. This may perhaps be explained by the fact that this is a dry, descriptive 
article in which the writer confines himself to an identification of the various legal issues 
encountered by Allied courts in their prosecution of Nazis accused of war crimes. It is in 
no way intended to be a critique of the decisions reached by these various courts. 
  A rather more comprehensive discussion of the Nuremberg Medical Trial was 
published in the journal International Reconciliation in 1947. This article states that „the 
principle count of the indictment charged the defendants with criminal responsibility for 
cruel and frequently murderous „medical experiments‟ performed, without the victims‟ 
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consent, on concentration camp inmates, prisoners of war, and others‟.150 The Nazi 
„euthanasia‟ programme is mentioned, and the article quotes the description of it given in 
the Nuremberg Medical Trial indictment (see previous chapter and page seven of this 
chapter). However, nothing is made of the description, save for a mention that, amongst 
the various defences employed by the defendants and their counsel, was the claim that 
„euthanasia has strong advocates in all countries‟. For anyone who had any knowledge of 
the discussions of „euthanasia‟ at the Nuremberg Medical Trial, this remark is surely 
insufficient. It seemingly fails to take into account the totally non-consensual nature of 
the killings and, by definition, ignores the problem that while „mercy‟ was certainly the 
perpetrators‟ given reason for their participation in the programme, there was nothing at 
all merciful about it in reality. This article also makes reference to the judgement, stating 
that the Tribunal „dealt wisely with the fundamental issues‟.151 Though much of the 
judgement, in particular the formation of the Nuremberg Code, may rightly be considered 
„wise‟, the last chapter showed that the Tribunal‟s handling of the issue of „euthanasia‟ 
was woefully deficient, to the extent that they implicitly refused to consider even a state‟s 
imposition of non-consensual „euthanasia‟ as a moral or legal issue, except if it was used 
as an excuse for killing „beings of other nations‟. The remark by the writer of this article 
indicates that he does not regard „euthanasia‟ as being „one of the fundamental issues or, 
that he is unconcerned by the Tribunal‟s chilling indifference to the plight of those whose 
governments might (and in the case of Germany, already had) subjected them to 
„euthanasia‟ without their consent. 
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 This trend, now firmly established, continues in the other legal journals in which 
the subject of the Nuremberg Medical Trial is discussed. The North Carolina Law Review 
published an article in which it was explained that, following the Trial of the Major War 
Criminals, indictments had been filed against specific groups of Nazis involved in 
„carrying out Hitler‟s programme of world conquest‟.152 These „specific groups of Nazis‟ 
included industrialists and physicians. Physicians, states the article, were accused of „war 
crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the performance of so-called medical 
„experiments‟ upon human beings‟.153 This again shows that, as we have seen throughout 
this chapter, the sole crime with which the Nuremberg Medical Trial defendants were 
perceived to have been charged was that of committing human vivisection upon 
concentration camp inmates. 
 The scarcity of legal discussion of the Nuremberg Medical Trial may appear 
rather odd. It may simply be the case that the Nuremberg Medical Trial was less major 
than the first Nuremberg Trial, and so attracted less attention. It might also be that there 
was a perception that, being a medical Trial, the Nuremberg Medical Trial raised more 
questions for physicians than for persons of other professions. As we shall now see in this 
section, much legal discussion of „euthanasia‟ in both the United States and Britain seems 
to be centred around a strong feeling that this is a moral question which should be based 
upon medical assessments of the condition and prognosis of the person who has been 
killed, as opposed to being a strictly legal matter.  
 Strange as it may seem, an important indication of the state of the „euthanasia‟ 
debate in the United States in the late 1940s, can be gained from a case involving the 
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interpretation of „good moral character‟ under the Nationality Act 1940. The case in 
question is that of a man named Repouille, a Frenchman who, on October 12, 1939, took 
the life of his disabled thirteen- year- old son by administering chloroform to him.
154
 In 
the first instance, the jury found Repouille guilty of second-degree manslaughter, (which 
presupposes that the killing was unintentional),
155
 but recommended that he should be 
treated with „utmost clemency‟.156 On September 22, 1944, Repouille applied for 
citizenship, which was granted, but the decision was reversed on appeal. The court held 
that a petitioner for citizenship could not be held to be of „good moral character‟ if some 
aspect of his conduct failed to conform to „the generally accepted moral conventions 
current at the time‟.157 The appeal judge lamented what he claimed was the absence of 
any kind of useful document which would give him greater insight into the opinions of 
the general public on the subject of euthanasia.
158
    
 As we saw in the introductory chapter, such polls did exist, and the results of the 
1947 Public Opinion Quarterly poll would have been released in time for them to be of 
assistance in the Repouille case.
159
 The question that now needs to be addressed is that of 
whether, in the legal discussion of the Repouille case, any reference was made to the 
question of „euthanasia‟ under the Nazis, and any alarm bells that this should sound for 
Americans who were considering the question. 
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 The judges who refused Repouille‟s application for citizenship did demonstrate an 
awareness of the potentially wider moral implications of the Repouille case. Judge 
Learned Hand, one of the judges in the majority, proclaimed: 
 
 “...a test…whether „the moral feelings, now prevalent generally in this country, would be 
outraged by the conduct in question…[I]n the case at bar itself the answer is not wholly 
certain; for all we know there are great numbers of people of the most unimpeachable 
virtue, who think it morally justifiable to put an end to a life so inexorably destined to be a 
burden to others, and – so far as any possible interest of its own is concerned – condemned 
to a brutish existence, lower indeed than any but the lowest forms of sentient life. Nor is it 
inevitably an answer to say that it must be immoral to do this, until the law provides 
security against the abuses which would inevitably follow, unless the practice were 
regulated‟.160 
  
It may be argued that there would have been no justification here for any mention of 
„euthanasia‟ under the Nazis to have been made, as the Repouille case was that of a man 
who had independently elected to end the life of his disabled son, not of any kind of state 
policy to this effect. Nevertheless, it does seem likely that, had the issue been of concern 
to the judges in the case, they might have made some mention of it during their 
consideration of the ethical and societal dimensions of „euthanasia‟. In addition, with 
regard to legal commentaries on the case, it is interesting to note that, whilst all of these 
referred to the ethical problems of „euthanasia‟ and the importance of trying to discover 
and then paying attention to current public attitudes to the subject, none gave any 
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indication that the attitudes in question had been at all influenced by the reports of the 
Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme.161 Furthermore, since, as we have seen, the Nuremberg 
Medical Trial was portrayed so overwhelmingly as being devoted to the prosecution of 
perpetrators of medical experiments, this may have contributed to a lack of awareness, 
amongst the British and American public, of the potential risks of justifying „euthanasia‟ 
on the basis of „compassion‟. Despite this, it is extremely important to highlight the fact 
that, in the Repouille case in particular, the murdered child was discussed very much in 
terms which portrayed him not as an individual, but as the physical manifestations of 
various defects. This is a continuation of the depressing trend seen particularly in the last 
chapter, but often, too, in this chapter. In other words, those confronted with cases of 
„euthanasia‟ seem universally to have fallen into the trap of reducing the problem to an 
overly simplistic calculation. After it has been established that the person who has been 
killed had an illness or a impairment, „because‟ of which the perpetrator killed him or 
her, the conclusion is leapt to that the person must have been suffering intolerably. Since 
the allegedly intolerable suffering was caused entirely by the impairment or illness in 
question, further enquiries into the possibility of non-lethal amelioration of the victim‟s 
circumstances were rendered unnecessary. Of course, both Long and Repouille were 
convicted, indicating that their actions were regarded with some degree of seriousness. 
Nevertheless, it is clear from recent literature that, in both Britain and the United States, 
there was no appreciable change in the compassion with which those who claimed to 
have killed for reasons of mercy were treated.
162
 In some of these cases it would appear 
that what should have been called for is not so much a harsher sentence for the 
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perpetrator of the killing, rather, a questioning of the all-pervasive assumption that 
problems caused to the family of a disabled person could be solved quickly and easily by 
killing the disabled person – who, rather conveniently, was incapable of deriving 
enjoyment from life in any case.  
 Much of the literature on the history of eugenics in the United States,
163
 and the 
vexed question of possible parallels between this and aspects of National Socialism, has 
not really concerned itself greatly with the possible connection between eugenics and 
„euthanasia‟. This was discussed at the beginning of the chapter, and the subject is given 
further prominence by our next source. This is a book published in London in 1946, 
entitled Criminal Justice and Social Reconstruction, by Hermann Mannheim, a refugee 
from Nazism who became a lecturer in criminology at the University of London.
164
 
Though extensive searches have been carried out, there was little legal discussion of the 
Nuremberg Medical Trial in the post-war period, with only Mannheim making any 
specific mention of it. In addition, legal discussion of „euthanasia‟ as an abstract issue, 
and the bearing that recent events might have had on it, is largely unforthcoming. This 
being so, it is often the case that more insight can be gained into contemporary (to the 
period) attitudes to „euthanasia‟ and disabled people from legal cases (such as those of 
Repouille and Long, discussed above. Nevertheless, legal texts are important because, in 
many ways, they give further evidence of discussions which did not occur, and of ethical 
problems which did not cause concern, when it seems quite clear that they ought to have 
done.   
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Mannheim‟s book is an interesting one, as it is not a straightforward legal textbook, but, 
as one reviewer described it, „its purpose is to examine whether the present criminal law 
offers the necessary legal protection to the fundamental values of human society as these 
exist today‟.165 It has been described as being „rightly recognized as his most influential 
and widely-read work‟.166 In his preface, Mannheim himself writes: „I am not optimistic 
enough to believe that these views will, in the near future, gain widespread approval. It is 
well-known that…the legal world is the slowest in making the necessary adjustments in 
changes in society‟.167 Mannheim argues that the post-war period is the ideal time to 
address the „crisis in values‟ which, he claims, exists in society: 
 
„The crisis in values which confronts the criminal law today is by no means of recent 
origin. Like the present rise in crime, it has not been produced by the war, though the war 
may have aggravated certain pre-existing tendencies…To a greater or smaller extent, in 
every country the criminal law has in essential parts become out of date. Instead of being a 
living organism, supported by the confidence of all sections of the community and 
developing according to the practical and ideological needs of the time, it presents itself as 
a petrified body, unable to cope with the endless variety of problems created by an ever-
changing world and kept alive mainly by tradition, habit and inertia‟.168 
  
In terms of euthanasia and the Nazi analogy, Mannheim‟s book is unusual for this period 
in that some mention is made of the Nazi policy of „large-scale extermination of 
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politically or racially „undesirables‟‟,169 and this is described as the „collectivistic 
analogue to euthanasia…to rid the community of a member who is not an asset but only a 
burden or a danger‟.170 Mannheim comments that the Nazis, by their extermination of 
these „politically or racially „undesirables‟‟ have „probably stifled any tendencies of this 
kind amongst other nations‟.171 Mannheim then goes on to advocate that what he calls the 
„shaping of human material‟172 should be carried out via the use of sterilization, birth 
control and abortion.
173
 He also discusses possible differences between infanticide and 
euthanasia, a topic which is interesting to consider in the light of the early history of the 
„euthanasia‟ movement, and will become important in later chapters, particularly in 
relation to the philosopher Peter Singer. 
 Much can be gained by scrutinizing the reactions of Mannheim‟s contemporaries 
to this book. It was reviewed in both the Virginia Law Review (in September, 1947),
174
 
and the Modern Law Review (in April, 1949).
175
 Though both reviewers mention 
Mannheim‟s focus on euthanasia, neither do so in a critical way, and neither mention 
anything about „euthanasia‟ under the Nazis.176 Nevertheless, the reviewer in the Virginia 
Law Review does appear to be somewhat alarmed by some of Mannheim‟s suggestions. 
In response to Mannheim‟s approval of the introduction of identity cards, the reviewer 
writes,  
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„[T]his is what the world has just spent six years of war to suppress. The litmus paper of 
tyranny turns quickly, and it is best to label this sort of suggestion the dangerous nonsense 
that it is – at least until mankind has added another spiritual cubit to its stature‟.177  
  
In the post-war climate, the introduction of identity cards might well have seemed an 
alarming prospect. This does underline, however, the reviewer‟s apparent assumption that 
an issue like „euthanasia‟ – even though it involved active killing - was not one which, 
given recent history, perhaps ought to be approached with a degree of caution. Similar 
sentiments may be found in the Modern Law Review, with the reviewer mentioning in 
passing Mannheim‟s approval of „euthanasia, sterilisation and birth control‟,178 but 
remarking that his views on criminal procedure are „more controversial‟.179 This would, 
of course, imply that Mannheim‟s views on „euthanasia‟ are not controversial. 
 Jerome Hall‟s book General Principles of Criminal Law was published in 1947 
and reissued in 1960.
180
 Hall was a Professor of Law at the University of Indiana. He 
argued that a perpetrator‟s motive for killing was irrelevant, even if professed to be 
laudable, as in a case of „euthanasia‟. This was because the perpetrator in question 
voluntarily committed a penal harm – the taking of a life.181 It is clear from this that Hall 
himself is not an advocate of euthanasia, but also that he is not particularly exercised by 
any specific concerns which recent events might have brought into relief. In addition, the 
reviewer of his book in the Harvard Law Review, does not remark upon Hall‟s discussion 
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of „euthanasia‟, merely mentioning it in passing.182 This may have been due to a desire to 
avoid sensationalising the issue; however, one would suggest that, as the review appeared 
during the penultimate stages of the Nuremberg Medical Trial, a failure to mention this 
„euthanasia‟ connection would indicate that it did not occupy the reviewer‟s thoughts to 
any real extent. All-in-all, this chapter has shown that the Nuremberg Medical Trial did 
not greatly interest lawyers. It was suggested earlier in the chapter that this might have 
been because questions raised by the Trial were perceived as being medical and ethical in 
nature, as opposed to strictly legal.  
 
 
   
‘The veriest ignorance of the lay public’                                             
  
 
This chapter began with a discussion of the descriptions and discussions of the Trial in 
professional journals. One of the most protracted of these discussions occurred in the 
British medical periodical The Lancet, and it serves to demonstrate that there appears to 
have been, in the British medical profession at least, very little concern or awareness of 
the discussion of „euthanasia‟ at the Nuremberg Medical Trial or, as we shall see 
presently, of the possibility that Nazi „euthanasia‟ might add another dimension to 
debates on the subject in other Western countries. Reports of the Medical Trial, and 
discussions of its significance, also appeared in the British Medical Journal, and in the 
Journal of the American Medical Association. 
 The British Medical Journal‟s coverage of the Nuremberg Medical Trial was not 
exhaustive, but an article and an editorial on the subject appeared in one issue of the 
                                                 
182
 The Harvard Law Review, Vol. 60, No.5, (May, 1947), pp.846-850. 
 90 
journal in January, 1947. The article is entitled „Medical Experiments on Human Beings 
in Concentration Camps in Nazi Germany‟ and, indeed, the article is largely devoted to 
descriptions of the experiments carried out, the perpetrators thereof, and to the question 
of whether or not the data obtained in these experiments is of any use to medical 
science.
183
 A section on the Trial indictment, however, mentions that other crimes with 
which the Medical Trial defendants were charged “…the various „euthanasia‟ 
programmes for removing scores of thousands of Poles with tuberculosis and millions of 
„useless eaters‟”.184 On reading through the article and the accompanying editorial, 
however, it does become clear that the reader‟s attention is called particularly to the 
medical experiments. These are portrayed as the Nazis‟ principal medical crime, and the 
discussion of the potential use of the data obtained in them is highlighted. This certainly 
shows an awareness of the potential ethical problems caused by the Nazis‟ medical 
crimes.
185
  In addition, this is similar to the attitude demonstrated by the Tribunal at the 
Nuremberg Medical Trial, who, while being perfectly able to envisage future potential 
ethical problems concerning the use of human beings in medical experiments, did not feel 
bound to implement any measures to protect people from being subjected to „euthanasia‟ 
against their will. 
 The British Medical Journal’s editorial on the Nuremberg Medical Trial makes it 
very clear how important the Trial was considered to be, by that journal. For example, it 
is stated that  
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„It is a commonplace to say that medicine knows no frontiers, but behind this statement lies 
the recognition that medicine as it is practised in the civilized world is a product of 
Western civilization and therefore inspired by Christian ethics and Greek thought. The 
code of the civilized doctor is the Hippocratic oath…When, therefore, any group of 
medical men in a country claiming to be civilized offends against the spirit and tradition of 
Western medicine the offence becomes the concern of all doctors who follow the same 
tradition and try to live up to the same spirit. To ignore the infamy of these German doctors 
who have betrayed their trust and their profession would in part be to condone it‟.186  
  
It might appear from this paragraph that it is the whole of Nazi medical crimes which are 
being condemned here, but the statement that „[I]t is probably impossible for the British 
doctor to understand the mentality of the German doctors accused of brutal 
experimentation on fellow human beings‟ [my italics] demonstrates once again that it is 
the Nazis‟ experimentation upon human beings which is being condemned here, showing 
a clear link between this source and those which have previously been discussed.   
 In the United States, the Journal of the American Medical Association also 
contained a number of reports from, and discussions of, the Nuremberg Medical Trial. 
Amongst these are several references to the report on Nazi medical crimes which Dr. 
Andrew Ivy, an „expert witness‟ at the Trial, submitted to the American Medical 
Association. Partly due to the fact that Ivy has generally been associated with the 
reporting of Nazi medical experimentation, as opposed to that of other Nazi medical 
crimes,
187
 it is difficult to tell how much, if any, of his report was devoted to the issue of 
„euthanasia‟. It would, however, appear that any mention he did make of „euthanasia‟ 
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went unnoticed, and that it was the issue of medical experimentation which the American 
Medical Association regarded as being the important one, and the one with far-reaching 
ethical ramifications. For example, just before the opening of the Medical Trial, an 
editorial was published in the Journal of the American Medical Association on the 
subject of the Nazi medical crimes and the forthcoming Trial. This editorial makes what 
may be a brief reference to „euthanasia‟: „[T]he nonexperimental crimes included mass 
killings of persons who were about to die from disease, malnutrition and old age‟, but this 
is merely a comment in passing, and no ethical dimensions of the problem are 
discussed.
188
 Despite this, it is quite clear that the editor of the Journal wishes to show 
that the conduct of „these German physicians‟189 represented a total departure from 
ethical medicine as it had ever been understood.
190
 From this, it may be argued that the 
Journal was issuing a wholesale condemnation of Nazi medical crimes, and this may 
very well be the case. Nevertheless, the majority of the editorial is devoted to a 
discussion of the experiments, which are all listed in detail, whereas the other medical 
crimes are referred to briefly, in passing.
191
 In addition, all other references to Ivy‟s 
report and the American Medical Association‟s response to it refer to Nazi medical 
experimentation and its failure to meet the ethical requirements of the American Medical 
Association‟s guidelines on human experimentation.192 
 Ivy himself submitted an interesting article on Nazi medical crimes to a book of 
essays entitled Symposium on Medicolegal Problems: Series Two, which was published 
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in 1949, the first volume having appeared the previous year. Judging from the book‟s 
preface, the rationale behind its publication does not seem to have been any specific 
perceived need to promote wider public discussion of medical ethics in response to 
abuses which occurred under Nazism [find quote]. The symposium was interdisciplinary 
in scope, having been co-sponsored by the Institute of Medicine of Chicago, the Chicago 
Bar Council and the Chicago Medical Society. The convener of the symposium, Dr. 
Samuel A. Levinson of the University Of Illinois College Of Medicine, requested that Ivy 
should consider the question „Were the Nazi physicians who experimented upon the 
prisoners in the German concentration camps psychopathic and/or criminal?‟193 It is, of 
course, obvious that this question in itself shows a concern with human experimentation 
as opposed to other Nazi medical crimes, but Ivy does make one reference to „euthanasia‟ 
during the course of his speech, when he states:  
 
„Under the German criminal code, reviewed as late as 1944 by the Minister of Justice, they 
[medical experiments in concentration camps] were crimes, because it was criminal in 
Germany, just as it is in every civilized nation, to experiment on a person without his 
consent. In fact, any sort of euthanasia [my italics] was criminal under the German law‟.194 
  
In this peculiar statement, Ivy strongly implies that medical experimentation is a form of 
euthanasia, which it clearly is not. Consequently, it is somewhat difficult to see exactly 
how Ivy‟s remarks relate to this enquiry. The point he wished to make, at this stage of his 
speech, was that the Nazis were committing acts which were even illegal under the 
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German law of the time,
195
 and he did remark that one of these illegal acts was 
„euthanasia‟, but did not refer to it as the murder of people who were, allegedly, incurably 
ill, but as a medical procedure such as human experimentation.    
 The discussion of the Nuremberg Medical Trial in the Lancet was motivated by 
an article entitled „A Moral Problem‟, which was published in that journal on November 
30, 1946, just days prior to the commencement of the Trial. This article mentioned that 
further Nuremberg Trials would shortly commence, and that „among the first to answer 
charges of atrocious conduct will be some doctors who are said to have misused human 
beings in scientific experiments‟.196 The article goes on to explain that, having 
incarcerated Jews and members of other groups in concentration camps, the Nazis 
decided to profit from them by subjecting them to experiments prior to their deaths, so 
that the Nazis would be able to use the data obtained in these experiments for their own 
knowledge and future benefit.
197
  
 The writer of the article then asks „But supposing facts of real value to medicine 
were still to emerge from the records of these experiments – should they be published or 
not?‟198 Over the following two months or so, a number of the Lancet‟s readers attempted 
to answer this question. A letter expressing willingness to utilize the data on the basis that 
„If I myself had been a victim…I am sure that I should have preferred to know that this 
knowledge would have been used and that I had not died entirely for nothing‟199 is 
swiftly followed by others expressing the opinion that the data should not be used 
                                                 
195
 Ibid. 
196
 „A Moral Problem‟, in The Lancet, Vol. 248, Issue 6431, November 30, 1946, p.798. 
197
 Ibid. 
198
 Ibid. 
199
 Letter from Kenneth Mellanby, Dept. of Entomology, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine. The Lancet, Vol. 248, 
Issue 6432, December 7, 1946, p.850. 
 95 
because of the way in which it had been obtained.
200
 This debate is important with regard 
to a discussion of the ethical problems of human experimentation, but it does demonstrate 
that the British medical profession had an interest in the Nuremberg Medical Trial, and 
could see the wider ethical problems arising from the defendants‟ crimes.201 It does not, 
however, appear that they thought about „euthanasia‟ in this way, as becomes especially 
clear from reading the last published letter of the Lancet‟s debate on this subject. The 
letter in question is from one F.B. Charatan of Calcutta, who writes of the necessity of 
making one‟s own decisions with regard to the ethical dilemmas occasioned by the 
Nazis‟ human experimentation, and on „allied problems, such as euthanasia‟.202 
 One cannot positively say that the writer of this letter was unaware of the 
discussions of „euthanasia‟ which were then taking place at Nuremberg. However, he 
clearly regards „euthanasia‟ as „an allied problem‟ in the sense of being an ethical 
dilemma, not in the sense that it has any specific connection with the Nazis. 
 A few months later, but still during the Nuremberg Medical Trial, the Lancet 
reported that the Voluntary Euthanasia Society (VES) had plans to reintroduce into the 
House of Lords a Bill, unsuccessfully introduced in 1936, for the legalization of 
euthanasia for those in great pain from incurable diseases.
203
 The Lancet reports that, at 
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the Voluntary Euthanasia Society‟s annual meeting on May 21st, 1947, a doctor named 
E.A. Barton spoke in favour of the legalisation of euthanasia, on the basis that this would 
do much to improve the situation of doctors who „accede to a patient‟s appeal for 
release‟, but who, owing to the state of the law, were obliged to take upon themselves the 
whole responsibility for this decision and any consequences it might have.
204
  
 Barton‟s views were published, in an extended version, in March, 1947, a few 
months before the speech at the Voluntary Euthanasia Society‟s Annual Meeting. The 
article, entitled „Death and Euthanasia‟, gives a very strong indication that, whilst 
proponents of euthanasia in Britain may often have been confronted with „slippery slope‟ 
arguments, these did not generally have any connection to Nazism. Barton wrote: „And 
so we come to the consideration of Euthanasia. [Barton has previously related how, fifty 
years previously, he had used chloroform to end the life of a terminally ill man who, 
Barton claims, had repeatedly requested death].  
 
„One might begin by saying how ignorant the lay public are with regard to this 
subject. They can and do know nothing whatever about such piteous cases…They think 
that the legalising of Euthanasia would give every doctor the right to wilfully murder 
whom he would and that countless murders would be committed. All this is the veriest 
ignorance and hence they are quite unqualified to give any opinion on the matter…We 
accord to a sick or wounded animal a mercy that we deny to ourselves: on the battlefield a 
man will take the life of his great friend if hopelessly wounded. I like to think that there are 
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amongst us many who are willing to risk criticism and worse by doing for a patient what 
they would desire for themselves under similar circumstances‟.205 
  
Barton was a proponent of euthanasia, speaking to a sympathetic audience. 
Consequently, one would not expect him to say anything along the lines of „I am in 
favour of the legalisation of euthanasia, but, owing to recent events in Germany, we have 
to be especially careful that abuses do not occur‟. However, his sneering contempt for the 
„veriest ignorance‟ of those who fear that abuses might occur indicate that it has not been 
necessary for proponents of euthanasia to develop a coherent response to opposition of 
this nature. This is despite the fact that „euthanasia‟ societies in both Britain and the 
United States were shown to have been sufficiently concerned about the first reports of 
the „euthanasia‟ programme to have issued bulletins and pamphlets explaining that they 
did not support this type of „euthanasia‟. This was discussed earlier in the chapter, and 
the fact that this flurry of activity had, apparently, been entirely forgotten by proponents 
of euthanasia, shows that its effects were considerably more transitory than they might 
have been. Given the other evidence uncovered thus far in the various sections of this 
chapter, such a dramatic change of emphasis is not nearly as surprising as one might 
think. In addition, we do not know exactly who Barton means when he condemns the „lay 
public‟, nor is it entirely clear whether the fears of these inconvenient and timid souls are 
of a general nature or based upon familiarity with recent events. If it is the latter, this is 
certainly not mentioned. The following issues of the University College Hospital 
Magazine do not carry any letters or articles disagreeing, in the light of recent history, 
that the implementation of a euthanasia law might carry with it a degree of risk, or be 
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undesirable in any way.
206
 In addition, the Journal of the American Medical Association 
carried a report of Barton‟s speech in their „Foreign Letters‟ section, during June of 1947. 
This report is, in effect, merely a reworking of the important points of Barton‟s speech, 
with no real comment of any kind, or explanation of the Journal of the American Medical 
Association‟s position on the question of euthanasia and any risks they might have 
perceived in the legalisation thereof.
207
 
 I have shown that, in the period during and after the Nuremberg Medical Trial, 
there was some awareness amongst physicians in the United States and Britain that the 
Nazi medical crimes did raise some important ethical questions. Nevertheless, it is also 
clear that physicians did not, generally speaking, consider that the recent experience of 
the Nazis should complicate their thinking on the issue of „euthanasia‟. That awareness of 
Nazi medical crimes was widespread in the medical profession during this period cannot 
be doubted, however, as the issue was discussed at two important medical conferences – 
the Bad Nauheim Physicians‟ Convention of June 14 and 15, 1947, and the First Annual 
Meeting of the General Assembly of the newly-formed World Medical Association 
(WMA) , which took place in Paris three months later, from September 17-20, 1947. The 
dates of these conferences makes them highly relevant to this enquiry, the former having 
taken place during the course of the Nuremberg Medical Trial and the latter, almost 
exactly a month after the judgements were passed. These two conferences will be 
considered in turn, beginning with the Bad Nauheim Convention. 
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 This Convention was organized by the Medical Chambers of the three Western 
Zones of Germany (in other words, Britain, France and the United States).
208
 It took place 
at Bad Nauheim in Hesse. Though its main purpose was to address the state of nutrition 
in Germany, the participants passed a resolution recommending that every German 
physician be required to take an oath, demonstrating his awareness of his professional 
obligations towards his patients.
209
 The fact that the Convention was organized by the 
Allied powers, for German physicians, strongly suggests that it was perceived that, in 
light of recent events, German physicians needed to be re-educated concerning the 
purposes, duties and ethical requirements of their chosen vocation.  
 As the proposed oath showed, these duties were wide-ranging, encompassing 
consideration and respect for patients, the recognition of no other laws than those of 
humanity, the undertaking „never to destroy the power of procreation without compelling 
reason‟, and the refusal to subject a patient „against his will or even with his consent,210 to 
means or methods which may become harmful or injurious to his body, his soul or his 
life‟.211 Crucially for this enquiry, the proposed oath also states that: „Awed by the 
creative powers of nature, and trusting their oftentimes hidden forces, I shall preserve all 
human life; shall not interfere with its natural course, even at the request of the sick‟.212 
 It is apparent that, at this conference, the issue of „euthanasia‟ was discussed, and 
that the participants must have regarded the issue as being sufficiently important for a 
clause rejecting the commission thereof, even when this was requested by a sick person, 
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to be inserted into the proposed oath. However, this draft oath applied only to German 
doctors. In order to find out whether or not any warning against „euthanasia‟ was 
recommended for physicians of other nations, we cannot do better than look at the 
discussions of the Nazi medical crimes which took place at the first Annual Meeting of 
the General Assembly of the World Medical Association, which was attended by 
representatives from both Britain and the United States. 
 The Minutes of this important meeting record that the first discussion of War 
Crimes occurred on Friday, September 19, 1947 – the penultimate day of the 
conference.
213
 Measures proposed by the Danish Medical Association, and supported by 
a number of other parties, that a report should be compiled on the crimes of German 
physicians, and made available to all physicians, were carried.
214
 In addition, it was 
resolved that a report should be received from the War Crimes Committee, and that the 
WMA „solemnly condemns the crimes against human beings committed by certain 
members of the medical profession‟.215 Additionally, it was resolved that every doctor 
should be required to take an oath to the following effect: 
 
My first duty, above all other duties, written or unwritten, shall be to care to the best of my 
ability for any person who is entrusted or entrusts himself to me, to respect his moral 
liberty, to resist any ill-treatment that may be inflicted on him, and, in this connection, to 
refuse my consent to any authority that requires me to ill-treat him. 
     Whether my patient be my friend or my enemy, even in time of war or in internal 
disturbances, and whatever may be his opinions, his race, his party, his social class, his 
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country or his religion, my treatment and my respect for his human dignity will be 
unaffected by such factors.
216
 
 
As regards the German medical profession, an additional oath was required, 
encompassing a declaration of awareness of the „very large number of acts of cruelty 
committed…since 1933, in mental hospitals and concentration camps, and violations of 
the medical ethic‟; an expression of regret that the German medical profession offered no 
resistance; a condemnation of these crimes which resulted in the „death of some millions 
of people‟; and the expulsion from their medical associations of physicians who 
participated in these crimes‟.217  
 Both the Bad Nauheim proposed oath, and the propositions of the World Medical 
Association make it clear that, unsurprisingly, it was expected that special precautions 
should be taken by German doctors, and that it was they who were expected to engage in 
the most open recognition and condemnation of the Nazi medical crimes. Nevertheless, 
what can be said concerning the general oath for physicians agreed upon by the World 
Medical Association? How does this oath relate to the subject of „euthanasia‟? 
 Upon reading the oath, it is evident that its scope was intended to be as wide as 
possible. The undertaking not to discriminate against patients on any of a number of 
grounds could well be seen as a laudable endeavour to ensure that physicians would 
never again use the skills that should have been placed at the service of humanity, to 
commit the grossest outrages against people who differed from them in terms of race, 
religion, or other factors. This is particularly understandable when we remember the 
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emphasis placed, at the Nuremberg Medical Trial, on the non-German victims of the Nazi 
medical crimes. 
 As regards „euthanasia‟, the oath is not entirely satisfactory. One could argue that 
the oath does cover „euthanasia‟, as it requires the physician to resist attempts by others 
to ill-treat his patient, and certainly never to engage in such ill-treatment himself. 
Generally speaking, killing is rightly considered to be the ultimate form of ill-treatment. 
However, as we saw in the previous chapter, the Nuremberg defendants who participated 
in „euthanasia‟ insisted relentlessly that the killings had been for the victims‟ own benefit. 
Furthermore, the prosecution made alarmingly little effort to challenge these assertions. 
Consequently, it is not entirely clear that the World Medical Association‟s proposed oath 
makes any concrete pronouncements on the subject of „euthanasia‟. 
 A better idea of how this might have worked in practice can be gained from a 
discussion of examples of „mercy-killing‟ in Britain and the United States throughout the 
period during and shortly after the Nuremberg Medical Trial and the two Physicians‟ 
Conventions discussed above. If the WMA oath was widely discussed in relation to the 
subject of „euthanasia‟, one could of course infer from this that the whole issue had 
galvanized both public, and, specifically, medical opinion. However, we have seen so far 
that the Nuremberg Medical Trial was, in newspapers and news magazines, reported 
overwhelmingly as a trial devoted exclusively to the prosecution of perpetrators of 
medical experiments upon human beings. In addition, it has been shown that discussions 
of the Trial‟s ethical dimensions did not tend to focus on „euthanasia‟, and that debates 
about „euthanasia‟ did not tend to refer to its abuse under the Nazis. A recent article218 
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has shown that the British euthanasia movement was very active indeed in the years 
following the end of World War II, and that this was largely due to cases of euthanasia 
which were highlighted in the British press.
219
 The writer of the article identifies two 
cases involving „mercy-killing‟ of people discovered to be terminally ill, in the United 
States, both of which apparently caused widespread debate.
220
  I have discovered another, 
case which might prove instructive. It is an English one, having been brought to trial in 
London, but the defendant in question was an American citizen, which may explain why 
the case was reported in the States. On Friday, November 29
th
, 1946, the New York Times 
reported as follows: „Gordon Richard Long, 46-year-old paper mill worker, who pleaded 
guilty last week to having put his imbecile daughter Jessie to death, and was sentenced to 
hang, received a reprieve today from Home Secretary Chuter Ede. The death sentence 
was commuted to life imprisonment‟.221 
 That this case did not pass unnoticed is evident from a short article which 
appeared about it in Time magazine. This article is interesting for two reasons, aside from 
the additional information which is given concerning the facts of the case. In addition to 
this, the article in Time firstly, identifies „euthanasia‟ as an important moral problem, and 
secondly, mentions eugenic practices in Germany, reporting that „the Nazis in 1933 
legalized compulsory sterilisation of sterilisation of idiots, imbeciles and irredeemable 
criminals‟.222 
 There are two points to be made in relation to this. Firstly, why, when the 
Nuremberg Medical Trial, prosecuting the perpetrators of Nazi medical crimes, including 
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„euthanasia‟, was shortly to commence, did the commentator in Time magazine choose to 
highlight Nazi eugenic policies, as opposed to Nazi „euthanasia‟? Secondly, is it possible 
to relate this statement to the enthusiasm for eugenics in the United States? In addition, it 
becomes necessary to consider the links, if there are any, between eugenics on the one 
hand and „euthanasia‟ on the other? In other words, did the relative prevalence of the 
former have any implications for tolerance of the latter? 
 The Time magazine article states that „no civilized country distinguishes in law 
between „mercy-killing‟ and murder.223 The reference to the Nazi sterilisation law, which 
immediately follows this sentence, may be considered to be an inference that Nazi 
Germany was not a „civilized country‟, but that the United States is. It is also interesting 
to note the comment concerning the lack of legal distinction between „mercy-killing‟ and 
murder. That „mercy-killing‟ is not murder is the principle argument that the proponents 
of „euthanasia‟ use to support it.    
 The American newspapers also report that, in late 1946, the Euthanasia Society of 
New York State proposed submitting a bill to the legislature permitting „mercy-killings of 
„the incurably ill who are suffering and unwilling to continue to live‟.224 In addition, the 
Euthanasia Society of America (ESA) announced that fifty-four Protestant clergymen in 
New York had signed a statement in which they stated their approval of voluntary 
euthanasia „under careful safeguards‟.225 In the United States, the disapproval of this step, 
and of the proposed Bill in New York State, seems to have been led by Catholics, who 
condemned the proposals as contrary to Christian teachings.
226
 Nevertheless, there is one 
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report that the Catholic War Veterans Association condemned the proposed New York 
State Bill in their official publication, recalling that „Nazi Germany was charged with 
using euthanasia to do away with German World War One veterans who were no longer 
useful to the state‟.227 A report of this bill was also published in Time magazine, stating 
that only those over the age of twenty-one would be eligible to apply, and that „the bill 
would do nothing about imbeciles or children born monstrously deformed‟.228 Time also 
reported that Monsignor Robert McCormick of New York had condemned the proposals 
as „Anti-God, un-American, and a menace to veterans!‟229 This statement is interesting, 
because, although it makes no specific mention of the Nazis, McCormick‟s reference to 
the „menace to veterans‟ which the bill would allegedly pose, does demonstrate a possible 
link with the criticisms of the bill made by the Catholic War Veterans‟ Association. It 
also demonstrates that, in some respects at least, the „euthanasia‟ programme was 
understood as having been targeted primarily at veterans of the First World War. Perhaps 
this can be explained by the fact that the organisation making this link represented war 
veterans.  
 As I showed earlier in the chapter (footnote 170) E.A. Barton had a rather bold attitude 
concerning the legalisation of euthanasia, but we do not really know what the policies of 
the two organizations were, or how these shaped wider debates about euthanasia. Recent 
research has suggested that neither C. Killick Millard, honorary secretary of the VELS, 
nor Mrs. R.L. Mitchell, secretary of the ESA, were entirely opposed to the Nazis 
„euthanasia‟ campaign, with Mitchell writing to Millard that the murders by the Nazis of 
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mentally handicapped Polish children were „a great blessing‟.230  As regards the field of 
medical textbooks, a recent work has highlighted the case of A.F. Tredgold. Tredgold 
was an eminent British neurologist and believer in eugenics, who was a leading authority 
on mental defect for much of the first half of the twentieth century, and who had been an 
expert witness at the Royal Commission on the Care and Control of the Feeble-minded in 
1908.
231
 This was also the year in which Tredgold‟s textbook Mental Deficiency: 
Amentia first appeared. Tredgold‟s case is a particularly interesting one, as earlier 
editions of his text - rule out the possibility of „euthanasia‟ for the „mentally 
handicapped‟, but the seventh edition, published in 1947, includes a new section 
specifically advocating this. In this section, Tredgold states that 
 
„with the present shortage of institutional accommodation there are thousands of mothers 
who are literally worn out in caring for these persons at home. In my opinion it would be 
an economical and humane procedure were their existence to be painlessly terminated, and 
I have no doubt, from personal experience, this would be welcomed by a large proportion 
of parents‟.232 
  
Kemp gives no indication as to the responses to Tredgold‟s recommendations, but one 
assumes that, had such responses been vehemently hostile, this would have been 
mentioned. Tredgold was also an important figure in his own field of medicine, which 
would suggest that, had his ideas been viewed as being totally unacceptable, the shock 
that such a well-respected figure was arguing in favour of them would have been great. 
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Kemp also gives the example of Dr. E.W. Barnes, the bishop of Birmingham, who, at the 
annual conference of the co-operative association in 1947, spoke in favour of the 
„euthanasia‟ of defective infants, and claimed, „Euthanasia and sterilisation should be 
discussed without importing anti-Nazi prejudice‟.233 This could be interpreted as meaning 
that there is no logical connection between Nazi policies on the one hand, and the 
termination of the lives of those subjected to severe suffering on the other. Nevertheless, 
Barnes‟ remarks do not indicate that he is aware of, or concerned by, the insistence of the 
„euthanasia‟ programme perpetrators that they were motivated by compassion for 
suffering people. Perhaps this is not surprising, given the dearth of media reporting of this 
phenomenon. In addition, it is not entirely clear whether Barnes is talking about actual, or 
merely hypothetical, „anti-Nazi prejudice‟. It is not even at all easy to know whether 
Barnes strongly disapproved of the „euthanasia‟ programme. Kemp rightly points out that 
Barnes was „something of a maverick‟234, but this chapter has revealed that his views 
were not at all uncommon. 
 
 
 
‘Twenty-three doctors charged with experimenting on human beings’ 
 
 
We saw in the last chapter that the prosecution and the tribunal at the Nuremberg Medical 
Trial, in many ways failed adequately to examine the question of „euthanasia‟. This 
failure took a number of forms. Little attempt was made to challenge the defendants‟ 
claims that their actions had been motivated by compassion. Furthermore, the tribunal did 
not consider it either needful or desirable for them to issue general guidelines concerning 
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the practice of „euthanasia‟, despite having formulated the Nuremberg Code for the 
protection of future subjects of human experimentation. All-in-all, the Trial presented a 
lost opportunity, in its unwillingness to take the issue of „euthanasia‟ seriously or regard 
it as a moral problem with far-reaching implications. As previous sections of this chapter 
have made clear, the medical and legal professions of both the US and Britain were 
unanimous both in their view of the Trial as being solely concerned with medical 
experiments, and in their „blind spot‟ regarding „euthanasia‟. This section will consider 
the reporting of the Nuremberg Medical in the US and British press. Their reporting of 
the Trial also focused almost exclusively upon medical experiments, a trend which began 
to be established even before the commencement of the Trial. For example, on October 
25,
 
1946 (just over a month before the Trial began on December 9), the London Times 
reported that „major German war leaders, possibly approaching 1000‟, were to be tried at 
Nuremberg the following month. The newspaper named the American judges of these 
future trials, and reported that indictments were yet to be served, but gave no indication 
of the probable scope of the Trials, or of the charges which the indictments were likely to 
contain when they were served.
235
  On the same day, the New York Times carried a 
slightly longer and more informative article on the subject of the forthcoming trial. Like 
the London Times, the New York Times reported on the arrival of the judges in 
Nuremberg, but it also mentioned that the defendants would be ‟23 German physicians 
accused of atrocities in the form of  experiments on concentration camp prisoners‟.236  
We can see here that an early description of the Nuremberg Medical Trial, before 
it had begun, gives an indication that there is at least some expectation that the charges 
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will relate solely to medical experiments, and that this is the subject to which the Trial 
will be devoted. Nevertheless, this early description is by no means sufficient to 
demonstrate any kind of general trend in newspapers‟ reporting of the Nuremberg 
Medical Trial. 
 In the period before the opening of the Trial, however, we gain other hints that the 
newspapers and news magazines seem generally to view the Trial as the prosecution of 
perpetrators of medical experiments upon non-consensual human subjects, and nothing 
else. On Sunday, December 8
th
, 1946, the Washington Post reported that the Trial would 
begin the following day, and described the crimes with which the defendants were 
charged as „the murder and torture of thousands of concentration camp inmates used as 
human guinea pigs‟.237 The newspaper also gives specific details of the experiments 
themselves, reporting that „the defendants…are charged with experimenting with disease, 
freezing and high-altitude tests on prisoners in various concentration camps. The personal 
physicians of Hitler and Himmler, and the woman doctor, Gerta Oberheuser, who 
allegedly performed sterilizations at Ravensbrueck, are among the defendants‟.238  In 
addition, a report of the forthcoming trial, published in Newsweek and entitled „Herr Dr. 
Sadist‟, reported that the twenty-three defendants pleaded not guilty „to the charge of 
murdering thousands of persons in brutal medical experiments that have stirred horror 
and disgust throughout the world‟.239 In its report on the opening of the Trial, the Daily 
Telegraph explained to its readers that the defendants were charged with „committing 
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murders, cruelties, brutalities and atrocities by means of medical experiments on helpless 
inmates of concentration camps‟.240 
 It is fairly clear now that, at the beginning of the Trial, newspapers in both Britain 
and America generally regarded it as a trial in which medical experimentation was the 
sole subject of the charges. This does seem odd, given that the newspapers from which 
we are quoting were (and continue to be) major publications with international 
readerships, and with correspondents attending the Trial. In addition, these 
correspondents must, one assumes, have been familiar with the contents of the 
indictment. If one reads this document, one can see that, whilst much of it is devoted to 
medical experiments, paragraph nine („war crimes‟) clearly mentions  
 
„[T]he so-called „euthanasia‟ programme of the German Reich, in the course of which the 
defendants herein murdered hundreds of thousands of human beings, including nationals of 
German-occupied countries. This programme involved the systematic and secret execution 
of the aged, insane, incurably ill, of deformed children and other persons, by gas, lethal 
injections and divers other means, in nursing homes, hospitals and asylums. Such persons 
were regarded as „useless eaters‟ and a burden to the German war machine. The relatives of 
the victims were informed that they died from natural causes such as heart failure. German 
doctors involved in the „euthanasia‟ campaign were also sent to the Eastern occupied 
countries to assist in the mass-extermination of Jews‟. 
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 This paragraph is reiterated, at somewhat shorter length, in paragraph fourteen, („crimes 
against humanity‟), of the indictment.241 The indictment also demonstrates the view that 
the killings had a purely utilitarian basis.  
 The above paragraph is interesting for a number of reasons. Of course, in relation 
to the previous chapter, it does demonstrate that there must originally have been some 
sort of intention amongst the prosecutors to treat the issue of „euthanasia‟ seriously. In 
addition, it does appear to show that those newspaper correspondents who attended the 
Trial and reported from it would, from the indictment if nothing else, have known that the 
Trial was not to be wholly taken up with the issue of medical experiments. Nevertheless, 
it is of course necessary to peruse the newspapers from 1947 to determine whether their 
reporting of the Trial differs from that seen in 1946. Nevertheless, before moving on to 
this, there are some other reports of the Trial from December 1946 which deserve 
consideration. 
 On December 9, 1946, (the day after the Washington Post report quoted above), 
the New York Times reported that the Trial would be commencing that day, and described 
it as concerning „charges of murders and atrocities committed in medical experiments in 
concentration camps‟.242 This newspaper clearly took a great interest in the early stages 
of the Trial, reporting on it regularly throughout December 1946. On December 10, it 
carried a long report of the opening of the Trial, and of chief prosecutor, Brig. Gen. 
Telford Taylor‟s comment that the „killing of some 275,000 persons in the guise of 
„euthanasia‟‟ was one of a number of atrocities which were „beyond the pale of even the 
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most perverted medicine‟.243 This is obviously a quotation from Taylor, rather than 
something which the reporter independently decided to highlight. Nevertheless, it will be 
interesting to see whether or not the issue of „euthanasia‟ is kept in mind in future reports. 
 On the same day, the Washington Post carried a similar report of Taylor‟s 
opening address. The Post reports that Taylor „opened the Trial of the 22 men and one 
woman with a day-long presentation of charges – wanton killing of victims in dubious 
experiments, „mercy slayings‟, and tortures in concentration camps‟.244 The Daily 
Telegraph did not actually describe the scope of the Trial in any particular terms, but its 
report made reference to experiments involving freezing, simulation of high altitude, 
mustard gas, sea-water, sterilization and deliberate infection of wounds.
245
  
 Two main features of the media reports of the Trial have so far become apparent. 
Firstly, the description of the Trial as one devoted solely to the prosecution of 
perpetrators of medical experiments upon inmates of concentration camps. This may be 
because, as Newsweek described above, the medical experiments „stirred horror and 
disgust throughout the world‟.246 Nevertheless, it does mean that the subject of 
„euthanasia‟ is not mentioned. Secondly, it appears that the Times, the New York Times 
and the Washington Post all have a specific way of describing the Trial, perhaps designed 
in some ways to keep it in their readers‟ minds. This „device‟, if such it may be called, 
appears to involve referring to the Trial, every time it is reported, in roughly similar 
terms, which focus on its prosecution of those accused of medical experimentation. This 
differs somewhat from the reportage in the Daily Telegraph, which tends to focus on the 
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medical experiments, but avoid describing the Trial in particular terms relating to the 
charges, merely commenting that the defendants are „physicians accused of war 
crimes‟.247 In practice, this would mean that whilst the readers of the Daily Telegraph 
were getting slightly different descriptions of the scope of the Nuremberg Medical Trial, 
the readers of all these newspapers would gain the impression that, at least, the main 
focus of the Trial concerned medical experiments in concentration camps. Of course, 
discussion of this did form a large part of the Trial, and most deservedly so, but it does 
seem odd that the defendants‟ constant insistence that their instigation of and 
participation in, the „euthanasia‟ programme, did not motivate a greater number of 
questions amongst commentators about the problem of „mercy-killing‟. 
 The following day (Wednesday, 11 December, 1946), an editorial entitled 
„Nightmare at Nuremberg‟ appeared in the New York Times. The editor at first appears to 
be making a general condemnation of the defendants‟ crimes, writing:  
 
„Many of these doctors were eminent specialists in the art of healing, all sworn to the 
Hippocratic Oath of mercy. Trained to serve humanity, they willingly exposed themselves 
to a moral infection which destroyed their mercy and left only their science to function in 
the last refinements of physical torture‟.248 This sounds as though it might be a 
condemnation of both the medical experiments and the „euthanasia‟ campaign, but the 
following sentence makes it clear that it is the experiments which are being deplored: „The 
details of these experiments [my italics] are revolting almost beyond the bounds of 
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credibility…It is from the lowest depths to which civilized society has ever fallen that these 
twenty-two men and one woman have been dredged up for trial at Nuremberg‟.249 
 
 This does not, of course, mean that the editor of the New York Times does not deplore the 
„euthanasia‟ campaign, merely that he has not felt moved to do so at this point. 
Nevertheless, one can say that, so far, the newspapers studied seem to have done much to 
establish in the public mind that the Nuremberg Medical Trial is, to all intents and 
purposes, a trial concerning the perpetrators of medical experiments alone. 
 On the same day, the Daily Telegraph published another short report of the Trial. 
Again, this did not describe it in specific terms, but referred to both Karl Brandt‟s denial 
that he was Hitler‟s physician, and the insistence of the defendant Hans Wolfgang 
Romberg, that he had voiced his objections to high-altitude experiments to his superior, 
the late Dr. Rascher.
250Other newspaper reports which appeared before the Trial‟s 
Christmas recess tend   to reinforce this view. On December 14, 1946, the New York 
Times published a photograph of the Nuremberg Medical Trial defendants in the 
courtroom, bearing the caption „Nazi Doctors and Scientists on Trial for Criminal 
Experiments: Defendants before the military tribunal in Nuremberg where they are 
accused of war crimes against inmates of concentration camps and prisoners of war‟.251 
 On December 18, 1946, both the New York Times and the Washington Post 
carried a report from the Trial concerning a tailor (Walter Neffe) in Dachau concentration 
camp, who was handed over for experimentation because he had refused to make a suit 
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for an Elite Guardsman.
252
 Interestingly, both reports describe the Trial in exactly the 
same way; as being of ‟23 Nazi physicians charged with practising cruelties on human 
beings under the guise of science‟,253 a statement which is ambiguous, and could 
obviously be describing both „euthanasia‟ and experimentation. On December 23, 
Newsweek made a further reference to Brig. Gen. Taylor, reporting that „In words fraught 
with bitterness, [he] characterized the most brutal of all war crimes in Nuremberg last 
week. The defendants were twenty-three Nazi doctors and scientists…All were charged 
with conducting a „scientific‟ mass-murder programme in which some 100,000 helpless 
victims were choked, gassed, bled or frozen to death‟.254 This is, of course, ambiguous, 
and could, like the previous report, be a description of virtually any of the Nazi medical 
crimes. However, further reading of the report makes it apparent that it is the issue of 
medical experiments that is being specifically highlighted: „Dr. Leo Alexander, Duke 
University psychiatrist, even produced the word „thanatology‟ (the science of inducing 
death) to try to give meaning to the hideous German experiments in which men and 
women were substituted for monkeys‟.255 A further report in the following issue focused 
on the testimony of Berl Bessing, a Swedish Jew who had been subjected to medical 
experimentation by the Nazis.
256
  
 The London Times gave a short report on the Nuremberg Medical Trial at the 
beginning of January 1947, describing it as „the resumed trial…of 23 Nazi doctors 
charged with experiments on human beings‟.257  This report is particularly interesting, 
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because the focus so far has been largely on newspapers from the United States. The 
Times report would appear to demonstrate a continuation of the trend we have seen 
already for describing the Trial as focusing solely on medical experiments, and it is 
interesting to notice this perception occurring in Britain as well as in the United States. 
There is, however, one report, from the New York Times, which did report briefly on the 
discussion of „euthanasia‟ at the Nuremberg Medical Trial, as follows: „ 
 
Mercy killings charged against four German doctors here were illegal even under Nazi law, 
the prosecutor, James McHaney told the United States War Crimes Court today. „No 
euthenasia (sic) law was ever promulgated in Germany‟, the prosecutor said. „Mercy killers 
have been sentenced to death by German courts and the records of these courts will be 
offered in evidence‟.Adolf Hitler‟s personal physician, Karl Brandt, and three others of the 
twenty-three doctors on the war crimes dock are accused of participating in mercy 
killings.
258
  
 
  
Aside from the unusual spelling of the word „euthanasia‟, this report is interesting for a 
number of reasons. Unusually, it does actually mention discussions of the subject at the 
Nuremberg Medical Trial. In addition, it demonstrates some concern with the legal 
aspects of the programme, implying that the programme‟s illegality was of great 
importance, but that questions regarding the morality of the programme had not been 
considered. There is, it will be remembered, a similar trend to be found in the judgement 
of the Nuremberg Medical Trial, with regard to „euthanasia‟. In addition, the report 
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demonstrates a depressing resurgence of the tendency to refer to the programme 
(uncritically) as „mercy-killing‟. 
 It is important to note that one other article referring to „euthanasia‟ is to be 
found, in the Daily Telegraph. In a detailed report, relating to Viktor Brack‟s affidavit, 
the newspaper states that the aim of the programme was to rid Germany of 
institutionalised people in order to relieve doctors and nurses, and create more free 
hospital beds for members of the armed forces.
259
 This report is significant, not only 
because it refers in detail to the „euthanasia‟ programme itself, but also because, 
throughout the report, whilst the word „euthanasia‟ is used uncritically, without the use of 
quotation marks, the phrase „mercy-killing‟ does appear in quotation marks. This would 
certainly indicate awareness on the part of the Daily Telegraph‟s „own correspondent‟ 
that the programme was not merciful. However, Brack‟s insistence upon his 
„compassionate‟ motives is not referred to.260 In addition, a cynic might consider the 
remarks made by Michael Marrus, to the effect that the understanding of „euthanasia‟ in 
such utilitarian terms, echoing the description of the programme given in the indictment, 
was of inestimable value in separating Nazi „euthanasia‟ and eugenics from discussions 
of these subjects in other countries.
261
  
 As is often the case with long trials, media interest rather waned throughout the 
first months of 1947, undergoing a resurgence when the judgements were passed and the 
sentences were announced. By August 1947, when the judgement and sentences were 
passed, the newspapers were still describing the Nuremberg Medical Trial in terms which 
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strongly suggested that non-consensual human experimentation represented the entire 
scope of its enquiry. For example, when the judgement was announced, the London 
Times reported that the convicted defendants had been found guilty of participation in 
„sadistic „experiments‟ on inmates of concentration camps‟.262 The following day, the 
newspaper reported on the sentences handed down by the Tribunal, and used an almost 
identical description of the atrocities committed, calling them „sadistic „experiments‟ on 
the inmates of a concentration camp‟.263 The Manchester Guardian echoed this, 
informing its readers that the defendants had been found guilty of „crimes against 
humanity and sadistic experiments on human beings in German concentration camps‟.264 
Similarly, the Daily Telegraph reported that the condemned men were „held responsible 
for „sadistic‟ experiments in Nazi concentration camps and guilty of war crimes‟.265 What 
these latter two reports have in common is their inference that the charges did not relate 
entirely to medical experimentation, with the Manchester Guardian referring to an 
additional charge of „crimes against humanity‟, while the Daily Telegraph reported that 
the defendants who had committed these experiments had also been found guilty of „war 
crimes‟. However, neither newspaper comments upon the exact nature of these additional 
charges, nor is there any discussion of „euthanasia‟. 
 This perception of the Trial is mirrored in the United States. On August 20, the 
day the judgement was reported, the Washington Post informed its readers that „[Karl] 
Brandt is eligible for the death sentence. He and 14 other physicians, including one 
woman, were convicted specifically of complicity in torturous medical experiments on 
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„hundreds of thousands‟ of concentration camp inmates – gypsies, Jews, Poles, Russians. 
Almost all died‟.266The Post‟s concentration on Brandt is particularly interesting. Firstly, 
there is no mention of his participation in the „euthanasia‟ campaign, and, secondly, the 
reporter was, apparently, not struck by the bizarre accusation which the Tribunal levelled 
at Brandt, and which was highlighted in the last chapter. Namely, the Tribunal accused 
Brandt of dereliction of duty for deserting the programme after its inception, and thus 
allowing „abuses‟ – the killing of non-Germans – to occur.267 It is also noteworthy that 
the reporter did not appear to be alarmed by the Tribunal‟s pronouncement that they were 
not interested in „the abstract proposition of whether or not a state may impose [my 
italics] euthanasia upon certain classes of its citizens‟.268  
 There could be a number of explanations for this. In the light of the enormity of 
the defendants‟ crimes, the reporter may have been unwilling to criticize the Tribunal in 
any way. The reporter might also have felt that to criticize an American court abroad 
could be considered unpatriotic. This last possibility seems unlikely, however, as the Post 
was at the time a liberal newspaper, noted for its opposition to racial segregation.
269
 This 
would seem to indicate a willingness to criticize the United States authorities when it was 
deemed necessary to do so. 
This section has made clear that the British and U.S. media‟s coverage of the Nuremberg 
Medical Trial portrayed it overwhelmingly as a trial convened for the sole purpose of 
prosecuting Nazis accused of carrying out medical experiments upon non-consenting 
human subjects, who were rendered effectively powerless by their incarceration in 
                                                 
266
 The Washington Post, Wednesday, August 20, 1947, p. 10B. 
267
 FO 646, vol. 23, p. 11395, 19 August, 1947. 
268
 Ibid. 
269
 See The Washington Post, editorials and correspondence, 1946, for examples of this. 
 120 
concentration camps. Though the issue of experiments is, of course, a very important one, 
it is alarming to see the almost total silence on the subject of Nazi „euthanasia‟, which 
was demonstrated in this section. This silence indicates that  the issue failed to strike the 
media as being worth reporting, even given the scale and cruelty of the killings, and the 
alarm which, had the issue been properly considered, must surely have arisen from the 
defendants‟ claims that the motives of the programme were entirely merciful. This has 
ramifications for the public‟s view of the Trial, and also for their perception of the 
problem of „euthanasia‟. As the later sections of the chapter will show, the perception that 
disabled people had no possibility of deriving any enjoyment from life, and were often a 
burden to those caring for them, remained unchallenged in the post-war years. Had the 
media highlighted the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme in its reporting of the Nuremberg 
Medical Trial, it is possible that the public may have been motivated to question these 
assumptions, and that some degree of societal change in this area may have been 
achieved. Of course, the achievement of societal change would have entailed the 
involvement of professionals in important relevant fields, such as law and medicine. 
Consequently, this next section will consider the perception of the Trial in medical circles 
in Britain and the United States. This section will show that this perception was 
remarkably similar to that of the press. In other words, the Nuremberg Medical Trial was 
considered to be one devoted to the prosecution of perpetrators of medical experiments 
upon human beings in concentration camps. This indicates that lack of concern for the 
victims of „euthanasia‟ murders was a phenomenon not confined to the press, but reflects 
a deep-seated and wide-ranging societal perception that the issue was of importance when 
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its practice needed to be defended, but not when it was inflicted upon non-consenting 
victims. 
 
           
Conclusion 
 
  
This chapter tackled the difficult task of, in the words of Martin Pernick, „explaining why 
something didn‟t happen‟. In other words, it showed that the British and U.S. legal and 
medical professions, as well as the journalists of prominent newspapers, understood the 
Nuremberg Medical Trial as a trial for the prosecution of those who experimented upon 
non-consenting inmates of concentration camps. Though this certainly was an important 
aspect of the Trial, the issue of „euthanasia‟ was almost totally overlooked. It was 
suggested that the principle reason for this glaring omission was the overwhelming 
invisibility of the disabled in both Britain and the United States. Though they were, in 
some respects, an ever-present consideration, their institutionalization and the 
overwhelming feeling that they had nothing of any importance to say about themselves, 
and were a problem to be „dealt with‟, aided and abetted the perceptions of their 
„otherness‟ 
The important problem of the widespread perception that disabled people suffered 
intolerably, and that this suffering could only be remedied by death, was brought into 
sharp relief by the material discussed in the „legal‟ section. The cases of Long and 
particularly of Repouille gave a very strong indication of the widely-held belief that 
disability was, in many ways, a fate worse than death. Consequently, death was held to be 
a blessing, rendering its non-consensual nature of no great importance.  This attitude was 
clearly rather ingrained, given that not even something as extreme as the Nazi 
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„euthanasia‟ programme led the legal profession, or, indeed, anyone else discussed in this 
chapter, towards an appreciable unwillingness to accept defences of „euthanasia‟ in 
criminal cases, or to treat them with greater caution when they did arise.  
The „medical‟ section of the chapter revealed that, while many members of the 
medical profession were considerably concerned about the ethical implications of the 
Nazis‟ medical crimes, their worries focused on the question of whether or not it was 
ethical to use data obtained in medical experiments. A notable exception to this was the 
oath formulated at the Bad Nauheim Physicians‟ Conference, although this was only 
applicable to German physicians. The first Annual General Meeting of the World 
Medical Association may have been less successful as regards „euthanasia‟. It prohibited 
physicians from doing „harm‟ to their patients, but did not consider the possibility that the 
principle justification for „euthanasia‟ is the claim that the victim has been killed to spare 
him or her further suffering. 
Our „newspapers‟ section made clear that British and US media reporting of the 
Nuremberg Medical Trial portrayed it as being concerned overwhelmingly with the 
prosecution of perpetrators of medical experiments upon concentration camp prisoners. 
This did not assist the US/British debates about „euthanasia‟, nor did it highlight the ways 
in which the Trial fell short in its discussion of the subject. The overall impression was 
that the „euthanasia‟ aspect of the Trial made little impact upon the media or public 
imagination. This would have meant that the general public would have been largely 
unaware of the issue, and that an opportunity to bring the issue into the public arena, and 
discuss it in the light of an extreme and non-consensual example of its use, was 
completely missed. Such a discussion might have been able to occur if it had been 
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spearheaded by, for example, either the media or concerned professionals in a relevant 
field but, as the two preceding sections showed, discussion of the matter by the medical 
and legal professions virtually paralleled that found in the newspapers. 
The question we are left with now is a deceptively simple one: what difference, if 
any, should we expect Nazi „euthanasia‟ to have made in Britain and the United States? 
Both this chapter, and the limited amount of secondary literature on this particular 
subject, clearly contain expectations that the revelations should have had some 
appreciable effect, quantifiable in terms of a clear demarcation before the reports were 
received, and afterwards. This clearly did not occur. The truth of this is made particularly 
clear by the section of this chapter which dealt with actual cases of „euthanasia‟ in the 
United States and Britain. Though, in both countries, perpetrators of „euthanasia‟ were 
arrested and often convicted, they tended to receive extremely light sentences, and no 
attention seemed to be paid to any wider societal problems which may have gone some 
way towards provoking the killings (such as lack of social care facilities; it will be 
remembered that earlier in the chapter, A.F. Tredgold advocated „euthanasia‟ on the basis 
of lack of institutional provision). In addition, the assumption that disability caused 
intolerable suffering which could only be ended by death was widespread. Just as the 
previous chapter showed that the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme was not taken seriously at 
the Nuremberg Medical Trial, this chapter has established that not even the revelations 
about a systematic programme of murder were sufficient to move those who heard them 
to consider that „euthanasia‟ involves a real human being who has been murdered (such 
as Repouille‟s son and Long‟s daughter), and should be treated accordingly. In the next 
chapter, we will look at the ways in which historians have written about the Nazi 
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„euthanasia‟ programme, and see how early dismissive attitudes have – belatedly – given 
way to proper study of the programme as an event in its own right, and how it has even 
started to be used for socio-political purposes. 
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Chapter Three 
 
 
‘Usually the Topic Has Been Mentioned Only in Passing’: 
Historians’ Perceptions of the Nazi ‘Euthanasia’ Programme 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter will discuss the ways in which English-speaking historians of the Nazi 
period have viewed the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme. Michael Burleigh has claimed that, 
in the decades immediately following the end of the Second World War, German 
historians paid no meaningful attention to the Nazis‟ „euthanasia‟ project, the only text 
dealing with it being Alice Platen Hallermund‟s 1948 book Die Tötung Geisteskranker in 
Deutschland. Aus der Deutschen Ärztekommission beim amerikanischen 
Militärgericht.
270
 Reading between the lines of Burleigh‟s article, however, gives rise to 
the suspicion that, in the early years at least, the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme was not 
regarded as being a subject of great interest and importance by many non-German 
historians either. But why was this? In his review of Henry Friedlander‟s 1995 work, The 
Origins of Nazi Genocide: From Euthanasia to the Final Solution, Robert Gellately, then 
of the University of Western Ontario, remarked that „Although we have been aware, at 
least in broad outline, of the nature and scope of Nazi Germany‟s euthanasia program, 
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usually the topic has been mentioned only in passing‟.271  Gellately did not, however, 
offer any opinions as to why this was so. By contrast, Detlef Mühlberger, of Oxford 
Brooks‟ University, suggested that there were two reasons for this. In his review of 
Michael Burleigh‟s 1994 book Death and Deliverance: Euthanasia in Germany 1900-
1945, Mühlberger argued that, firstly, the Nazis had simply committed so many atrocities, 
that the „euthanasia‟ programme had, in terms of being regarded as an important topic, 
simply fallen by the wayside. Secondly, said Mühlberger, English-speaking historians 
had tended to pay more attention to the crimes committed by the Nazis against Jews and 
people of occupied nations, than those against German civilians.
272
 This was, of course, 
also a feature of the Nuremberg Trials themselves. Support for the view that the Nazi 
„euthanasia‟ programme had been paid relatively little attention by English-speaking 
historians also comes from a review of Burleigh‟s book, which appeared in the journal 
Isis in December, 1995. The reviewer, Sheila Faith Weiss, wrote that „most of the 
existing literature explores only facets of the Nazi Aktion or provides an overview of the 
disturbing particulars as part of the broader (if not unrelated) issues of the Nazi „racial 
state‟, medicine under the swastika, or the Holocaust‟.273 As discussed in my 
introduction, Colin Barnes and others have shown that the institutionalization of impaired 
people from the nineteenth century onwards has given rise to a widespread and tenacious 
assumption that the things which befall impaired people are, and can only ever be, the 
direct result of the impairment itself. In addition, this chapter, like the others, will show 
that there has been a frightening lack of importance attached to the lives of impaired 
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people, and to the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme – the ultimate crime committed against 
them. 
 This chapter will show that the relative lack of attention paid to the Nazi 
„euthanasia‟ programme by English-speaking historians – at least until the 1980s and, 
particularly, the 1990s – was caused by a number of factors. Right up until the mid-
1980s, when ‘Euthanasie’ im NS-Staat: Die ‘Vernichtung lebensunwerten Lebens’, by the 
German journalist Ernst Klee was published, and subsequently reviewed in a number of 
prominent English-speaking historical journals, the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme was, in 
the main, only discussed briefly, and usually only by historians whose books enjoyed a 
rather limited readership. Scholarly discussion of the programme was further hampered 
by the tendency amongst those historians who did consider it, to treat it not primarily as a 
programme of systematic mass-murder, but as an example of how public opposition to a 
killing programme could effectively get that programme stopped. Despite the fact that the 
Nuremberg Medical Trial had established that the programme did not end with Hitler‟s 
„stop‟ order of 1941, historians persistently asserted for decades that it had done so, and 
books are still being published in which claims to this effect are made.  For example, Eric 
Johnson‟s The Nazi Terror: Gestapo, Jews, and Ordinary Germans states that the 
programme ended – and did so immediately following, and largely as a result of, 
Clemens von Galen‟s sermon condemning it.274  Peter Longerich‟s 2001 book The 
Unwritten Order: Hitler’s Role in the Final Solution discusses the programme at some 
length, but still concludes that „resistance will have been a significant reason for breaking 
off the „euthanasia‟ programme.‟275 
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 This chapter will also show that historians in recent years have gone a significant 
way towards repairing the damage done by the dismissive attitudes of earlier scholars 
towards the „euthanasia‟ programme. Debates nowadays centre more upon the question 
of the Nazis‟ motivations for the programme, and the disagreements caused by differing 
interpretations thereof. However, a question-mark remains over how much attention the 
Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme, and other mass-murders of non-Jews by the Nazis, should 
command. For example, in his book The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives 
of Interpretation, Ian Kershaw writes:  
 
„The wider problem alters in essence, therefore, from an attempt to „explain‟ the Holocaust 
specifically through Jewish history or even German-Jewish relations, to the pathology of 
the modern state and … the thin veneer of „civilization‟ in advanced industrial 
societies…[T]his demands an examination of complex processes of rule, and a readiness to 
locate the persecution of the Jews in a broader context of escalating racial discrimination 
and genocidal tendencies directed against various minority groups. This is not to forget the 
very special place which the Jews occupied in the Nazi doctrine, but to argue that the 
problem of explaining the Holocaust is part of the wider problem of how the Nazi regime 
functioned…‟276  
  
Kershaw‟s peculiar concern – that the study of the Nazi persecution of non-Jews may be 
something to apologise for, as opposed to being an entirely legitimate undertaking – is 
echoed by Omer Bartov. In his introduction to a book edited by him, he comments upon 
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the studies of the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme produced by Burleigh and Friedlander, 
writing:  
 
„Far from diverting attention from the genocide of the Jews, they argue … that the so-
called „euthanasia‟ programme set the stage … for the … genocide of the Jews, the Roma 
and Sinti, and other categories of racial, social and political „undesirables‟.277  
 
In other words, attention may be paid to the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme, but only if this 
sheds light on the Nazi genocide of the Jews. This harks back the Nuremberg Medical 
Trial, in which the Tribunal stated that, in their view, a state was perfectly entitled to 
compel classes of its citizens to submit to „euthanasia‟, and that such a measure would 
only be worthy of international censure if it were to be applied in a racist manner. With 
specific regard to the Nazi persecution of the Jews, this chapter will show that, for 
decades, historians‟ discussions of the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme did „shed light‟ (or, 
at least, attention) on the Nazi persecution of the Jews, in the sense that the programme 
was regarded, by those historians who did discuss it, as an example of the possibility of 
German resistance to Nazism, and of what could have happened had the Germans not 
been too rabidly anti-Semitic to protect the Jews in a similar way. This preoccupation 
successfully obscured every aspect of the „euthanasia‟ programme itself. It also shows 
how historians regarded the „euthanasia‟ programme primarily as an ethical issue – not as 
the systematic murder of innocent people. During the last ten to fifteen years, however, a 
significant number of historians have begun to research Nazism from this wider 
perspective mentioned by Ian Kershaw and Omer Bartov.  This has, in many cases, led to 
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greater attention being paid to the „euthanasia‟ programme. This attention has taken the 
form of regarding the „euthanasia‟ programme (and subsequently the Final Solution) as 
arising from European racism and racial hygiene, or of such ideas as Social Darwinism 
and eugenics. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, another development has 
taken place. The new discipline of Disability History has also begun to consider the Nazi 
„euthanasia‟ programme, albeit in ways that are at least as much to do with socio-political 
issues as they are with history. All-in-all, this chapter will show that, whilst there may 
still be some way to go, study of the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme has come an 
amazingly long way, from unpromising beginnings when it was all too often dismissed, 
ignored, or noticed only by those who wished to use it to demonstrate the possibilities of 
German resistance to Nazism. 
During the decades immediately following the end of World War Two, no scholarly 
works dealt specifically with the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme. Seminal works on 
Nazism, such as William Shirer‟s bestselling The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich278 
make no reference to the programme at all. Shirer‟s book does contain an extensive 
discussion of the Nuremberg Medical Trial, and of the crimes which the defendants had 
committed. However, the Trial is discussed in a section of the book dealing with Nazi 
medical experiments, and there is no mention that the „euthanasia‟ programme was one of 
these crimes, and there are no references to the Nuremberg defendants Karl Brandt and 
Viktor Brack.
279
 Other important works, such as Alan Bullock‟s Hitler: A Study in 
Tyranny
280
, and Hitler’s Table-Talk281, edited by Hugh Trevor-Roper, similarly make no 
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reference to it.  A surprising exception to this is the British historian, William Carr, who 
refers to the programme briefly in his book A History of Germany 1815-1945. His view is 
that the programme‟s ostensible demise can be attributed to two factors: protests from 
church leaders, and the fact that the perpetrators were needed, in mid-1941, to facilitate 
mass-killings in the east.
282
 This perspective is particularly interesting, because Carr is 
virtually the only writer of this period to pay any attention to this transfer of personnel – a 
theme which would not generally be taken up by scholars for several decades to come, 
and which will be considered in section two of this chapter. Most scholars of this period 
who discuss the „euthanasia‟ programme conclude that it ended simply because the 
German public unanimously opposed the killing of „their own‟ people, and the Nazis 
were powerless to resist these protests, despite the fact that the need to transfer the T4 
personnel had been specifically mentioned during the course of the Nuremberg Medical 
Trial. Carr‟s comments concerning the supposed „end‟ of the „euthanasia‟ programme are 
also fitting. They lead into the next section of the chapter. Here, I will show that the most 
persistent and insidious reaction to the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme has been the 
insistence by historians that it was only significant because the protests against it 
established how anti-Semitic the bulk of the German population were, and how they 
could have prevented the Final Solution if they had made any attempt to do so. This 
obfuscation had a devastating effect on the academic (and, presumably) public perception 
of the programme. No attempt was made to establish anything about it or its victims; it 
was sufficient to remark that it had crumbled in response to pressure from prominent 
churchmen and the relatives of victims. Then, to complete the effect, all one had to do 
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was make some additional comment (in suitably offended tones) that all this just goes to 
show what could have happened if the German public had wanted to protect the Jews. 
The disability historian Catherine J. Kudlick has written that  
 
„Unlike racial, ethnic and sexual minorities, disabled people experience attacks cloaked 
in pity accompanied by a widely held perception that no one wishes them ill‟.283 
 
As this section will show, this is perhaps a partial explanation for the attitude to the Nazi 
„euthanasia‟ programme demonstrated by the historians we will encounter here.  To me, 
the emphasis on the protests rather than the programme is probably due to a number of 
factors. As discussed in the introduction, it has been quite a struggle to get people, both 
within academia and within society at large, to recognise that the effects of disability are 
often due to societal factors rather than arising directly from the individual‟s impairment.  
      
‘Outraged Human Feelings’: The Protests against the ‘Euthanasia’ Programme 
 
One of the most famous aspects of the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme concerns the way in 
which knowledge of it became public, leading to protests from the relatives of victims, 
and from prominent churchmen, such as Clemens von Galen, the Archbishop of Münster. 
These protests led to a publicly announced „halt‟, and, allegedly, to the complete stop of 
the programme. As mentioned in the introduction, this is an impression of the 
„euthanasia‟ programme which went almost totally unchallenged in Anglo-American 
historical circles until the late 1980s, when various historians, such as Paul Weindling 
and Robert Proctor, influenced by the work of German scholars such as Götz Aly and 
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Ernst Klee, began to study the Nazi ideology, and the resulting Nazi genocide, in terms of 
a comprehensively racist and eugenicist world-view arising partly from earlier European 
and Western ideologies such as Social Darwinism and eugenics. The work done by 
Weindling, Proctor and others was added to in the mid-1990s by the publication of Henry 
Friedlander‟s The Origins of Nazi Genocide: From Euthanasia to the Final Solution, and 
Michael Burleigh‟s Death and Deliverance: Euthanasia in Germany 1900-1945.284 These 
were the first books by English-speaking historians to be devoted specifically to the study 
of Nazi „euthanasia‟, and Friedlander describes the idea that the programme ceased 
completely as „based on a postwar myth‟.285 However, one thing which the Nuremberg 
Medical Trial did manage to establish was that the programme was, at most, temporarily 
suspended, and that the murder of children in particular continued right up until the end 
of the war.
286
 Despite this, many books which refer to the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme 
pay great attention to the public protests, to the extent of implying that their result was 
that so-called „wild euthanasia‟ was decentralised, and thus, that no further discussion of 
it is required (as it might legitimately be regarded as being an autonomous action by the 
perpetrators, rather than as an actual part of Nazi policy). Early examples of this approach 
can be found in Gerald Reitlinger‟s The Final Solution, and in Leon Poliakov‟s Harvest 
of Hate, originally published in French, but included here because it was published in 
English in 1954, and reissued in 1956. Also of relevance is Günther Lewy‟s The Catholic 
Church and Nazi Germany, which was published in 1964.
287
 Reitlinger‟s book gives an 
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account of the protests against the programme. He identifies these as having been led by 
the Christian churches, but with the addition of very significant public support.
288
 The 
result of the protests, he says, was that „in the end public opinion won and Hitler had to 
be content with his 50,000 or 60,000 German victims‟.289 Reitlinger continues,  
 
„There is some difference of opinion whether German adult mental patients were still killed 
after Bouhler had suspended operations. According to Viktor Brack, only (!) idiot children 
were still sent to the death institutes...‟290 Furthermore, „In Germany the calculated 
slaughter of lunatics and incurables had just ceased‟.291  
 
 Reitlinger raises the possibility that the killing of adults continued to occur to an 
extent
292
, but that this was not the result of adherence to any central policy – and 
consequently needs no further investigation. This explains Reitlinger‟s statement that the 
calculated slaughter of „lunatics and incurables‟ had just ceased. Furthermore, it is 
implied that the programme was of little importance to the Nazis and could be stopped 
without hesitation, and also that public opinion was unanimous in condemning it. The 
reason for the public objections, writes Reitlinger, was simple: „an asocial person, 
although a nuisance, might still be a German. If, however, the asocial belonged to a 
subject race, public opinion was dumb‟.293 Reitlinger‟s basis for this statement is the lack 
of public protest at the establishment of Auschwitz, which, he says, „was then part of 
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Germany‟.294 This phenomenon is particularly interesting in the light of the Nuremberg 
Medical Trial. Here, it will be remembered, one of the reasons for not taking the issue of 
„euthanasia‟ seriously was that the victims were largely German. 
 Reitlinger‟s stance is also taken by Guenther Lewy and Leon Poliakov. After 
having given an account of the public and church protests against the „euthanasia‟ 
programme, Poliakov writes:  
 
„Here again we must understand what is meant by „human feelings‟. The instructive 
example of the „euthanasia program‟ indicates clearly enough how the „will of the people‟, 
German public opinion, was able to be an active and effective factor…We have seen how 
this other extermination programme…had to be stopped because of the outcry against it of 
a population whose „human feelings‟ it had outraged. Also, the extermination of the so-
called „useless mouths‟ concerned German lives that were flesh of their flesh‟.295 
 
 Similarly, Lewy writes:  
 
„But the large majority of the very people who had been outraged when their sons and 
daughters, brothers and sisters, had been put to death, failed to react in the same manner 
when their Jewish neighbours were deported and eventually killed in the very gas chambers 
designed for and first tried out in the euthanasia program … There is little doubt that the 
vigor of the public outcry against the euthanasia program encouraged the Catholic Church 
to take a strong stand … That German public opinion and the Church were a force to be 
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reckoned with in principle and could have played a role in the Jewish disaster as well – that 
is the principle lesson to be derived from the fate of Hitler‟s euthanasia program‟.296  
 
In other words, do not, whatever you do, make the mistake of thinking that the 
„euthanasia‟ programme or its victims are important in themselves. Lewy also has some 
interesting remarks to make concerning the differences between the sterilization law 
implemented by the Nazis in Germany, and sterilizations carried out in the United States. 
Writes Lewy,  
 
„[D]uring the first year of the law‟s operation [in Nazi Germany] 32,268 sterilizations were 
carried out; in 1935, 73,714 persons were sterilized, and 63,547 in 1936. Each of these last 
figures was higher than the number sterilized in over fifty years in the United States, where 
from the enactment of the first sterilization law in 1907 until 1958, 60,166 sterilizations 
took place; furthermore, some of these were voluntary‟.297 
 
 Lewy does not inform us how many of these sterilizations were voluntary, nor does he 
consider the problem of whether, if one is living in a society in which sterilization is 
well-established and, apparently, widely accepted, a decision to have oneself sterilized 
was really entirely voluntary. In addition, Lewy‟s remarks indicate that, in his view, the 
lower number of sterilizations performed in the States is quite sufficient to absolve the 
United States from any accusation that its own sterilization laws bore any similarity at all 
to those of Nazi Germany. Though Lewy‟s remarks were not taken up at the time he 
made them, this chapter will show that they form an important link between Lewy 
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himself and later writers, such as Robert Jay Lifton (who broadly endorses Lewy‟s 
views), and Henry Friedlander (who does not).   
 As far as study of the „euthanasia‟ programme is concerned, these books 
disseminate the impression that the programme is important primarily, if not solely, as an 
exemplar. In other words, its distinguishing feature is taken to be that public opinion 
allegedly stopped it, not that it occurred in the first place. This may perhaps be partly 
explained by the fact that both Poliakov and Lewy take very pragmatic views of the 
motivations for the programme, with Poliakov writing:  
 
„It is significant that the decree activating the program is dated September 1, 1939, that is, 
the day on which war was declared…at such a time, moreover, one needed all the hospital 
space, physicians, and medical personnel one could find, and the fewer „useless mouths‟ 
the better. For this reason, from the beginning, the measure aimed less at those on the point 
of dying than at the feeble-minded and incurably insane‟.298 
 
 Similarly, Lewy reports that 
 
„On September 1, 1939, Hitler issued an order to kill all persons with incurable diseases. 
The start of the war seemed the propitious moment for inaugurating this … program, which 
… promised to yield much needed hospital space and to eliminate „useless eaters‟.299  
  
In addition, these writers are not the only ones to draw attention to the programme in 
terms of the effect that public protests about it were felt to have had. Poliakov himself 
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quotes from the judgement in the case of Veit Harlan, the director of the viciously anti-
Jewish film Jew Süss. The judgement in this case stated:  
 
„If large groups had openly or secretly opposed the persecution of the Jews as…they had 
opposed the murder of the mentally ill, the development of the terror would have been 
impossible in the long run, or at least it would have been retarded and made very 
difficult.
300
  
 
A similar train of thought is pursued by William O. Shanahan of the University of 
Oregon, in his review of Lewy‟s The Catholic Church and Nazi Germany, which 
appeared in the American Historical Review in January, 1966. The only difference is that, 
influenced by his reading of Lewy‟s book, Shanahan blames lack of courage amongst 
German bishops for the fact that the genocide of the Jews was allowed to develop and 
take place unimpeded: 
 
„…the German bishops underestimated their political strength. Not even a totalitarian 
government can remain indifferent to public disquiet, or to a show of popular resentment. 
Effective Catholic remonstrances against the euthanasia program demonstrate this point … 
Bishop Galen‟s sermon (Aug. 3 1940) appear[s] to have slowed and then stopped 
euthanasia – at least on the home front. Why, in the face of this success (and some others 
that Lewy records) did the hierarchy fail to speak out plainly against mass deportations and 
the „Final Solution‟?‟301 
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The protests to the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme were also discussed at length in Richard 
Grunberger‟s A Social History of the Third Reich, a book which, like William Shirer‟s 
The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, appears generally to have met with greater popular 
than scholarly success. This book is divided into chapters, each of which discusses some 
aspect of normal life under the Nazi regime, e.g. „Cinema‟ and „Health‟. The Nazi 
„euthanasia‟ programme is referred to a significant number of times, and is discussed in a 
certain amount of detail. Yet again, it becomes depressingly clear that its importance is 
considered to lie in the German public‟s reaction to it (portrayed as one of universal 
condemnation), rather than in the fact that the programme was implemented and resulted 
in the murder of at least tens of thousands of people. Grunberger also refers persistently 
to the programme as „mercy-killing‟. This take on the programme‟s importance is evident 
from the very first time Grunberger mentions it, when he writes: „The realization of what 
war and occupation meant to the occupied dawned only on a few Germans, and – unlike 
the euthanasia killings of German incurables and mental defectives – never agitated 
public opinion‟.302 Grunberger‟s second reference to the programme comes two hundred 
pages or so later, and is a reference in passing to what he describes as the „wartime 
mercy-killing of the mentally and physically handicapped‟, a description which indicates 
that Grunberger may be taking his „historical objectivity‟ to too great a length.303 
Grunberger‟s next reference to the programme comes in his section on „The Cinema‟, in 
which „films purporting to highlight the existence of certain problems currently in the 
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process of being solved‟ are discussed.304 Amongst these is Ich Klage an, the famous 
1941 film designed to accustom the German public to the idea of „euthanasia‟. 
Grunberger reports that the authorities took note of the reactions of audience-members to 
the film, and includes the following comment: „Quite interesting, but in this film, the 
same thing happens as in the asylums where they are finishing off all the lunatics right 
now. What guarantee have we got that no abuses creep in?‟305 
Grunberger describes this comment as „Delphic‟, and remarks that what he calls 
„this sort of boomerang effect‟ can also be seen in public reactions to other films: „The 
SD reported apprehensions in the ethnically mixed eastern provinces that Polish viewers 
of colonial liberation epics … might be stimulated into identifying themselves with the 
rebels on the screen…‟306 It is rather difficult to gauge from this what sort of picture 
Grunberger is attempting to paint here of public reactions to the Nazi „euthanasia‟ 
programme; clearly, what links the comments in the SD reports is a public fear that life 
might begin to imitate art. However, this explanation is unsatisfactory as far as Ich Klage 
an is concerned, as the audience-member interviewed claims that the sort of killing the 
film portrays is the same as that taking place in asylums, thus his/her fear that abuses 
might occur would seem to relate only to some possible extension of these killings. Of 
course, we do not know what sort of extension the interviewee might have envisaged and 
this is possibly why Grunberger describes the comment as „Delphic‟. In any event, unless 
the SD had managed to uncover the only audience-member at any screening of Ich Klage 
an who was not passionately opposed to what was happening „in the asylums, where they 
are finishing off all the lunatics right now‟, it would seem that this report, so diligently 
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quoted by Grunberger, provides further evidence that at least one member of the German 
public must have believed that „finishing off all the lunatics‟ did not constitute an „abuse‟ 
of euthanasia. Grunberger, however, makes no mention of this interpretation. 
The problem of interpretation rears its head once more when Grunberger describes some 
of the events leading to the implementation of the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme:  
 
„In preparation for the euthanasia programme the Nazi authorities summoned leading 
members of university medical faculties to secret recording sessions for Assessoren, i.e. 
selectors of feeble-minded and incurably ill inmates of institutions for mercy-killing. At 
one such session a medical luminary (Professor Ewald) walked out in protest – but none of 
his eight fellow-professors present followed suit‟.307 
 
 This particular passage is especially important. We have seen so far – and are about to 
see again – that, in Grunberger‟s view, one of the most important aspects of the Nazi 
„euthanasia‟ programme was the large part played by the German public in its supposed 
demise. His interest in German attitudes to Nazi policies having been clearly established, 
one would expect that Grunberger would also have offered some additional discussion of 
the apparent acceptance of the programme by Professor Ewald‟s eight colleagues. Surely 
this would indicate that attitudes to the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme were rather less 
simplistic than Grunberger maintains? Disappointingly, however, this is not an avenue 
which Grunberger sees fit to explore. In addition, this discussion of the programme 
contains another uncritical use of the phrase „mercy-killing‟. 
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      Grunberger‟s final two references to the programme deal specifically with the 
protests against it. He makes clear that these protests were led by the Church, and 
contrasts these with the Church‟s silence regarding the Nazi persecution of the Jews, 
which was only protested publicly about in March 1943, and the protest was led by the 
non-Jewish wives of Jewish men rounded up for deportation, not by an official body.
308
  
Though Grunberger does not reveal whether this protest was successful or not, he uses it 
as a basis for his complaint that  
 
„In the entire history of the Third Reich, no single body – civic, academic, or even religious 
– ever made use of such opportunities as it had for publicly protesting about the regime‟s 
inhumanity. The feasibility of protests of this nature was demonstrated…by Cardinal 
Galen‟s denunciation of euthanasia from the pulpit, which evoked a sufficiently strong 
resonance to halt the regime‟s „mercy-killing‟ programme. But the euthanasia victims were 
flesh of German flesh, and those affected by their deaths ranged through all classes of 
society…as far as the great majority were concerned, Jewish suffering affected beings in 
another galaxy rather than inhabitants of the same planet as themselves‟.309  
 
In common with the historians whose works we have already considered in this section, 
we can see that in his enthusiasm for interpreting the German public reaction to news of 
the „euthanasia‟ programme as one of wholehearted opposition, Grunberger has portrayed 
the programme as, primarily, an example of German anti-Semitism, not as a programme 
of systematic murder against people who were, overwhelmingly, not Jewish. As 
happened with previous scholarly works endorsing this point of view, the forceful 
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insistence that the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme was notable only for the circumstances 
of its supposed demise, will have hampered any attempts that there might have been to 
study the details of the programme itself. 
Peter Stern‟s 1975 book Hitler: The Fuhrer and the People also considered the 
Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme, and Stern‟s conclusions were very similar to those reached 
by those of his scholarly predecessors whose works have been considered during the 
course of this chapter. In other words, the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme was not 
important in itself; its value for historians lay in the German public reaction to it. Stern 
gives an account of the various protests against the programme made by Catholic and 
Protestant churchmen, concluding:  
 
„Three weeks later most of Aktion T4 was discontinued. The protests on behalf of Aryan 
Germans had proved to be effective enough. Whether similar protests on behalf of their 
Jewish fellow citizens would have been equally effective we shall never know. The 
hypothesis was not tested‟.310 
 
Ian Kershaw‟s well-known Popular Opinion and Political Dissent also makes 
liberal use of the protests against the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme, discussing them in a 
very traditional way, in which the victims of the programme are, as well as its origins, 
post-1941 continuation, and moral implications are again, totally ignored. They do not, 
apparently, fit in very well with the tale Kershaw, like many historians before him, 
wishes to tell, a tale of selective German resistance to Hitler,  and of German anti-
Semitism, rather than as a programme of mass-killing. The programme is, of course, 
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referred to – we are told that „the „euthanasia action‟ was set in motion by a secret written 
order of Hitler shortly after the beginning of the war. By the time the „action‟ was 
officially halted almost two years later it had accounted for the deaths of more than 
70,000 mentally and physically handicapped persons‟.311 Interspersed with Kershaw‟s 
examples of opposition to the „euthanasia‟ programme are also brief references to the 
people who were actually killed.
312
 Nevertheless, this is overwhelmingly a tale of 
German resistance. The few lines describing the programme itself, taken against the 
twelve-page tale of the resistance towards it, render the victims of Nazi „euthanasia‟ 
effectively invisible and irrelevant. It is hardly surprising that Kershaw should conclude 
that „the Churches came, in 1941, to lead a victory without parallel for public opinion in 
halting the „euthanasia action‟.313 Kershaw reveals in a footnote that the programme did 
not end, but it is hard to envisage that this admission would have had much impact upon 
the reader. It is also important to highlight Kershaw‟s complete failure to mention the 
propaganda against „useless eaters‟, and his lack of discussion of any possible motives for 
the instigation of Nazi „euthanasia‟. It is as though this programme of systematic murder 
came, in Kershaw‟s view, from nowhere, and could be discarded the moment opposition 
to it began to be heard. As we have seen, this is an attitude which many historians have 
taken towards the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme. In Kershaw‟s case, this may be partially 
explicable by pointing to the fact that his book is largely devoted to a discussion of 
popular public opposition to Nazi policies. Nevertheless, in the case of the „euthanasia‟ 
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programme, this is just another instance of the study of Nazi „euthanasia‟ itself being 
effectively obscured by historians‟ desire to focus on opposition to it, and to regard it as a 
symbol of the possibility of German resistance to the Nazis, as well as a demonstration of 
German anti-Semitism. 
The following year, (1988), a book was published entitled Comprehending the 
Holocaust, and it was a collection of papers which had been given at a conference on the 
Nazi genocide, at the University of Haifa two years previously.
314
 One of these essays 
was by Ian Kershaw, who used the opportunity to revisit the topic of the German protests 
against the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme, with striking results. Kershaw‟s contribution to 
the book was an essay entitled „German Popular Opinion During the „Final Solution‟: 
Information, Comprehension, Reactions‟.315 As this essay concerns popular resistance to 
the Nazis, it is not unsurprising that Kershaw should have written a section focusing on 
the protests against the „euthanasia‟ programme. There proves to be, however, a startling 
disparity between the descriptions of the protests given by Kershaw in the main body of 
his essay, and those which are given in the related footnote. The text of the essay paints 
the protests in simple humanitarian terms: 
 
„In the most celebrated instance [of civil disobedience], the so-called „euthanasia action‟ – 
a genuine issue of humanitarian concern – a halt (at least in part) was called to the 
liquidation of heredity (sic) and incurably sick persons in asylums within Germany itself, 
as a result of growing popular unease and objections articulated by leading churchmen. The 
fact that protest could and did take place on a range of issues, even including, as in the 
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„euthanasia action‟, a directly humanitarian issue, itself indicates the hollowness of the 
apologetics that the terroristic repression of a totalitarian system was sufficient in itself to 
deter any dissent‟.316 
 
This reference to the protests against the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme is a confusing 
one, especially with regard to Kershaw‟s repeated references to „humanitarian concern‟. 
It is not entirely clear whether he means to say that the protests against the programme 
had a humanitarian basis, or whether, for some reason, this description refers to the 
programme itself. When one reads the related footnote, however, it becomes clear that 
Kershaw meant to say that the basis of the protests, not the programme, was 
humanitarian. The footnote also, however, complicates matters considerably, as it casts 
considerable doubt on exactly how humanitarian the protests were:  
 
„It should be noted, however: that unrest did not emanate alone or even chiefly from 
humanitarian concern, but arose in good measure from doubt – reaching into Nazi circles – 
about the lack of clear legal guidelines and sanctions for the taking of „useless life‟; that the 
well-known public protest by Bishop von Galen was voiced only in August, 1941, after the 
„action‟ had been in operation for close on two years…that by August 1941 the numbers 
murdered in the „action‟ had already exceeded the official target figure for potential 
victims; that „euthanasia‟ murders did in fact continue in Germany itself (and even more 
extensively in the occupied territories)… and that, according to one piece of post-war 
testimony, the „halt‟ of August 1941 amounted to a rumor put around by the Propaganda 
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Ministry, suggesting that the Führer had just discovered the truth of what was going on, 
and had immediately ordered its cessation‟.317  
 
This might well have been „noted‟, but only by a particularly eagle-eyed reader, who was 
in the habit of giving footnotes and main text equal degrees of attention. 
 
Here, Kershaw seems to have taken footnotes, or rather, endnotes, somewhat 
beyond their usual function. Traditionally, endnotes and footnotes are repositories for 
additional information which one has not been able to include in the main body of one‟s 
essay or chapter. In this instance, however, the information in Kershaw‟s endnote directly 
contradicts that given in his talk. There, Kershaw states twice that the basis of the protests 
was solely humanitarian, when the information in his endnote, taken from Ernst Klee‟s 
1983 book, „Euthanasie’ im NS-Staat: Die ‘Vernichtung lebensunwerten Lebens’ shows 
that this was not the only reason for the protests, and is unlikely even to have been the 
principal one.
318
 Perhaps even more importantly, the footnote also shows that, contrary to 
Kershaw‟s claim that the protests led to a cessation of the programme „at least in part‟, 
the programme actually continued. Kershaw is, as we have seen, by no means the first 
historian to assume that the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme was so inconsequential that it 
could be swiftly abandoned the moment a murmur of protest was raised against it. 
As has become evident throughout the course of this chapter, many, many 
historians have highlighted the protests against the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme, and this 
focus has generally been at the expense of discussion of the programme itself. As we 
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have seen, the protests against the programme have been seen as being particularly 
important, because they are taken as proof of the possibility of German resistance, and 
regarded as clear evidence of German anti-Semitism. One wonders, therefore, if one 
explanation for the lack of engagement amongst historians with the reality of the 
programme itself and its cultural and historical context, might sometimes be a fear that 
such interest would itself appear to be an expression of anti-Semitism. It is, for example, 
noteworthy that Kershaw neither referred to any of the propaganda against „useless 
eaters‟, nor questioned his own assumption that every single person in German society 
was vehemently opposed to the programme, even though Ernst Klee‟s book could have 
provided him with ample evidence that this was not the case. Such evidence, had 
Kershaw provided it, would surely also have come under the heading of „German Popular 
Opinion‟, which was the title of Kershaw‟s talk. 
The protests to the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme are also discussed at length by 
Daniel Goldhagen, in his notorious work, Hitler’s Willing Executioners. The reliability of 
this book has been called into question by many scholars who have identified, amongst 
other things, Goldhagen‟s cavalier attitude to his source material. Nevertheless, 
Goldhagen‟s attitude to the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme is surprisingly similar to that 
taken by more respected scholars, such as Ian Kershaw. In common with such scholars, 
Goldhagen regards the programme as an example of German resistance, and of German 
anti-Semitism. In his view, the German public were unanimous in their rejection of it, 
but, luckily, it was of no importance to the Nazis, and could be dropped, like the 
proverbial hot potato, once the objections to it became troublesome. Goldhagen describes 
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it as „the best-known case of protest that took place in Nazi Germany‟.319 He lists exactly 
what he believes the protests indicated about the German population as a whole: 
„Germans (1) recognized the slaughter to be wrong; (2) expressed their views about it; (3) 
openly protested for an end to the killing; (4) suffered no retribution for having expressed 
their views and for pressing their demands and (5) succeeded in producing a formal 
cessation of the killing program, and saving German lives‟.320 In an explanatory footnote, 
Goldhagen refers his readers to a number of recent (and not so recent) published works 
on Nazi euthanasia, namely, Michael Burleigh‟s Death and Deliverance, Ian Kershaw‟s 
Popular Opinion and Political Dissent in Nazi Germany, Guenther Lewy‟s The Catholic 
Church and Nazi Germany, and Ernst Klee‟s groundbreaking Euthanasie im NS-Staat.321  
Goldhagen‟s reading of Kershaw‟s book (and Lewy‟s) would, as we have seen, have led 
him to adopt exactly the attitude towards the „euthanasia‟ programme which he exhibits. 
However, Burleigh and Klee‟s studies make it absolutely clear that the Nazi „euthanasia‟ 
programme is deeply important in its own right, should no longer be ignored because of a 
preference among scholars for reporting, in offended tones, the opposition to it. 
Goldhagen‟s footnote continues with his own comments: „The regime‟s killing of „life 
unworthy of living‟, though formally suspended, did continue with greater concealment 
in a program known as Aktion 14f13. Still, Germans‟ moral opposition to and political 
protest against the murders led to the sparing of many Germans‟ lives‟.322 As Henry 
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Friedlander has written, Aktion 14f13 was in fact a different programme, involving the 
murder of sick and disabled (and Jewish) concentration camp inmates.
323
   
At this point, Goldhagen also expresses his views concerning the motives for the 
protests against the „euthanasia‟ programme. These were „a consequence of their [the 
German public‟s] rejection of important aspects of Nazi biological racism. As far as these 
Germans were concerned, the victims were German people possessing the right to life 
and to decent care which such membership brought‟.324  This echoes Grunberger, Lewy 
and Reitlinger‟s remarks concerning the motives for the protests against the programme. 
It also strikes me that, in some respects, the historians quoted in this section might 
legitimately be accused of, to paraphrase Richard Grunberger, treating the victims of the 
„euthanasia‟ programme as though they were „beings from another galaxy‟.  
 
‘Euthanasia’ and the Final Solution: Technical Evolution of Mass Murder 
Gerald Reitlinger‟s 1953 work The Final Solution is one of the first to consider 
the links between the „euthanasia‟ programme and the Final Solution. Reitlinger makes 
important use of the Nuremberg Medical Trial transcript in his efforts to connect the two 
by showing that, in many cases, those involved in the former were also actively complicit 
in the latter.
325
 To this end, he makes the rather startling statement that „Thus it was 
brought to light that the „mercy-killers‟ had served under the mass-murderer Globocnik. 
The same men, doctors as well as police officers, who had allegedly worked for human 
welfare, had built up an organisation that tortured and killed millions of normal beings‟ 
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[my italics].
326
 As Martin S. Pernick has pointed out, historical sources making liberal use 
of such terms as „lunatics‟, „imbeciles‟, and „idiot children‟ are not necessarily as 
viciously pejorative as they would be were they to appear in modern works.
327
 
Nevertheless, Reitlinger‟s reference to „normal beings‟ does not inspire a great deal of 
confidence in his views of the „euthanasia‟ programme.  
 Other sources of this period do refer to the „euthanasia‟ programme periodically, 
and it seems that the majority of these formed a part of what Peter Novick claims was a 
niche market – books, usually written by Jewish academics, concentrating specifically on 
the Nazi genocide of the Jews, but tending to make some mention of extermination 
programmes which had been directed at other groups.
328
 A reading of these sources in 
which the „euthanasia‟ programme is mentioned demonstrates that some of these 
historians‟ understanding of it tallies very much with the portrayal of the programme 
which emerged from the Nuremberg Medical Trial, particularly with regard to the 
supposedly compassionate motives of the defendants, and the desire to ensure that the 
victims „did not suffer‟. Nevertheless, it is in these sources that we find the first 
discussions of the origins of the use of gas chambers in the Final Solution. This theme 
would, as we shall see, come to be discussed in greater detail by historians, but one of the 
first instances of this train of thought comes in Raul Hilberg‟s 1961 book The Destruction 
of the European Jews, in which there is a discussion of the „euthanasia‟ programme, 
albeit an extremely brief one.  
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 Hilberg‟s information about the programme does not come from the Nuremberg 
Medical Trial, but from the 1946 affidavit of Dr. Konrad Morgen who, we are told, was 
an SS officer brought in to investigate corruption in the SS.
329
 Hilberg writes that Hitler‟s 
„euthanasia‟ order was „intended for and applied to incurably insane persons only‟, an 
insight he gained from Morgen‟s affidavit. Apparently, from his vantage point 
investigating SS corruption, Morgen „gained insight into the killing phase of the 
destruction process‟.330 The problem is that Morgen had no real connection with the 
„euthanasia‟ programme, save that, in 1943, he had come into contact with Christian 
Wirth, a major architect of the Final Solution, who had developed the „technology‟ of the 
gas chambers later used in the Aktion Reinhard death camps by conducting „trial runs‟ on 
„the insane‟ in an abandoned prison in Brandenburg an der Havel. 331 The result of his 
reliance on Morgen‟s affidavit is that Hilberg is able to state, confidently, „[Christian] 
Wirth constructed carbon monoxide gas chambers, a device which overwhelmed its 
victims without their apprehension and which caused them no pain‟.332 
 It is clear that Hilberg did not get his information from anyone involved in the 
Nuremberg Medical Trial. Indeed, on the evidence of his text it did not occur to him to 
mention the Trial at all. However, we can see that his reliance on Morgen has led to much 
the same result as reliance on the Trial transcript might have done. Firstly, Morgen‟s 
claim that the victims of the „euthanasia‟ programme were all incurably insane was, it 
will be remembered, an unchallenged defence which allowed the Nuremberg Medical 
Trial defendants to evade the question of non-consensual killing. Secondly, the claim that 
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the victims did not suffer whilst being gassed has, as in the Nuremberg Medical Trial, 
gone unchallenged. Hilberg‟s focus on the supposedly „gentle‟ death of the victims of the 
„euthanasia‟ programme has also helpfully obscured the circumstances surrounding the 
killings. The impression given by Hilberg is that the motives of the programme were 
merciful, despite the killings being totally non-consensual. As in the Nuremberg Medical 
Trial, there is no real attempt to establish anything about the victims, other than to parrot 
Morgen‟s claim that they were „incurably insane‟. From there, Hilberg leaps to the 
unstated but very clear conclusion that, as the killing was „painless‟, no further discussion 
of the programme is required. Hilberg‟s book was reviewed positively in both the 
American Historical Review
333
, and the Journal of Modern History.
334
 Neither of these 
publications makes any reference to Hilberg‟s remarks on the Nazi „euthanasia‟ 
programme, something which is hardly surprising, given both the brevity of Hilberg‟s 
description of it, as well as the length of his book, and the amount of information 
contained therein. Nevertheless, any reader who did get an impression of the programme 
from reading Hilberg‟s book would be left with a view of it similar to that provided by 
the Nuremberg Medical Trial. What Hilberg also demonstrates, however, is that, in his 
view, the use of gassing as a method of mass-killing is one factor linking the Nazi 
„euthanasia‟ programme with the subsequent Final Solution.   
 As we saw in the previous section, for some decades, historians‟ principle 
reaction to the „euthanasia‟ programme was that of highlighting protests against it, to the 
complete exclusion of any details about it. Thus perhaps it is not entirely surprising that 
the theme of links between the „euthanasia‟ programme and the Final Solution was not 
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taken up again until 1985. In this year, the historian Gerald Fleming published Hitler and 
the Final Solution.
335
 This book was intended as a final rebuttal of the controversial 
historian David Irving, who had claimed (as appears to be his wont) that Hitler was 
ignorant of the extermination of the Jews until at least 1943.
336
 To support this thesis, 
Fleming points to the example of the „euthanasia‟ programme. This is only part of his 
thesis, and pertains rather more to links which Fleming identifies between the methods 
common to both the „euthanasia‟ programme, and to the Final Solution. Most prominent 
amongst these are (a) mass-killing by means of built-in gas chambers and (b) pilfering of 
gold teeth from corpses.
337
 Fleming writes that, at Sobibor, identical liquidation 
procedures were in place, and that these procedures were identical both in terms of the 
use of carbon monoxide gas, and as regards the despoliation of corpses.
338
 
Arno Mayer‟s 1988 work Why Did the Heavens Not Darken? also considered the 
question of similarities between the „euthanasia‟ programme and the Final Solution. It is 
particularly interesting to compare Mayer‟s analysis with that of Fleming. Fleming‟s 
argument centre on clear parallels between the two programmes, which, he claims, make 
it quite obvious that the one arose out of the „trial run‟ of the other. Mayer states that 
though it is tempting to look at the matter from this point of view, the „euthanasia‟ 
programme is, in fact, not „the ever elusive missing link in the chain of Hitler‟s sole and 
direct responsibility for the Jewish torment‟.339 In Mayer‟s view, the similarities between 
the „euthanasia‟ programme and the Final Solution, though obvious, are insufficient to 
allow the former to be regarded as a direct antecedent of the latter. The reason for this is 
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that, in Mayer‟s view, the „euthanasia‟ personnel were not sufficiently pivotal in the 
implementation of the Final Solution: „Many or most of them were truck drivers, 
guardsmen, cremators and clerks‟. This claim could hardly be made with regard to Viktor 
Brack, or to Christian Wirth or Franz Stangl (both of whom were former bureau chiefs of 
Schloss Hartheim, near Linz), but Mayer insists that even these men were relatively small 
fry who had little contact with one another, thus: „To fix excessively on them is to 
obscure the enabling conditions for their actions and to exculpate both the leaders who 
directed them and the elites who condoned them‟.340  
Thus, we can see that the discrepancy between Fleming‟s views on the one hand, 
and Mayer‟s views on the other. Fleming sees clear links between the „euthanasia‟ 
programme and the Final Solution, because of the methods of murder common to both, 
and because of the treatment meted out to the corpses of the victims. Mayer rejects any 
such link – for him, the important thing is that the „euthanasia‟ personnel simply did not 
play a sufficiently significant role in the subsequent Final Solution. As we will see later 
in the chapter, this is also a subject investigated by Michael Burleigh and Henry 
Friedlander, when study of the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme finally „came of age‟ in the 
mid-1990s. 
 
 
 
Bedbugs and Black Widows: Holocaust Studies and Nazi ‘Euthanasia’ 
  
As we saw above, the books of Reitlinger and Hilberg were pioneering at the time they 
were published, insofar as they focused specifically upon the Nazi genocide, as opposed 
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to referring to it as part of a wider history of the Third Reich. Now, decades later, the 
Nazi genocide of the Jews forms the principle part of studies of the Third Reich and 
interest in it shows few signs of abating.  
This section will consider how historians of the Nazi genocide of the Jews have 
dealt with the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme. As we saw at the beginning of this chapter, 
those early historians who had taken it upon themselves to research in detail the Nazi 
genocide of the Jews seemed to view the „euthanasia‟ programme principally as an 
opportunity to highlight the possibility of German resistance against the Nazis, not as an 
example of systematic murder. The protests which allegedly led to its demise (and the 
large-scale absence of such protests in relation to the persecution of the Jews) were 
considered to provide conclusive proof of widespread German anti-Semitism. As this 
section will demonstrate, the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme is sometimes taken seriously 
by historians, but it also frequently suffers from attempts to trivialize it, either by, as we 
have seen, highlighting the protests and all but ignoring the programme at which they 
were aimed, or by pointing to differences between the respective places occupied by Jews 
of Jews and by „useless eaters‟ in the Nazi Weltanschauung and, presumably as a 
consequence, abandoning any attempt to discuss the „euthanasia‟ programme except to 
dismiss it as being of no real importance. In this regard, this section provides an 
interesting comparison with the previous one, as both are, in many ways, preoccupied 
with identifying similarities and differences between the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme 
and the Final Solution.  
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 1961 saw the publication of Yehuda Bauer‟s The Holocaust in Historical 
Perspective.
341
 Though there is nothing about the „euthanasia‟ programme in this book, 
Bauer does write at one point that there are „any number of textbook or lay statements 
that the Nazis began their destruction with the Jews … ‟342 Of course, Bauer only says 
that such statements exist – he does not actually make the claim himself. Furthermore, he 
gives no concrete examples of these statements. However, he makes his motive for 
embarking on the discussion very clear, when he writes that those statements which state 
that Nazi extermination began with the Jews also claim that „had the Nazi regime 
persisted for any length of time, Poles, Czechs, Russians and others would have suffered 
the same fate‟.343 This is, says Bauer, quite false, as „there never was a Nazi policy to 
apply the measures used against the Jews to other national communities‟.344 Thus, the 
purpose of Bauer‟s discussion is to refer to (and then to dismiss) the idea that, had the 
Nazis remained in power for longer than they did, they would have broadened their 
policies against non-Jewish groups (which Bauer describes as „genocide‟) into something 
more akin to their policy towards the Jews („wholesale, total murder of every one of the 
members of a community‟).345 Though these passages are clearly intended to differentiate 
between Nazi policy towards the Jews, and Nazi policy towards other groups, they 
belong in this section, because they demonstrate that, by either accident or design, Bauer 
bypassed the question touched upon by Reitlinger and Hilberg. These two considered, 
albeit briefly, the question of similarities of technology and personnel between the Nazi 
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„euthanasia‟ programme and the Final Solution. Bauer, in failing to acknowledge that the 
Nazis did not begin their destruction with the Jews, sidesteps this problem. 
 A similar approach is taken by Lucy Dawidowicz, in her 1981 book The 
Holocaust and the Historians.
346
 On two occasions, Dawidowicz claims that the gas 
chambers were developed and used originally for the murder of Jews, only later being 
required for others whose continued existence was, the Nazis had decided, surplus to 
requirement. She writes: „The German dictatorship devised two strategies to conduct its 
war of annihilation against the Jews: mass shooting and mass gassing.‟347 A few pages 
further on, she claims: „Auschwitz…was invented by National Socialist Germany to kill 
its mortal enemy, the Jews. Once its killing facilities were devised and installed, once 
Auschwitz became an operational enterprise for murdering the Jews, it became 
convenient for the Germans to use that equipment also to murder those non-Jews who 
had, for one reason or another, become expendable.‟348 Taken together, these two 
statements are problematic not because of the remarks which Dawidowicz makes about 
Auschwitz and its function, but because she makes it appear that gassing as a means of 
mass killing was deigned specifically at Auschwitz, and specifically to annihilate Jews. 
These claims fail to take into account the use of gas chambers in asylums during the 
„euthanasia‟ programme, which had begun in 1939. In her original discussion of the 
„euthanasia‟ programme, Dawidowicz writes that it claimed about 100,000 lives within 
Germany itself, but makes no mention of the methods of murder used. Her only mention 
of gas chambers in relation to „euthanasia‟ killings comes in a claim that throughout the 
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war, convoys of mental patients (estimated to have included thousands of people in total) 
from occupied countries were sent to Auschwitz and immediately gassed on arrival.
349
 
Lucy Dawidowicz has considered the topic of the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme in 
two different books; firstly, in The War Against the Jews, published in 1975, and 
secondly, in The Holocaust and the Historians, which appeared six years later, in 1981. 
The contrast between the two books is a striking one, as Dawidowicz‟ views on the 
programme and its importance seem in many respects to be at odds. The former book 
contains a long and comprehensive discussion of the programme. The latter, despite 
describing the programme as being one of „racially motivated murder, euphemistically 
called „euthanasia‟, is very largely concerned with differentiating between the Nazi 
genocide of the Jews on the one hand, and that of other minority groups on the other.
350
 
Much of this discussion is centred upon the attitudes of the Nazis towards Roma and 
Slavs, but Dawidowicz also makes a number of statements which are intended to 
demonstrate the singularity of the Nazi genocide of the Jews, but which are factually 
inaccurate, as can be seen when they are considered in the light of the Nazi „euthanasia‟ 
programme.  
Bauer and Dawidowicz have demonstrated an attitude to the Nazi „euthanasia‟ 
programme which has not thus far been encountered in this chapter. As we have seen and 
shall continue to see, it is far from unusual for historians of Nazism to refer to „the 
euthanasia programme‟, but to forbear from any discussion or explanation thereof. 
However, Dawidowicz and Bauer‟s attitude is different insofar as they have simply failed 
to acknowledge it at all.  
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 From small beginnings in the 1950s and 1960s, the scholarly – and not so 
scholarly - literature on the Nazi genocide of the Jews has grown immensely. Of course, 
the concerns of the writers of these books are extremely divergent in focus; whilst many 
of them seek to elucidate the different stages of, and motivations for, Nazi policies 
towards the Jews, others have seemed keener to engage in attempts to prove that the Nazi 
genocide of the Jews was „fundamentally different from all crimes that have existed in 
the past‟.351 A discussion of this topic is, of course, quite beyond the scope of this 
enquiry, but, as might be expected, only a limited amount of either of these two strands of 
literature makes any mention of the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme. Seminal works, such 
as Karl A. Schleunes‟ The Twisted Road to Auschwitz make no reference to it.352 The 
various books, however, which consider the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme in the light of 
its connection (or not) with the genocide of the Jews, belong more properly in other 
sections of this chapter. This section will be confined to a consideration of those works 
which differentiate between the Nazi genocide of the Jews and the Nazi „euthanasia‟ 
programme.  
Daniel Goldhagen‟s Hitler’s Willing Executioners has plenty to say on the subject 
of the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme, and his stridently expressed views will make further 
appearances in this chapter. His discussion of the programme can justifiably be described 
as „insidious‟. Despite dutifully referring to it as the „so-called euthanasia programme‟, 
Goldhagen comprehensively and repeatedly trivialises it, emphasizing the protests to it 
rather than the programme itself, and making unsubstantiated claims regarding its lack of 
                                                 
351
 The German historian Karl Jaspers quoted in Lucy S. Dawidowicz, The Holocaust and the Historians (Harvard: Harvard 
University Press, 1981), p.14. 
352
 Karl A. Schleunes, The Twisted Road to Auschwitz: Nazi Policy Towards German Jews 1933-1939 (Urbana/Chicago/London: 
University of Illinois Press, 1970. 
 161 
importance, which fail to explain why it was instigated in the first place. Worst of all, 
Goldhagen contrasts it with the murder of Jews, in order to make unsupported assertions 
concerning the lack of attendant cruelty to which the victims of the „euthanasia‟ 
programme were supposedly subjected, vis-à-vis murdered Jews. These points will be 
dealt with in turn. 
Part of Goldhagen‟s book is also concerned with differentiating between the 
Nazis‟ murder of Jews, and their murder of other groups. As Ruth Bettina Birn and 
Volker Riess have written, Goldhagen marshals a great deal of often distorted evidence to 
support his claim that „the Germans‟ treated Jews in a much crueller way than they did 
their non-Jewish victims.
353
 Nevertheless, it is important to consider Goldhagen‟s 
treatment of the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme in this regard, for two reasons. Firstly, 
many of Goldhagen‟s comments concerning the lack of cruelty to which the „euthanasia‟ 
victims were supposedly subjected prior to, and whilst being, murdered, echo Raul 
Hilberg‟s claim that these people did not suffer. Secondly, it is remarkable, given the 
extent to which Goldhagen uses the „euthanasia‟ programme, how little in the way of 
comment his usage attracted from reviewers of his book. 
Goldhagen begins by making unsupported claims concerning the respective 
positions occupied by Jews, and by the people who were to become the victims of the 
„euthanasia‟ programme, within the Nazi world-view. He writes: „[t]hose whom the 
Nazis marked for slaughter in the „Euthanasia‟ program … were nevertheless thought to 
be far less of a threat to Germany than were the Jews. 
354
 In terms of the motivations for 
the programme, Goldhagen cites Robert Proctor‟s Racial Hygiene, and concludes that the 
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„euthanasia‟ programme was the resulted of a twofold perceived threat from its victims: 
firstly, that they would pass on their ailments to future generations, thus causing racial 
degeneration; secondly, that they would consume food and other resources needed for 
those people who were actually fighting the war.
355
 This was, however, a much more 
benign sort of threat than that supposedly represented by the Jews, who „unlike the 
Euthanasia program‟s victims – were considered to be wilfully malignant, powerful, bent 
upon and perhaps capable of destroying the German people in toto‟.356 Goldhagen quotes 
one of Hitler‟s speeches, in order to show that, as Proctor has also written, Hitler and the 
Nazis regarded Jewishness as a „racial illness‟.357 The culmination of this differentiation 
comes in Goldhagen‟s claim that the „benign‟ nature of the threat from „lives unworthy of 
living‟ was reflected in the methods of killing used upon them, which, in comparison to 
the murders of Jews, were not traumatic for the victims, and were totally lacking in 
attendant cruelty:  
 
„Coldly uninvolved were the Germans who killed the mentally ill and the severely 
handicapped in the so-called Euthanasia program. Most of them were physicians and 
nurses who dispatched their victims in the dispassionate manner of surgeons, who excise 
from the body some hideous and hindering excrescence. By contrast, the Germans‟ killing 
of the Jews was often wrathful, preceded and attended by cruelty, degradation, mockery 
and Mephistophelean laughter. Why? Why did these hangmen of the Jewish people not act 
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as hangmen do? ... The answer to this lies in their conception of the Jews. In their eyes, der 
Jude is not merely a heinous capital criminal. He is a terrestrial demon…‟358  
 
Given the amount of discussion generated amongst scholars by Goldhagen‟s book, it 
seems somewhat surprising that his comprehensive trivialization of the Nazi „euthanasia‟ 
programme attracted very little comment. It is not mentioned in Ruth Bettina Birn and 
Norman Finkelstein‟s book A Nation on Trial: The Goldhagen Thesis and Historical 
Truth, neither is it alluded to in the book edited by Geoff Eley entitled The ‘Goldhagen 
Effect’. History, Memory, Nazism – Facing the German Past.359 Unsurprisingly, those 
who do remark on it tend to be those who have actually studied the programme in depth. 
For example, Henry Friedlander, when reviewing Goldhagen‟s book, pointedly asked if 
Goldhagen meant that Irmfried Eberl, who ran two „euthanasia‟ centres, had learned to 
laugh differently by the time he directed gassings at Treblinka?
360
 
Dan Diner pursues this theme of differentiating between the murder of Jews and 
the murder of non-Jews by the Nazis, by considering the concept of „collective memory‟. 
This, he claims, is far more potent amongst some groups or collectives than amongst 
others:  
 
„[I]n Germany, the Jewish victims of Nazism do not dominate the mnemonic 
hierarchy because of a view that Jewish lives have more inherent worth than those of the 
Romany or victims of euthanasia. Rather, along with the reality of sheer numbers of 
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victims, such ranking reflects, in the end, a longer presence and deeper impact of the Jews 
within the collective German memory. Formed over centuries, Christian Europe‟s troubled 
relations with the Jews and Judaism has furnished an imagistic arsenal for coming to terms 
with the post-Holocaust present … [A]s a socially stigmatized group of individuals 
belonging to their own collective, those the Germans murdered on „medical‟ grounds have 
left few traces within German collective memory, when again compared with the Jews or 
the Romany. The euthanasia victims‟ fate, though it calls for reflection and description 
with greatest empathy, simply cannot produce the grounded mnemonic resonance needed 
for that sort of historical transmission‟.361 
 
Here, Diner is claiming that, while all human lives (or deaths) are equal, some are 
more equal than others. The murder of the Jews is of greater significance than the murder 
of people who are disabled or mentally ill because the Jews, one way or another, have 
had far more impact over the centuries and have, throughout European history, been 
subject to persecution. This, in many respects, ties in with Lucy Dawidowicz‟ comment 
that „[T]he annihilation of the 6 million Jews brought an end with irrevocable finality to 
the thousand-year culture and civilization of Ashkenazic Jewry, destroying the continuity 
of Jewish history‟.362 This idea, also to be found in debates concerning the definition of 
the term „genocide‟, advances the view that a cultural loss of some kind, incurred as the 
result of a mass atrocity perpetrated against a particular people, renders the killing itself 
even more grievous, as opposed to being regarded as a tragic by-product of some mass 
atrocities, all of which are in themselves equally abhorrent. The final section of this 
chapter will challenge this assumption, by looking at the new interest in studying 
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disability history, and what this interest has meant for understanding of the Nazi 
„euthanasia‟ programme. Firstly, though, we need to look at how historians have dealt 
with the link between illness and disability of the one hand and racism on the other.  
 
 
 
The Medicalization of Race  
 
In any discussion of the Nazi genocide, questions of „race‟ are often intertwined with 
those concerning health. Though this way of considering Nazism has only really come to 
particular prominence since the 1980s, there are a small number of early works in which 
consideration is given to the idea that the Nazis saw Jews, and people of some other 
races, as being „racially ill‟. Thus, a link with the „euthanasia‟ programme has sometimes 
been identified in this regard. By contrast, other historians have considered the 
programme to be an aspect of racist thought, insofar as people who are „weak‟ or „ill‟ are 
considered to be a drain on the nation‟s resources and a threat to its strength. 
An early version of this idea is provided by Gerald Reitlinger‟s 1953 work The 
Final Solution. In contrast to Raul Hilberg in The Destruction of the European Jews, 
Reitlinger makes significant use of the Nuremberg Medical Trial transcript. As 
Reitlinger‟s book was published eight years before Hilberg‟s, this does indicate that 
Hilberg‟s dismissive views of the „euthanasia‟ programme would seem to arise partly 
from a less-than-wholehearted attempt to familiarise himself with the programme in its 
entirety. Of course, a previous chapter showed that, had Hilberg done this, his 
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conclusions would probably have been substantially the same, but his knowledge might 
at least have been greater. 
 By contrast, Reitlinger has clearly read the Nuremberg Medical Trial transcript 
closely, in order to establish the stages in the evolution of the Nazis choice of gassing as a 
method of mass-murder.
363
 In this, he can be compared to Raul Hilberg. Hilberg‟s 
reference to the „euthanasia‟ programme, though extremely brief, demonstrates that, in 
his view, the „euthanasia programme and the Final Solution are linked, in terms of their 
common use of gas chambers as a method of mass-killing.  As to the question of „mercy-
killing‟ itself, Reitlinger describes it as „undoubtedly one of the problems which modern 
society has created for itself by becoming increasingly institutional‟.364 Reitlinger‟s 
meaning here is that „it was left to institutions to decide that a person was a mental 
defective, an incurable bearer of disease, or simply an asocial type‟, and that this was 
particularly important in Nazi Germany, where „even in peacetime, National Socialism, 
with its morbid insistence on youth and health, had almost made illness a crime‟.365 We 
can see here that Reitlinger, unlike other historians of this period, does identify some 
importance attached by the Nazis to the idea of health.  
 Other chapters of this study (most notably the legal chapter) make it clear that one 
oft-expressed concern about „euthanasia‟ is that its legalisation might lead to increased 
toleration of the killing of other innocent people. In essence, Reitlinger claims that a 
version of this train of thought explains the Nazi genocide of the Jews. He writes,  
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„The plea of bouches inutiles [„useless mouths‟] which justified every massacre of Jews 
had its roots in notions of national economy and even of social welfare. Thus the language 
of welfare workers found its way into the reports of the Security Police, who combed out 
the Jewish settlements in Russia in the autumn of 1941‟.366 As evidence for this, Reitlinger 
quotes from a police report which stated that on one day in October 1941, when the town 
of Janowici was in the grip of contagious diseases (or so it was claimed), 1025 Jews were 
shot to „prevent contagion‟, and a „special treatment‟ (i.e., death) was „applied‟ to a further 
812 non-Jews.
367
 
   
Though this is an appalling story, it is unclear why Reitlinger is connecting it with the 
Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme. From the report, the Security Police evidently either 
believed, or claimed to believe, that the killing, particularly of the Jews, would prevent 
the spread of disease. As far as one can tell, this does seem to tally with Reitlinger‟s 
interpretation of the motives of the „euthanasia‟ programme, judging by his comment that 
„it was left to institutions to decide that a person was a mental defective, an incurable 
bearer of disease, or simply an asocial type, definitions that the least wave of popular or 
engineered panic could expand‟.368 This does suggest that Reitlinger views the Nazi 
„euthanasia‟ programme as a response to an irrational panic about the spread of, say, 
mental disorders, amongst the general population. As we can see, this interpretation is 
entirely different from that which emerged from the Nuremberg Medical Trial. 
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 1978 saw the publication of Towards the Final Solution: A History of European 
Racism, by the American historian George Mosse.
369
 As the title indicates, this is not a 
book about the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme as such, being instead a chronicle of 
European racism from the Enlightenment to the Nazi genocide, and with a few 
concluding remarks on post-war racism. However, Mosse does embark on a fairly wide-
ranging discussion of Nazi „euthanasia‟, which he views, one might say, as a step along 
the road towards the Final Solution.  
 The „euthanasia‟ programme is viewed by Mosse as being linked to the Nazis‟ 
overall project for, as he describes it, „the victory of the Aryan‟.370 He also links the 
programme with earlier racist and eugenic thought, citing the importance which racists 
attached to the idea that „superior‟ races were productive, whilst „inferior‟ races were not. 
Consequently, it was important to eradicate „the congenitally sick‟ in order that the 
community could be „freed from the burden of caring for its useless members‟.371 
 One interesting facet of Mosse‟s discussion of „euthanasia‟ is his concentration 
upon the work of Karl Binding and Alfred Hoche. These two men, a lawyer and a 
psychiatrist respectively, published a tract in 1920 entitled Die Freigabe der Vernichtung 
lebensunwerten Lebens. Ihr Mass und ihre Form [The Granting of Permission for the 
Destruction of Worthless Life. Its Extent and Form]. Though, as we shall see, it has 
become commonplace for historians of the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme to refer to 
Binding and Hoche, and to argue over the importance which the Nazis attached to their 
book, earlier historians such as Reitlinger did not do this. Mosse identifies no trace of 
racist thought in Binding and Hoche‟s book, but rather considers that the characteristics 
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approved of by them were held to be those which characterised the „master race,‟, and: 
„Euthanasia thus became the necessary consequence of attempts to improve the race by 
doing away with its parasites…Euthanasia and the war were interrelated as closely as the 
war and the final solution‟.372  
 From this point of view, Mosse‟s thesis is significantly different from those 
advanced by the earlier scholars whose books have been considered in this chapter. It is 
particularly noteworthy that Mosse considers the „euthanasia‟ programme to be an 
integral part of the overall Nazi „master plan‟. This is quite different from the purely 
pragmatic measure described by Lewy and Poliakov.  Nevertheless, his views of the 
programme, and most particularly, his views regarding its cessation, also bear great 
similarities to those of former historians. For example, Mosse indicates that, in his view, 
the public protests against the programme occurred because the whole population felt 
potentially threatened by it, either through fear that a frail family member might fall 
victim to it, or concern amongst protesters that they themselves might meet such an 
end.
373
  
 Here, Mosse is falling into line with historians of the 1950s and 1960s, when he 
implies that the only reaction which the German people showed the „euthanasia‟ 
programme was the most vigorous opposition. As we shall see presently, it would be a 
further decade before the multiplicity of reaction to the programme even began to be 
considered by English-speaking historians. 
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 In their reactions to his book, Mosse‟s fellow historians made little mention of his 
discussion of the „euthanasia‟ programme.374 The exception to this is Eugen Weber of the 
University of California, who wrote, in the American Historical Review that, whatever 
the pre-Nazi prevalence of eugenic and biologically racist doctrines:  
 
„It would be left to German National Socialists to put such conclusions into practice, first 
in the 1933 law for the prevention of hereditary sickness and in the euthanasia program of 
1939-41 that killed some 70,000 incurably sick, then in the massacre of „degenerate‟ and 
„anti-social‟ elements like the gypsies and, above all, the Jews‟. 
  
 
In the same year, the British historian William Carr returned to the theme of the Nazi 
„euthanasia‟ programme in his book Hitler: A Study in Personality and Politics. Carr, like 
Mosse, points out that some of the ideas underlying Nazism were actually quite 
commonplace in pre-war Europe. However, while Mosse asserts that the most important 
and most dangerous of these ideas was that of racial ideology, which could be allied with 
Social Darwinism when it was expedient to do so, Carr believes that it is Social 
Darwinism itself which is at the root of Nazi evil. In his view, Nazism arose out of an 
extreme Social Darwinist position which argued that  
 
„[P]ity was out of place in a world governed by the inexorable operation of biological laws 
beyond human control. To feel concern for concentration camp inmates, the old and sick 
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being put to sleep in euthanasia centres, subject peoples suffering under the heel of the 
oppressor or enemy soldiers dying on the battlefield was sheer sentimentalism, the 
corrupting legacy of a Christian-humanitarian past‟.375  
  
The difficulty with Carr‟s explanation is that it would appear to work only where certain 
actions of the Nazis are concerned. Most notable amongst these is the invasion of other 
countries, as „expansion at the expense of weaker neighbours was a „right‟ bestowed on 
the strong by the laws of evolution and a categorical imperative for the leaders of these 
peoples‟.376 However, to say that it is „sheer sentimentalism‟ to feel concern for the plight 
of concentration camp inmates or for the victims of „euthanasia‟ murders offers no 
explanation for why „euthanasia‟ murders were committed or for why concentration 
camps were brought into existence. Carr accounts for these developments in the 
following manner: Social Darwinist thought adhered to the belief that traditional moral 
values are a perversion of the evolutionary process, and thus called for the abandonment 
of these traditional values. The abandonment of these values meant that „in the long run 
the door was open, logically, to the sterilization of the unfit, euthanasia of the old, and the 
physical extermination of anyone deemed by the rulers to be „socially undesirable‟‟.377 
Carr gives various examples of Hitler‟s concern that society should not be „dragged 
down‟ by the weak: „Nature knows nothing of the notion of humanitarianism which 
signifies that the weak must at all costs be surrounded and preserved even at the expense 
of the strong‟, and „War is therefore the unalterable law of the whole of life – the 
prerequisite for the natural selection of the strong and the precedent for the elimination of 
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the weak … A people that cannot assert itself must disappear and another must take its 
place‟.378 
 The 1980s saw the publication of a number of scholarly works concerning the 
broad topic of „the Nazi doctors‟. Though explanations for this apparently rather sudden 
development are not widely given, it does seem that the work of German historians may 
have had a significant part to play.  This is particularly evident in Robert Proctor‟s 1989 
work Racial Hygiene: Medicine under the Nazis.
379
 In this work, Proctor discusses the 
Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme at some length, and frequently demonstrates the insights he 
has gained from studying the research of contemporary West German historians, most 
notably Goetz Aly and Ernst Klee. For example, Proctor credited Götz Aly with showing 
that the „euthanasia‟ programme was not unpopular, and actually received a broad level 
of public support. In addition, Aly showed that many parents of disabled children in Nazi 
Germany were keen to rid themselves of the stigma which they felt this entailed.
380
 In 
terms of his understanding of the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme itself, and its place in the 
whole scheme of the Nazi genocide, Proctor‟s thesis is one which is now more associated 
with Henry Friedlander. Namely, Proctor asserted that there were clear links between 
„euthanasia‟ programme on the one hand, and the Final Solution on the other, for two 
reasons. Firstly, Jews were described as cancers or parasites upon the body of the Volk; 
secondly, the Nazis argued (partly on the basis of pre-Nazi research which had often been 
published in Jewish journals) that Jews had higher incidences of mental illness than non-
Jews, as well as higher incidences of ailments such as nervous disorders, gallstones, 
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bladder and kidney stones, neuralgia, chronic rheumatism and brain malfunction.
381
 
Proctor argues that whilst the „euthanasia‟ programme was held to be justifiable due to 
the cost of keeping institution inmates alive, as well as their lack of productivity, it was 
linked to extermination of other minorities by way of Nazi and pre-Nazi theories about 
the racial specificity of certain diseases.
382
 
 Proctor‟s book was widely and positively reviewed in a number of major 
historical journals, but it is interesting to note that out of these reviews, only two refer to 
the „euthanasia‟ programme specifically, and of these two, only one mentions it in terms 
of Proctor‟s assertions concerning the link between the „euthanasia‟ programme and the 
rest of the Nazi genocide.
383
 It may perhaps not be very surprising that this review, which 
appeared in the American Historical Review, was written by Henry Friedlander, whose 
own book would, a few years later, be entirely devoted to a similar thesis. One of the 
most notorious of these was Robert Jay Lifton‟s The Nazi Doctors, which has been 
variously subtitled Medical Killings and the Psychology of Genocide, and A Study in the 
Psychology of Evil, published in 1986. Though not universally admired by historians, it 
has been very widely read, and was even the inspiration for Martin Amis‟s novel Time’s 
Arrow.
384
 As another chapter showed, Lifton‟s book was highly instrumental in 
motivating renewed discussion of the relevance (or not) of the Nazi analogy to 
contemporary U.S. debates about the legalization of „euthanasia‟ – such debates having 
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previously relied largely upon endless discussion of Leo Alexander‟s 1949 article 
„Medical Science Under Dictatorship‟. 
 Lifton‟s work is important for two particular reasons. Firstly and most obviously, 
we must consider the interpretation which he gives of the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme 
itself.  Secondly, the ways in which he rejects links between Nazi „euthanasia‟ and Nazi 
sterilization policies on the one hand, and contemporaneous U.S. sterilization policies on 
the other, are revealing. In addition, they help to link his ideas with those of past 
historians, such as Guenther Lewy, and also with those of historians whose works would 
be published some years later than his own – for example those of Friedlander and 
Burleigh, as well as Stefan Kuehl‟s The Nazi Connection, a study of eugenicists in the 
United States and their connections with members of the Nazi party. With regard to the 
origins of the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme, Lifton contrasts the United States very 
positively with Germany:  
 
„Anyone trained in American medicine has personal experience of doctors, nurses, and 
medical attendants colluding in the death of patients…But those practises have been 
restrained by legal limits and strong public reaction, and have not developed into a 
systematic programme of killing those designated as unworthy of living. In Germany, 
however, such a project had been discussed from the time of the impact of „scientific 
racism‟ in intellectual circles during the last decades of the nineteenth century. That kind of 
focus, as with any intense nationalism, takes on a biological cast. One views one‟s group as 
an „organism‟ whose „life‟ one must preserve, and whose „death‟ one must combat, in ways 
that transcend individual fate‟.385  
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In advancing this interpretation, Lifton is interpreting the „euthanasia‟ programme quite 
differently from early historians (such as Poliakov and Lewy, who, as was demonstrated 
earlier, saw the programme as a rather ruthlessly utilitarian response to the shortage of 
hospital beds caused by the wartime situation. To some extent, one could say that Gerald 
Reitlinger believed that the „euthanasia‟ programme had a biological (or at least semi-
biological) basis, but, given the limited readership achieved by Reitlinger‟s book, and the 
lack of discussion of the „euthanasia‟ programme amongst historians when it was 
published, the theories of Reitlinger, Poliakov and Lewy did not, in their own times, have 
much effect. Interestingly, Lifton‟s views to some extent pre-empt those of Henry 
Friedlander, which we shall consider presently.    
 In his 1989 book Health, Race and German Politics between National Unification 
and Nazism 1870-1945, Paul Weindling states expressly that medical killing „became a 
pilot scheme for the holocaust‟.386 As far as the link between medicine, biology and racial 
ideology is concerned, Weindling writes that, on the one hand, genetic defects were 
viewed as a serious threat to the national community, but that once the Nazis took power, 
they widened considerably the ranks of those considered „degenerate‟, to encompass all 
sorts of different groups, e.g., racial groups such as Jews, Slavs and Gypsies, and social 
„problem‟ groups, such as criminals, homosexuals, and feeble-minded people.387 
„Euthanasia‟, though an „extreme form of racial hygiene‟, was a secret measure (unlike 
sterilization), and, consequently was facilitated by a number of diffuse factors, such as 
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the wartime situation, subordination to Hitler, and professionalism taken to extreme.
388
 A 
similar emphasis on the importance and history of racial hygiene is given by Richard 
Breitman, who echoes Weindling‟s point about „purifying the gene pool‟, and extending 
the categories of those considered a threat to it.
389
 
 One of the most striking aspects of the scholarly interest in Nazi ideology as, in a 
sense, an aspect of the history of medicine, is the decrease in emphasis upon the protests 
against the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme. For example, Weindling mentions them, but 
only in passing. His interest is in the motivations for the implementation of different 
aspects of Nazi „health‟ policies, and in the interplay between prominent individuals and 
groups therein. This is an aspect of the „euthanasia‟ programme which was, as we saw, 
completely obscured by those historians who insisted on highlighting the protests to the 
programme whilst studiously ignoring every other aspect of it. 
  
 
Michael Burleigh, Henry Friedlander, and after 
  
We saw in the previous section that the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme was discussed in a 
significant number of books focusing on „the Nazi doctors‟. Prominent amongst these 
was Robert Jay Lifton‟s The Nazi Doctors: A Study in the Psychology of Evil, which, as 
the legal chapter will show, did so much to stimulate discussion of „euthanasia‟ and the 
relevance (or not) of the Nazi analogy amongst members of the U.S. legal profession.] 
However, these books concentrated on the „euthanasia‟ programme as part of wider 
studies of Nazi medical crimes. It was not until the 1990s that full-length books 
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concentrating on Nazi „euthanasia‟ began to appear in English. The journal Isis described 
Michael Burleigh‟s Death and Deliverance: Euthanasia in Germany 1900-1945390 as „the 
first full-length examination of what its author rightly terms „a bleak subject‟‟.391 Indeed, 
Burleigh‟s extensive bibliography of secondary literature contains no English-language 
books on the „euthanasia‟ programme, although there are several concerning wider 
topics, such as racism in Nazi and Weimar Germany, psychotherapy in Nazi Germany, 
eugenics and genetics, as well as several books on the Nazi doctors, such as those by 
Weindling, Lifton, Proctor, and George J. Annas, which we encountered in the previous 
section.
392
  Burleigh‟s book was joined the following year by Henry Friedlander‟s The 
Origins of Nazi Genocide: From Euthanasia to the Final Solution
393
. The principal 
difference between Burleigh and Friedlander concerns their respective explanations for 
the decision to implement the programme. In Burleigh‟s view, one‟s „intellectual 
predilections have a role to play, concerning the explanations one considers important.
394
 
Nevertheless, he considers the programme to be largely a result of what he calls „crude 
collectivist materialism‟ coupled with the oft-expressed view that the programme‟s 
intended targets functioned only on the „lowest animal level‟ – and, presumably, would 
not be deprived of anything if a decision was taken to kill them.
395
 The impetus for the 
programme‟s final implementation was, in Burleigh‟s view, the case of the Knauer baby, 
an infant apparently born in Leipzig in 1938, who was, it was claimed, blind, missing a 
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leg and part of an arm, and was, in addition, an „idiot‟.396 To the extent that he identifies 
some pragmatic considerations for the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme, Burleigh allies 
himself with much earlier historians, such as Richard Grunberger. Though Grunberger 
does not go so far as to suggest what the motivation might have been for the Nazi 
„euthanasia‟ programme, he does refer in passing to its role in lessening the shortage of 
hospital beds caused by the wartime situation:  
 
„The war of necessity modified the health pattern quite fundamentally. Of an available 
stock of half a million hospital beds, 185,000 were diverted to military use, but the 
resultant shortage was partly made good by means of the Euthanasia Programme, which 
exterminated an estimated 100,000 inmates of institutions. Another – far more innocuous – 
wartime campaign centred on the dental health of boys aged fourteen to eighteen…‟397  
 
It is noteworthy that Grunberger tacitly acknowledges that the „euthanasia‟ programme 
was far less „innocuous‟ than a programme promoting dental health, but it is clear that – 
to some degree at least – Grunberger has followed earlier historians in failing to consider 
his own use of the term „euthanasia‟; an approach which is distinctly alarming. Thus, 
Grunberger‟s explanation for the programme is that it was motivated purely by practical, 
rather than ideological considerations. Burleigh recognizes that such practical 
considerations had a part to play, but, having investigated the programme itself to an 
infinitely greater extent than had Grunberger, Burleigh has concluded that this is very far 
from the whole story, writing that „Nazi Germany was unique in attempting to 
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exterminate the chronically mentally ill and physically disabled in the interests of 
economy and physical fitness‟.398  
By contrast, Friedlander‟s explanation for the programme stresses motivations 
somewhat different from those outlined by Burleigh:  
 
„Nor were these patients murdered to free hospital space or to save money; the killers were 
motivated by an ideological obsession to create a homogenous and robust nation based on 
race. They wanted to purge the handicapped from the national gene pool‟.399 
 
This difference in emphasis upon the motives of the programme is not the only 
dichotomy between the views of Burleigh and Friedlander. The chapter concerning the 
Nuremberg Medical Trial demonstrated that Viktor Brack and Karl Brandt, the Trial 
defendants discussed, attached great importance to the idea that the victims were all 
„incurable mental patients‟ – a device which, if nothing else, allowed them to sidestep the 
question of why they had subjected adults to non-consensual killing. Burleigh and 
Friedlander deal with this problem in entirely different ways. On the one hand, Burleigh 
reveals his conviction of the essential irrelevance of this question when he writes: 
 
 „Very little has been done to study those who were killed, which is a sad comment upon 
how we all think and operate. Such studies of patients as do exist tend to use computers to 
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tot up the proportions of epileptics to schizophrenics among the murdered, an approach I 
find depressing and worrying‟.400  
 
By contrast, Friedlander highlights the inadequacy of the term „mental patients‟, writing:  
 
„[A]s I read through the evidence, I realized that the traditional description of the victims of 
euthanasia as „mental patients [Geisteskranke] was inaccurate. Of course, I had always 
known that the use of the term „euthanasia‟ was a euphemism to camouflage their murder 
of human beings they had designated as „life unworthy of life‟; that their aim was not to 
shorten the lives of persons with painful terminal diseases but to kill human beings they 
considered inferior, who could otherwise have lived for many years. Although the victims 
were institutionalized in state hospitals and nursing homes, only some suffered from mental 
illness. Many were hospitalized only because they were retarded, blind, deaf, or epileptic, 
or because they had a physical deformity. They were handicapped patients, persons who in 
the United States today are covered by the Act for Disabled Americans‟.401  
 
To support his assertions that the victims were not brain-dead or lacking a desire to live, 
Friedlander cites a 1967 judgement by the District Court of Frankfurt, which concluded 
that one per cent of victims lacked „a natural desire to live‟.402 Friedlander does not 
identify why the description „mental patient‟ should have gained so much currency but, 
as I suggested in Chapter One, it is likely that the Nuremberg Medical Trial was at least 
partly responsible for this state of affairs. In addition, this chapter has tried to show that, 
at least prior to the mid-1980s, this term was used unquestioningly by most historians.  
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 Though these two books were published one year apart, historical journals often 
seemed to review them at roughly the same time. For example, the American Historical 
Review published its verdict on The Origins of Nazi Genocide in February of 1997, whilst 
the English Historical Review did the same for Death and Deliverance in April of the 
same year.
403
 Aside from this, both books seem to have been broadly welcomed, and the 
remark that they covered ground which had hitherto been largely unexplored was 
expressed with some frequency. This phenomenon is most notable in relation to Henry 
Friedlander‟s book, and this is likely to have been because Friedlander‟s thesis was, in 
many ways, more radical than Burleigh‟s. In other words, as was shown above, the 
former‟s stated intention was, in part, the redefinition of the word „Holocaust‟ to include 
the Nazis‟ murder of Sinti and Roma people on the one hand, and of disabled people on 
the other. This was a development neither considered nor attempted by Burleigh.  
 One of the most striking developments in this area following these publications 
has been the number of subsequent books to which Burleigh and/or Friedlander have 
contributed. These books tend to have a number of contributors, generally all eminent 
historians, each of whom write a chapter on an aspect of the Nazi dictatorship. One 
positive result that a number of these books have had concerns the extent to which the 
Nazi persecution of non-Jewish groups is now regarded as a legitimate area of scholarly 
interest. Their publication also demonstrates the impact which Burleigh and Friedlander‟s 
researches have had on other scholars‟ understanding of the Nazi genocide.  
 One of the earliest of these books was The Final Solution: Origins and 
Implementations, which was edited by David Cesarani and was published in 1994. It 
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includes a chapter from Henry Friedlander‟s The Origins of Nazi Genocide. It has been 
followed by a number of others. Amongst these is The Holocaust: Origins, 
Implementation, Aftermath, which includes chapters from both Death and Deliverance 
and The Origins of Nazi Genocide.
404
 This is a book which, as its title implies, comprises 
essays and chapters from other books by a large number of eminent historians, in which 
aspects of the Nazi genocide, as well as its origins and legacies, are considered. We saw 
earlier in the chapter that, in his introduction to this volume, Bartov felt compelled to 
remark that, apparently to his surprise, the study of the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme did 
not divert attention from the Nazi genocide of the Jews.
405
 In his introduction he also 
comments that Burleigh and Friedlander‟s studies of Nazi „euthanasia‟ have played an 
important role in furthering historical understanding of Nazism as a whole, by 
highlighting both the role of science (and pseudo-science) in the theories which led 
ultimately to the Nazi genocide, but also their historical specificity.
406
  
 The following year produced another book of essays on aspects of Nazism, this 
time incorporating an essay by Henry Friedlander, using material from The Origins of 
Nazi Genocide. Social Outsiders in Nazi Germany, edited by Robert Gellately and 
Nathan Stolzfus, was, as its title suggests, devoted to studies of many of the groups (not 
only Jews) who were, in the Nazi mindset, surplus to requirements. The rationale behind 
this approach was to provide a comprehensive overview of how, after coming to power, 
the Nazis had set about establishing a „racially pure community of the people‟, in the 
editors‟ words.407 As regards the question of how Nazi „euthanasia‟ fits into this 
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discussion, the editors consider, as Omer Bartov did, that Henry Friedlander‟s attention to 
pre-Nazi theories of eugenics, race, and heredity is of significant value in showing 
exactly how the Nazis advanced such theories and gave them a murderous twist.
408
 The 
two (American) editors describe such theories as „German and European‟, but it is 
noteworthy that Friedlander‟s own book does not shirk from showing the pre-Nazi 
American enthusiasm for eugenics. Still, the editors‟ omission is a striking one, in some 
ways harking back to Guenther Lewy‟s claim, earlier in this chapter, that American and 
Nazi sterilization were fundamentally opposed because those in the U.S. occurred on a 
smaller scale and were, apparently, sometimes voluntary. The editorial discussion of Nazi 
„euthanasia‟ in this volume is also important, in the light of the number of historians in 
this chapter who have claimed that the German public were unanimous in their 
opposition to the programme:  
 
„When the public got wind of what was happening there was some unrest, but no open 
protest. Some, but not all, local residents near the killing sites were appalled. One woman 
wrote to the hospital where her two siblings reportedly died within a few days of each 
other. She said she accepted the Third Reich, and „hoped to find peace again‟ if doctors 
could assure her that her siblings had been killed by virtue of some law that made it 
possible to „relieve people from their chronic suffering‟.409  
 
This is a deeply significant passage, because it demonstrates that, at least for some 
scholars, Burleigh and Friedlander‟s researches have yielded at least one very important 
result: they have managed to begin the process of dispelling the simplistic assumption by 
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other historians that the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme was noteworthy only in terms of 
the protests against it, which were, supposedly, the sole public reaction it provoked. 
 In contrast to Gellately and Stolzfus‟ comments concerning the apparently wholly 
European nature of theories of eugenics and scientific racism, the editors of Medical 
Ethics in Nazi Germany: Origins, Practices, Legacies are concerned with what they 
regard as the universal, still relevant questions which the Nazi use of medicine continues 
to pose.
410
 In their opinion:  
 
„even as we are compelled to demystify and demythologize the Nazi past, so too are we 
called upon to consider the applicability of the controversies and policies in past and 
present democratic societies. Regardless of our own national or institutional contexts, the 
questions raised in this volume bear an immediate relevance to current controversies … 
Are we in danger of witnessing the evolution of a new eugenics that could have similar or 
even more murderous consequences than those effected by eugenic thinking and its co-
optation of science and medicine in the Third Reich? Does a reflexive and restrictive focus 
on the evils of medicine under the Nazi regime eclipse our view of the history and practice 
of eugenics in our own societies, and if so, what are the potential outcomes?‟411  
  
These are questions which the final chapter will consider, focusing on how the subject 
has been dealt with in moral philosophy - primarily in the relatively new field of 
Bioethics. The questions asked by Huener and Nicosia will be brought into practical 
focus when we discuss the so-called „Singer Affair‟, in which the historian Michael 
Burleigh was an important, if rather unwilling, participant. This chapter has certainly 
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shown that historians‟ perceptions of the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme have changed 
fundamentally in recent years. Motivated by the pioneering work of German historians, 
English-speaking scholars have begun to realise that the „euthanasia‟ programme is 
deeply important and worthy of study in its own right. The situation is not yet entirely 
ideal, with some historians continuing to state that the programme ended in 1941 and that 
the circumstances of its alleged demise is its only relevant feature. In the main, however, 
it is becoming well-integrated into the study of Nazism as a whole, and also in its own 
right. There are, however, still disagreements about what its legacy should be. Some of 
these have been covered by previous chapters; others will be considered now. 
The very recent past has seen two additional important contributions to the literature in 
this area. Paul Julian Weindling‟s Nazi Medicine and the Nuremberg Trials discusses 
Nazi medical crimes and the Allies‟ prosecution of the perpetrators (as one might expect, 
given the book‟s title!). Ulf Schmidt‟s Justice at Nuremberg: Leo Alexander and the Nazi 
Doctors’ Trial is a biography, partly of Alexander‟s life up to the time of the Nuremberg 
Trials, and partly of his participation in them. There is also a concluding chapter dealing 
with the subject of post-war medical ethics. Weindling‟s short but informative section on 
Nazi „euthanasia‟ discusses its development as a policy, but also its prosecution at the 
Nuremberg Medical Trial. He argues that the origins of the programme are to be found in 
German racial hygiene, but that this was not explored at the Nuremberg Medical Trial 
due to a measure of reluctance to scrutinize the accounts given by Karl Brandt.
412
 
Weindling highlights the individualistic and humane justifications given by both Brant 
and other defendants – we saw these in Chapter One. Weindling also remarks upon the 
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„deep and at times perplexing contrast between the brutality of euthanasia as actually 
implemented and the retrospective moral legitimations the accused presented‟413. He 
concludes however that „the prosecution saw euthanasia as the cruel culmination of racial 
medicine.‟414 As was made clear in Chapter One, the prosecution saw no such thing. An 
explanation for Weindling‟s view might be that his aim was to investigate the genesis of, 
and condemn the perpetrators of the „euthanasia‟ programme, not those who were 
prosecuting them. In any event, a similar attitude to the Trial was shown by Ulf Schmidt. 
Again, he obviously condemns the programme and his intention is to show how the 
defendants themselves justified it. This is particularly the case with Karl Brandt. Schmidt 
writes that „Brandt‟s closing speech made it clear that he had genuinely believed in the 
righteousness of the killing operation. His arguments were nevertheless unconvincing … 
It may not have been envisioned as murder, but for the court it was de facto murder 
beyond any reasonable doubt‟.415 As stated above, Chapter One showed that this was in 
no way true. Like Weindling, Schmidt rather circumvents the problem of how the 
Tribunal at the Doctors‟ Trial showed, at best, a chillingly dismissive attitude to the 
victims of the „euthanasia‟ programme – he does not discuss the Judgement or the 
Nuremberg Code in relation to it. Nevertheless, he himself condemns it. When we think 
back to how the programme was trivialized by earlier historians – who, for example, used 
it as a tool to „demonstrate‟ that protests would have stopped the Final Solution, but 
afforded it no significance in its own right – we can see how very far removed Weindling 
and Schmidt are from such an attitude. 
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 Another ‘Other’? 
 
 
This chapter has so far shown what huge progress has been made in the ways in which 
the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme is treated by historians. Still, one might argue that these 
changes in emphasis – dramatic though they undoubtedly are – do comparatively little to 
move the victims of the „euthanasia‟ programme from where they have all too often been 
placed – as subjects of discussion by others, but invisible with regard to what they 
themselves thought or felt. Catherine J Kudlick‟s 2003 article „Disability History: Why 
We Need Another „Other‟‟ included a brief survey of the literature on the Nazi 
„euthanasia‟ programme, and made the point that most studies of it have placed it in a 
broader medical context.
416
 Kudlick argues that this approach does not work for disability 
history, as the field „desperately needs people to tell their own stories‟.417 The criticism 
that one might immediately make of this is that „dead men tell no tales‟, and that victims 
of the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme are, by definition, no longer able to tell their own 
stories. However this is also a reaction to the problem I identified in the introduction to 
this thesis, in other words the practice of trying to solve a problem without any input 
from those affected.  
 Hugh Gregory Gallagher‟s By Trust Betrayed: Patients, Physicians and the 
License to Kill in the Third Reich was published in 1990. In this regard, his book predates 
Catherine J. Kudlick‟s call for „another other‟ by over a decade. Despite this, Kudlick 
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does not mention it, concentrating instead on Horst Biesold‟s 1999 Crying Hands: 
Eugenics and Deaf People in Nazi Germany. However, there are significant grounds for 
comparison between these two books, particularly when considered in the light of 
Kudlick‟s desire for „people to tell their own stories‟ to advance the field of Disability 
History. Biesold‟s book allows deaf Germans, sterilized under the Nazis, to speak about 
their experiences. Many of them had never done this before; a combination of misplaced 
shame and the fact that enforced sterilization had robbed them of descendants who might 
have given them a richly-deserved sympathetic hearing ensured that the stories Biesold 
coaxed out of them were ones which had never been heard before.     
 
Another way of injecting some humanity into the history of a programme which has been 
treated like a sterile ethical issue comes from Hugh Gregory Gallagher‟s By Trust 
Betrayed: Patients, Physicians and the License to Kill in the Third Reich.  Though this 
was published in 1990, and thus predates both Burleigh and Friedlander, it is included in 
this section because it contains a chapter in which the reader is encouraged to think about 
the experiences of victims of the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme from their own point of 
view. Gallagher, who uses a wheelchair after having contracted polio in early adulthood, 
does this not by, for example, producing letters or diaries from institution patients, but by 
looking at the ways in which disability has been defined and regarded in a multiplicity of 
societies -  ancient and modern, advanced and primitive. The reason for this is that there 
„can be no doubt that the way a society perceives and deals with a handicap is a major 
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factor in determining just how disabling – in a real sense – the handicap will be‟.418  
Gallagher explains the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme in purely utilitarian terms:  
 
„During the Nazi era, the Germans were out to build a new society, a Super Race. They 
saw themselves as the strong in triumph over the weak. How annoying the presence in their 
midst of seemingly helpless disabled and elderly people must have been‟.419  
 
Thus, Gallagher‟s explanation for the programme fits in with his thesis that the various 
reactions to disabled people are largely dependent on the societal norms and values of the 
societies in which they live. Gallagher‟s argument is expanded by Suzanne E. Evans in 
her book Hitler’s Forgotten Victims: The Holocaust and the Disabled, which was 
published in 2007. Evans‟ book offers a new way of looking at the „euthanasia‟ 
programme, not through providing new evidence but by bringing together all the relevant 
material, both for a wider audience, and for a clear socio-political purpose. The aim of 
her book and of the Disability Holocaust Project from which it results is to „utilize the 
shared history of the Holocaust as a vehicle for building greater co-operation between 
organizations of people with disabilities and to relate pre-Holocaust concepts to 
pernicious contemporary attitudes and enhance awareness of the existing stigmatization 
of people with disabilities‟. There has been much criticism of the use of historical 
injustices and worse as vehicles for fostering a contemporary sense of „identity through 
victimhood‟.420 However, as this chapter – and this whole enquiry – demonstrates, there 
is in this case a great practical need to redress the balance of widespread misconceptions 
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about „euthanasia‟, which such disciplines as disability history are in an excellent 
position to assist with.  
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Chapter Four 
 
 
 
The ‘Law in Action’ versus the ‘Law on the Books’:  
Legal Issues Relating to ‘Euthanasia’ and Disability in English and U.S.  Law 
since 1947 
 
 
 
Introduction: The Law on the Books 
 
It is now over fifty years since the US legal scholar Yale Kamisar wrote his famous 
rebuttal of Professor Glanville Williams‟ proposals for legalising voluntary euthanasia.421 
Nevertheless, his assertion that the law in theory differs substantially from the law in 
practice still has a high degree of applicability today. Kamisar‟s article makes no 
particularly strong distinctions between „mercy-killing‟ in the United States and in 
Britain. As he himself says, „The Law on the Books condemns all mercy-killings‟. This 
holds true in both countries: the perpetrator‟s motive for committing murder is 
irrelevant.
422
 This is also one of the reasons why this chapter will consider the legal 
situation in both countries, rather than devoting a separate chapter to each of them. The 
legal situation in the two countries is by no means identical, but the similarity in issues, 
events, and levels of technology means that comparisons are not particularly onerous. 
Neither jurisdiction recognizes a specific defence of „mercy killing‟. The law in this area 
in England and Wales is governed by a number of statutes, depending upon the nature of 
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the killing. Murder is the most serious, and involves „intentional causation of death‟.423  
A layperson who commits a „mercy killing‟ can, by virtue of an offence introduced in the 
Homicide Act 1957, claim a defence of „diminished responsibility‟. If successful, this 
will reduce the conviction from murder to manslaughter.
424
 .  The law on assisted suicide 
in England and Wales has recently been clarified. Family members who assist the suicide 
of a terminally ill person will not generally face the threat of prosecution. This 
clarification occurred as a result of legal action taken by Debbie Purdy. Ms. Purdy, who 
has multiple sclerosis, won the right to be provided with guidance from the Director of 
Public Prosecutions as to how he would exercise his discretion in relation to Article 2(4) 
of the Suicide Act 1961. This provides that no prosecutions should be brought against 
persons who „aid, abet, counsel or procure‟ another‟s suicide, except by the Director of 
Public Prosecutions, or with his consent.
425
 Furthermore, the case of Ms. Purdy (R. (on 
the application of Purdy) v. D.P.P. [2009] UKHL 45) held that Ms. Purdy‟s rights under 
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which enshrines respect for 
private and family life, entitled her to be provided with such guidance.
426
 She wished to 
know if ending her life with assistance would leave her husband, Omar Puente, in danger 
of prosecution for assisting a suicide. Starmer‟s remarks, however, identify another 
problem, and one which will be a primary focus of this chapter. Starmer was quoted in a 
Crown Prosecution Service press release as emphasizing that „this policy does not, in any 
way, permit euthanasia. The taking of life by another person is murder or manslaughter – 
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which are among the most serious criminal offences‟.427 Finally, a physician who kills a 
patient who has, for example, a terminal illness, will usually face a murder charge but 
may plead „double effect‟. This defence, introduced by the Bodkin Adams case of 1957, 
will provide that a physician is not guilty of murder provided he or she can demonstrate 
that drugs administered to the dying patient were given with the sole aim of relieving 
suffering, even if they eventually caused death.
428
 The law in the United States is 
somewhat more complicated. It has grown over the years to take into account „living 
wills‟, assisted dying, persistent vegetative state, and other matters. Not all laws apply in 
all states. Nevertheless, what still holds true is that active „euthanasia‟ is a crime in every 
single US state.
429
 In some ways, the treatment options for neonates which he discussed 
are of less relevance now than they were then, having been largely replaced by 
sophisticated pre-natal tests and the resulting opportunity to dispose of a disabled baby 
before it has the chance to see the light of day. For example, figures released show that 
pre-natal diagnosis of the two congenital impairments mentioned by Raphael and others 
(namely, Down‟s syndrome and spina bifida) resulted in termination in 90 and 92 per 
cent of cases respectively.
430
 In addition, though abortions are generally prohibited after 
twenty-four weeks, section 1 (1)) (d) of the Abortion Act 1967 (as amended by the 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990) does provide for abortion at any time up 
to birth, if there is a „significant risk that the baby will be born seriously disabled‟.431 The 
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Office for National Statistics shows that, in 2009, only 1% of abortions took place 
because of foetal disability.
432
 Although, as the above statistics of 90 and 92 per cent 
terminations for Down‟s syndrome and spina bifida showed, it may be that the percentage 
of abortions for types of disability is significantly higher.   It would be difficult to 
demonstrate conclusively that the disparate ethical problems of disability-related abortion 
on the one hand, and euthanasia on the other, are connected, but I do feel that, if there 
were less eagerness to regard abortion as a way of „solving‟ disability, then people who 
become disabled, say in adulthood, might be more aware that there were steps that they 
might take, which did not involve campaigning vociferously for their „right to die‟. It is 
noticeable that the debates in this area are often led by previously healthy people, now 
facing  terminal  or degenerative illness, and who want the opportunity to die at a time 
and in a manner of their own choosing. This phenomenon has led to a number of 
important developments: some U.S. states now have „living wills‟; Jack Kevorkian has 
served time in prison for „helping his clients to die‟, and legal ramifications are also being 
felt in the United Kingdom.          As this chapter will show, and as writers such as 
Richard Huxtable have identified, the above statement of Mr Starmer‟s contains more 
than an element of wishful thinking. This chapter will demonstrate that cases of 
„euthanasia‟ occupy – and have done for decades – a separate but largely 
unacknowledged category of British criminal law. Though they come before the courts in 
a whole variety of guises, this chapter will argue – as this whole enquiry has done – that 
the courts have proceeded without any real attempt to solve the underlying problems 
which cases of „euthanasia‟ represent. The comprehensive challenges to the unspoken 
assumption that some lives may be extinguished with no real consequences have come 
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from the disability community but, particularly in England and Wales, have really not 
been adequately taken up by the courts. In addition, the „right to die‟ is not nearly as 
straightforward as high-profile campaigners like Debbie Purdy and Terry Pratchett appear 
to imagine. Not only is it a debate with a long history, but it also raises questions about 
such things as the value of different lives, and provision for people with complex needs. 
These extremely important topics will simply not be addressed if the current trend 
continues – that of articulate, previously healthy individuals who assert that, now their 
lives have become challenging, it should be their inalienable right to end them. Maybe in 
some cases this is correct, but as this chapter will show, the tenor of the debate has for so 
long been hostile to the idea of a life which may contain many difficulties being as 
worthy of preservation as a „normal‟ life, that the situation has arisen in which the least-
noticed areas of the debate are the ones which stand in greatest need of consideration. 
This is what will happen in this chapter. It will also become apparent that the cases 
highlighted here are ones which focus overwhelmingly on disability, as opposed to 
terminal illness – and the public debate does focus very much on the death of terminally 
ill people.  
          The case of Debbie Purdy, like that of Diane Pretty in 2001-2, caught the public 
imagination, and focused attention and debate on „end-of-life‟ issues. Both these cases 
involved adults who had independently decided that they wished to die, but who required 
assistance in doing so. Because of this, an impression may have arisen that the problems 
of euthanasia and assisted suicide are relatively few and easy to solve.  In common with 
the preceding chapters, this chapter will demonstrate that is not the case. Not only do 
debates about „euthanasia‟ have a long and, sometimes, unsavoury history, but there are 
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also very many different problems which have entered the discussion over the years. As 
far as the British legal debate is concerned, the period of the 1940s to the 1960s is 
perhaps the most straightforward, focusing as it does on active killing, either of patients 
by their physicians, or of sick or disabled people by their relatives. In addition, medical 
technology was not at this point sufficiently advanced to enable catastrophically injured 
people (such as Tony Bland in 1993) to be kept alive. Thus, some of the questions which 
would, in later years, become almost emblematic of the „euthanasia‟ debate did not even 
arise. Other questions, such as that of selective infanticide by physicians, were often a 
response to advances in surgical techniques, which enabled more babies to survive but 
left many with chronic health problems which physicians and parents decided, made their 
lives „not worth living‟. Most recently, debates have focused on assisted suicide and 
termination of life support. However, the continued occurrence of cases of the killing of 
sick and disabled people by members of their own families – cases which might appear to 
belong to an earlier era –  show that the problems underpinning the subject of 
„euthanasia‟ are as far from being truly solved as they ever were. 
 
‘Idiots and People of That Sort’:  
The ‘Euthanasia’ Debates of the 1950s and 1960s 
During this period, the cases of „euthanasia‟ which one encounters are what might be 
described as „classic‟ cases of „euthanasia‟ – the active killing of a sick or disabled 
person, allegedly to spare that person further suffering. Both countries sought ways of 
both avoiding the problems such cases represented, and of demonstrating solidarity with 
the perpetrator – particularly when he or she was a layperson. England and Wales 
introduced a new defence of diminished responsibility, which continues to be used by lay 
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defendants accused of „mercy-killing‟.433 The United States also saw attempts such as 
refusing to indict defendants in the first place, trying them for manslaughter rather than 
murder despite evidence of obvious premeditation, or finding them not guilty by reason 
of, for example, temporary insanity.
434
 Contemporary attitudes to such cases and issues 
are highly revealing. The actions of the courts make it clear that they wished to protect 
the perpetrator from the full force of the law, and to express their sympathy for him or 
her. At the same time, they wished to make it appear that they regarded „mercy-killing‟ as 
a crime like any other. They would do this both by making pronouncements to the effect 
and by imposing a penalty (invariably extremely light) on the perpetrator. Current 
attitudes towards disability and disabled people can also be gleaned from passing remarks 
during debates about „euthanasia‟. Such attitudes are clearly to be seen in the 1950 House 
of Lords debate over the (unsuccessful) attempt to implement a bill to legalise voluntary 
euthanasia. The Voluntary Euthanasia (Legalisation) Bill was, in essence, an amended 
version of a Bill which had been placed, without success, before the Lords in 1936. It was 
debated in the House of Lords on November 28, 1950. An important motivation for the 
Bill‟s reintroduction at this time is likely to have been the prominence in British public 
discourse of a number of cases of „euthanasia‟ in the States, which were sympathetically 
discussed in the British press.
435
 Despite this, the Bill failed, and the Lords‟ debates 
demonstrate clearly that one reason for this was that many of the peers who spoke against 
it feared that it might prove to be the „thin end of the wedge‟. In particular, many Lords 
expressed concerns about this on the basis of the „small beginnings‟ of the relatively 
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recent Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme, which had then grown to encompass a much wider 
circle of victims.  The Bill‟s advocate in the Lords, Lord Chorley of Kendal, was a vice-
president of the Voluntary Euthanasia Legalisation Society.
436
 He hastened to assure the 
House that his proposed Bill would only grant the possibility of „euthanasia‟ to compos 
mentis adults: „only a person who is able to come to a decision for himself … should be 
granted this method of leaving his life‟.437 This reassurance failed to allay the concerns of 
many members of the House of Lords. Early on in the debate,  the Archbishop of York 
remarked that while the programme had had small beginnings, it had during the war 
transformed into a large operation for the destruction of those who, the Archbishop said, 
were considered „useless mouths in a time of emergency‟.438 The Archbishop expressed 
deep concern that any attempt to introduce „euthanasia‟ legislation in Britain would 
undermine the value attached to human life.
439
 With regard to the Nazi „euthanasia‟ 
programme itself, the Archbishop advanced what has come to be known as the „slippery 
slope‟ argument, asking:  
 
„If we once begin to allow this, where are we to stop? Now it is proposed that this right 
should be granted in connection with excessive pain. Why not also to those who are born 
feeble-minded? Why not also to those who are physically so crippled that they can be of no 
service to the nation? Why also should it not be applied to those who are in our mental 
asylums? It has to be remembered that Germany placed its feet on the slippery slope, and 
euthanasia, which was at first applied only to a very few, was eventually, under the stress 
                                                 
436
 N.D.A. Kemp, „Merciful release’: The History of the British Euthanasia Movement, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
2002), p.117. 
437
 Lord Chorley quoted in Kemp, p. 140. 
438
 Quoted in Kemp, p.141. 
439
 Ibid. 
 199 
of war especially, applied to a large number of people who were regarded as useless 
mouths in a time of emergency. I feel that there is a real danger that…imperceptibly and 
gradually this value in human life will be reduced if by law it is possible year by year to 
kill a large number of people‟.440 
  
It is clear from these statements that the Archbishop of York was not really considering 
the particular situations for which Lord Chorley had expressly designed his Bill. Instead, 
he was concerned about where it might lead. He clearly believed that unwelcome 
consequences were almost inevitable if the Bill were to become law. In addition, his 
remarks show that he considered the example of the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme an 
instructive one for his own society; as we have seen (and shall see again) those who 
believe that the example of the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme has no useful role to play in 
debates about euthanasia, are apt to point out the enormous differences between Nazi 
Germany on the one hand and Britain (or the United States) on the other. The concerns 
put forward by the Archbishop of York were echoed by other members of the Lords, such 
as Lords Amulree and Haden-Guest, as well as by the Lord Chancellor, Viscount Jowitt. 
In fact, these gentlemen agonized so exhaustively about the possible „slippery-slope‟ 
effects of any legalisation of voluntary euthanasia, that it is doubtful whether they 
actually considered the proposals which Lord Chorley attempted to place before them.  
Lord Amulree, for example, stated:  
 
„once we legally broke down that principle [of the sanctity of human life] there 
would occur what occurred in Germany before the war, when mental defectives 
                                                 
440
 House of Lords Parliamentary Debates Official Report, Fifth Series, 1950-51, Vol. 169, (Oct.31, 1950-Jan. 24, 1951), c.563-4. 
 200 
were put out of their misery, mad people were destroyed and people suffering from 
all sorts of incurable diseases were given release. It is much better to encourage the 
medical profession to find out forms of treatment and to alleviate pain rather than to 
encourage them …to kill people because they are in so much pain‟.441 
 
 Such concerns were repudiated by the Earl of Huntingdon, thus:  
 
„if a Hitler, or some other dictator…ever came to this country, a man who has probably 
waded through violence and bloodshed, and who holds down the country with an army of 
secret police, does anybody seriously consider that he would be stopped from doing away 
with his enemies because we had or we had not practised voluntary euthanasia? If we 
consider the implications of that argument, your Lordships will see that it is not one which 
we need take very seriously‟.442 
 
We have spent a significant amount of time discussing this debate. Why is this, if 
the Bill that the Lords were supposed to be considering did not even become law? The 
answer is, because it gives a vivid impression of the views that many of the Lords took of 
the both the victims of the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme, and of persons who might come 
under the scope of proposed British legislation. In the first place, we have seen how the 
Lords‟ preoccupation with the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme could almost be considered 
to be a pretext for failing to examine their own ideas. These are characterised by the 
implication that the killing of such people is not really murder, and by the assumption 
that the „slippery-slope‟ argument would only begin to be of general concern once the 
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intended victims thereof had already been killed.  Consider, for example, the 
contributions made to the House of Lords debate by Lord Jowitt, the Lord Chancellor. 
Towards the end of the debate, the Lord Chancellor spoke against the proposed Bill, 
partly to advise their Lordships that it was far too abstract for any government to consider 
supporting it, and partly to voice his own opposition to the legalisation of „euthanasia‟. 
Referring to earlier remarks by Lord Chorley in which Chorley justified „euthanasia‟ on 
the grounds that nobody hesitates to put a suffering animal out of its misery, Viscount 
Jowitt argued:  
 
„Does he not realise that the very arguments he used are arguments which tell much more 
powerfully in favour of exterminating idiots and people of that sort, than they bear upon 
the question of euthanasia? We have all seen what dreadful consequences spring from that 
doctrine. We have seen the thin end of the wedge introduced under Hitler; we have seen 
centres where killing took place, centres which started by being places where idiots were 
put away and which finally became places where political undesirables were put away. 
Most of us here, no doubt, would have qualified for that.‟443  
 
It would be a step too far to suggest that Lord Jowitt is in any way advocating the 
killing of „idiots and people of that sort‟, but he is clearly suggesting that their non-
consensual killing is of less concern than its later consequences might be, 
particularly if those consequences were to involve the killing of persons who 
reminded Lord Jowitt of himself. 
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As mentioned above, the Bill‟s promoter in the Lords, Lord Chorley of Kendal, 
was vice-president of the Voluntary Euthanasia Legalisation Society. If one pays 
attention to his speeches during the course of the debate, one can see clearly that his 
belief in „mercy-killing‟ was so great that it did not encompass only the envisaged 
„beneficiaries‟ of his Bill. . Suggesting that the Bill might be criticized for not going far 
enough, Chorley stated that „it applies only to adults and does not apply to children who 
have come into the world deaf, dumb and crippled, and who have a much better case than 
those for whom the Bill provides. That may be so, but we must go step by step‟.444 Nick 
Kemp has suggested that this was a major reason for the Bill‟s failure.445 It is true that, 
for example, opposition to Lord Chorley‟s Bill was most strenuous from Lords Amulree 
and Haden-Guest, and from Viscount Jowitt. It is, however, difficult to avoid remarking 
upon the assumption by a number of the noble members that the killing of someone 
whom they had decided was already suffering was not quite the same as the murder of an 
ordinary person.  For example, consider Lord Amulree‟s comments above regarding the 
victims of the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme. He describes them as being „destroyed‟, „put 
out of their misery‟, and „given release‟. Although he states clearly that the role of the 
medical profession is to alleviate the suffering of patients (and thus that „euthanasia‟ is 
wrong), he describes the victims as not possessing any characteristics other than their 
apparent suffering. In this regard, his attitude towards them is strikingly similar to that 
taken by the Nuremberg Medical Trial tribunal. Indeed, this attitude would seem to 
underpin the whole „right-to-die‟ movement. 
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The year 1957 saw two particular occurrences, both of which have considerable 
bearing on the law relating to „mercy-killings‟, at least in England and Wales. As we 
shall see in the following section, soon after its inception, the Homicide Act 1957 began 
to be used as a means of dealing with laypeople (generally parents) that had ended the 
lives of their disabled children. As far as case-law is concerned, 1957 was also the year of 
the famous case of Dr John Bodkin Adams, tried for and subsequently acquitted of the 
killing of his terminally ill patient, Mrs Gladys Morrell. The Bodkin Adams case is 
perhaps most well-known for its recognition of the doctrine of double effect – the 
acceptance by the courts that if a physician used drugs to relieve a terminally ill person‟s 
sufferings (for example, morphine for pain relief) but the drug coincidentally shortened 
the patient‟s life, he would not be guilty of causing the patient‟s death, provided that 
amelioration of suffering had been his sole objective.
446
 Ever since, there has been 
considerable debate over whether the heavy use of such drugs as opiates really have the 
effects which have been attributed to them – most notably that of respiratory suppression, 
which for obvious reasons has been considered the principle type of situation in which 
the doctrine of double effect would be likely to apply.
447
 For the purposes of this chapter, 
however, the importance of the case lies in the remarks made by the trial judge, Patrick 
(later Lord) Devlin, about the place of „mercy-killing‟ in English law. In his book on the 
trial, Easing the Passing, Lord Devlin claims that  
 
„[D]egrees of murder are unknown in English law. The taking of life is all that matters; the 
manner of taking is not considered. The law draws no distinction between fighters, robbers, 
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sadists and mercy killers. In 1922 the continent of murder was diminished by the 
detachment of infanticide, a statutory crime created in that year. Some day perhaps 
euthanasia will be treated likewise. But in 1957 euthanasia was, and still is, murder‟.448  
 
Furthermore,  
 
„[T]he so-called malice that that is the chief legal ingredient of murder is as much at home 
with benevolence as with malevolence. My direction to the jury would have to be that, if 
they were satisfied that there was an intent to kill, it was immaterial whether the intent was 
merciful or diabolic‟.449 
 
 These statements are strikingly similar to that of Kier Starmer, quoted at the beginning of 
this chapter. Both men, though writing over thirty years apart, express their earnest belief 
that motive and manner are irrelevant under English law: the only relevant fact is that a 
human being has been unlawfully killed. It would, however, be unwise to draw this 
conclusion. Throughout his account of the trial, Devlin draws frequent comparisons 
between „mercy-killing‟ and other types of murder. The first of these is a practical 
remark, designed to show the lay reader of Devlin‟s book how a prosecuting barrister 
opens his case by painting for the court a coherent portrait of the defendant, his character 
and motives:  
 
„The opening speech in a murder case must present a convincing portrait of a murderer. He 
can be one of many types ranging from the sadist to the mercy-killer. Usually the facts of 
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the case are themselves sufficient to portray him. Here they were not. Many of the public 
thought that the doctor‟s offence lay in the gift of death to the dying. … There lay in the 
facts of the case a character somewhere between the mercy-killer and the coldblooded 
villain who poisoned for paltry sums. A picture could have been painted of a doctor who 
used heroin to keep his patient happy, who in return expected baksheesh, a chest of silver or 
the like, who found himself having to drug more and more until it was too late to wean, and 
who saw at the end that he had to increase to kill. Could such a death be proved as murder? 
Very difficult: increasing the dosage has not the suddenness of the bullet nor the sharpness 
of a knife wound.‟450  
 
 
This explanation has a clear objective, but it also casts light on the views of Lord Devlin, 
and of English law in general, upon the question of „mercy-killing‟. The view that 
„mercy-killing‟ and sadistic murder occupy entirely opposite ends of a rather wide 
spectrum is clearly taken for granted. Lord Devlin also makes the interesting and rather 
important statement that „usually the facts of the case are themselves sufficient to portray 
him‟ [the defendant]. The cases that will be considered in this section will demonstrate 
that, in cases of „euthanasia‟, the „facts of the case‟ will often relate largely to the 
victim‟s supposedly irremediable suffering, rather than to a consideration of the victim as 
a full human being. 
 Lord Devlin‟s additional remarks concerning the status of „mercy-killing‟ in 
English law serve to cement this impression. Some of these remarks, like the one quoted 
above, relate specifically to the portrayal of the defendant by the prosecution. In this 
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regard, the chief prosecutor, Sir Reginald Manningham-Buller, is criticised by Devlin for 
the apparent „lack of imagination‟ in the picture he painted of the defendant as a base and 
grasping man, who had used the honour of his profession to conceal his covetous 
motives.
451
 Despite the fact that both this device, and Devlin‟s criticism of it, was specific 
to the trial and defendant in question, it does serve to demonstrate the fundamental 
problem identified in this chapter and in this whole enquiry: despite the protestations of 
such illustrious persons as Kier Starmer and Lord Devlin, „mercy-killing‟ is not seen as 
murder – it never has been. 
The U.S. legal profession were also debating the issue of „euthanasia‟ and the 
legalisation thereof during this time. In this instance, a change in law was not directly 
envisaged. What provoked this U.S. was the publication, in 1957, of a book by an 
eminent English scholar. The scholar‟s name was Glanville Williams, a fellow of Jesus 
College, Cambridge, and his book was entitled The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal 
Law. Three years previously, in 1954, a somewhat similar book, Morals and Medicine by 
Dr. Joseph Fletcher, a theologian, Episcopalian minister, and important member of what 
would become known as the „right to die‟ movement in the United States, had appeared. 
This book too gave rise to discussion of the problem of „euthanasia‟. In the words of Ian 
Dowbiggin, it „inspired legal scholars to join the debate over euthanasia‟.452   
  The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law advanced the opinion that the 
doctrine of the „sanctity of life‟ was defensible only on religious grounds.453 With respect 
to the argument about „euthanasia‟, Williams was distinctly reminiscent of a 1950s Peter 
Singer. He argued that it was time to replace the outdated idea that life was „sacred‟ with 
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something a little more realistic. He also claimed that, as courts had long been in the 
practise of acquitting parents who had killed their disabled children, it was high time for 
the law to respond to this by granting legal (rather than merely tacit) protection to such 
parents, by legalising „euthanasia‟ for such children.454  
 If Glanville Williams had opinions of any kind regarding the Nazi „euthanasia‟ 
programme, and any bearings which it might have upon his own views, he did not state 
them specifically. Indeed, even when such associations were made by his opponents, 
Williams responded to them by ignoring them completely. It is certainly the case that no 
references to the Nazis are to be found either in The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal 
Law, or in the speech which Williams made to the Euthanasia Society‟s Annual General 
Meeting in 1955. More tellingly, Williams made no mention of the Nazi „euthanasia‟ 
programme even after he had been specifically accused of having given insufficient 
consideration to its importance, because „the parade of horrors has taken place in our 
time and the order of procession has been headed by the killing of the „incurables‟ and 
the „useless‟.455 Williams‟ accuser here was Yale Kamisar, an associate professor of law 
at the University of Minnesota Law School. Kamisar‟s objections to Williams‟ views, in 
the light of the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme, were basically two-fold: the problem of the 
„wedge‟ or „slippery slope‟ argument, and the question of the „euthanasia‟ of disabled 
children and infants which, as Kamisar shrewdly observed, enjoyed significant public 
support, but was generally sidelined in discussions of „euthanasia‟, whose proponents 
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considered it more prudent to focus the debate upon incurably ill adults, who could 
usually give consent of a kind and, in addition, were actually dying.
456
 
 Kamisar advances the „slippery-slope‟ argument for two reasons, both of which 
are based upon his understanding of the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme. Firstly, he claims 
that the German public‟s opposition to the programme (which, Kamisar claims, had the 
desired result) was centred solely on the programme for the „euthanasia‟ of adults.457  By 
contrast, the „euthanasia‟ programme against children continued until the end of the 
war.
458
 Secondly, Kamisar uses his reading of Leo Alexander‟s „Medical Science Under 
Dictatorship‟ to support the idea that once „euthanasia‟ has been legalized, it is a 
relatively simple matter to apply it to groups or individuals who are not dying, but may 
simply be unpopular or inconvenient.
459
 
 With regard to the Nazi „euthanasia‟ of children and the supposed „success‟ of the 
public protests against the adult „euthanasia‟ programme, much can be said. It has 
become clear that the adult „euthanasia‟ programme was, at most, subjected to a 
temporary halt in mid-1941, after which it became decentralised and, in all probability, 
claimed even more victims than it had done in its original incarnation.
460
 Kamisar does 
make some reference to this. Using Alexander Mitscherlich and Fred Mielke‟s Doctors of 
Infamy
461
 as his source, Kamisar states that gas chambers from Hadamar and the other 
„euthanasia‟ centres were shipped out to the East to be used in the extermination of Polish 
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Jews.
462
 In addition, Dr. Andrew C. Ivy‟s Nazi War Crimes of a Medical Nature is used 
to show that by 1943, „the wind had become a whirlwind‟, and concentration camp 
prisoners were enthusiastically being done to death under the guise of „euthanasia‟ in 
order to create more space for new arrivals in concentration camps. As Michael Marrus 
has shown, this perceived widening of the scope of Nazi „euthanasia‟ had proved 
something of a distraction for those involved in prosecuting the Nuremberg defendants, 
with it often being stated that the term „euthanasia‟ was essentially meaningless and was 
merely a convenient blanket term for the killing of the Nazis‟ political and racial 
enemies.
463
 As was demonstrated in previous chapters, this, together with the fact that the 
overwhelming majority of victims of Nazi „euthanasia were German, and the problem of 
the Nuremberg Medical Trial prosecutors‟ chilling lack of concern with „euthanasia‟ as a 
concrete ethical problem, meant that discussion of Nazi „euthanasia‟ and its more general 
ethical implications was, at the Nuremberg Medical Trial, woefully deficient. A 
somewhat similar argument can be made regarding Kamisar‟s principle objection to 
Glanville Williams‟ proposals for the legalization of „euthanasia‟. This objection comes 
from Kamisar‟s reading of Leo Alexander‟s „Medical Science under Dictatorship‟. As 
stated above, this so-called „wedge‟ or „slippery-slope‟ argument warns that once 
„euthanasia‟ has been legalized, it would be extremely difficult to check its potential 
effects. In Kamisar‟s view, the relevance of the example of Nazi Germany here is 
twofold: firstly, the exclusion of German Jews (at least at first) from the Nazi 
„euthanasia‟ programme indicated to Kamisar that a prerequisite for the later stages of the 
Nazi genocide was that the German public should have been encouraged to disregard 
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traditional ideas of the „sanctity of life‟ by being introduced to the possibility that there 
were some people who were suffering so acutely and hopelessly that their lives were „not 
worth living‟. Kamisar‟s argument, taken from Alexander‟s article, is that this approach 
made the eventual idea of killing on ideological grounds more palatable, because it had 
been introduced in incremental stages.
464
 Though these arguments concern the Nazi 
„euthanasia‟ programme, and scholars‟ interpretations thereof, they do not really have a 
great deal to do with the rights and wrongs of „euthanasia‟ as such. This is an accusation 
which could also be levelled at Leo Alexander‟s „Medical Science under Dictatorship‟. 
Warning, as Alexander does, that the entire Nazi genocide sprang from „small 
beginnings‟, does not necessarily indicate a strong condemnation, or even a deep 
consideration, of the „small beginnings‟ themselves.  
It has been difficult to track down responses to Yale Kamisar‟s article, save for a 
rejoinder, by Glanville Williams himself, which did not deal at all with Kamisar‟s 
remarks concerning the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme. In addition, other reviewers tended 
to refer to the Nazi experience in passing, if at all.
465
 This makes it hard to determine why 
exactly it was so little-discussed. Nevertheless, one can find some references to the Nazis 
amongst these legal journals, and those that do exist are quite telling. Richard C. 
Donnelly, a professor of law at Yale, reviewed Williams‟ book, and commented upon the 
example of the Nazis not with regard to „euthanasia‟, but sterilization. He noted that 
compulsory sterilization did not have its origins in Nazi Germany, but in the United 
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States, the first sterilization law having been passed there in 1907.
466
 Donnelly writes that 
it is „perhaps not superfluous‟ to mention this.467 However, it is not entirely clear from 
Donnelly‟s review why he does mention it, as the point does not go anywhere, except 
insofar as Donnelly makes a number of rather general observations concerning the 
question of whether voluntary consent can ever really be voluntary.
468
 It is striking that 
Donnelly does not make any points similar to those made by Yale Kamisar – concerning, 
perhaps, a perceived danger that the scope of application of these laws could be widened 
indefinitely. 
The debates about „euthanasia‟ which did take place were occasioned by the 
publication of important texts by influential figures. It was also shown that, while 
memories and conceptions of the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme played an important role 
in these debates, it often seemed that arguments which used the programme as an 
exemplar of why „euthanasia‟ should not be made legal in the States, were not actually 
concerned with the problem of whether or not „euthanasia‟ could potentially be a „good 
thing‟, but whether it might have undesirable consequences for a wider (and, possibly, 
ever-expanding) circle of people than that for whom it was originally intended.  
 Glanville Williams was an ardent supporter of the „euthanasia‟ movement, being a 
prominent member of both the Euthanasia Society of America and the Voluntary 
Euthanasia Legalisation Society (VELS) in the United Kingdom. The thesis of his book 
was essentially that opposition to „euthanasia‟ could be justified only on religious 
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grounds. 
469
 The publication of Williams‟ book led Yale Kamisar to produce a lengthy 
article refuting and criticizing the view of „euthanasia‟ contained therein, and this 
rejoinder was published in the Minnesota Law Review. Joseph Fletcher‟s work also 
aroused considerable debate in legal circles. Before we consider the debates themselves, 
we must discover what exactly Fletcher and Williams proposed in the way of the 
legalisation of „euthanasia‟.  Fletcher proposed that „euthanasia‟ should be legalised in 
the United States, provided certain conditions were fulfilled.
470
  These „conditions‟ would 
appear to include the consent of the subject, who would be suffering from an incurable, 
hopeless and painful condition. Furthermore, the object of the killing would have to be a 
pure and unselfish desire to relieve the patient‟s suffering for his or her own sake.471  
 Unfortunately, Fletcher‟s avowed support in his Morals and Medicine for 
compulsory sterilization made it apparent that he was not concerned exclusively with 
relieving suffering. Whilst advancing the theory that the solutions to health-related ethical 
dilemmas depended solely upon the wishes and circumstances of the individual patient, 
Fletcher had very clear-cut ideas concerning the type of person society should not want, 
recommending the involuntary sterilization of people considered to be „mentally 
disabled‟. In common with other eugenics enthusiasts, Fletcher believed in the limitless 
fertility and sexual urges of „mentally disabled‟ people, which could only be curbed by 
means of compulsory sterilization.
472
 
 The issue of sterilization is an important one in this regard.  Ian Dowbiggin has 
written that few people agreed with Fletcher, despite the debate over his book, but the 
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actual extent of this disagreement is somewhat questionable. Harry Kalven Jr, a member 
of the Illinois Bar and professor of law at the University of Chicago Law School, wrote 
that: 
 
„There is some merit in the claim to a merciful death for the monstrously disfigured or the 
degradingly senile. To legalize euthanasia in this narrow area may well complicate and 
perplex the problem of equitable treatment of the many marginal cases near it. In the end 
and with no great conviction in my conclusion, I would favor leaving things as they are and 
trusting for awhile yet to the imperfect but elastic quality in the administration of the law as 
written‟.473  
 
In his article on Fletcher‟s Morals and Medicine, Kalven cites both the Nazi „euthanasia‟ 
programme and the famous Repouille case, which was referred to in chapter two. His 
remarks concerning the Repouille case lend further credence to the suspicion, gained 
from scrutiny of his remarks of the undesirability of legalising „euthanasia‟ (above), that 
Kalven saw nothing wrong in „euthanasia‟ of those unable to consent, but fought shy of 
advocating that the practise be legalised because of the consequences it might have. 
Kalven describes Repouille as „having mercifully killed his horribly deformed child after 
years of patient care‟, and refers to his actions as a „„crime‟‟, in other words, indicating 
that in killing his child, Repouille had not done anything remotely reprehensible. Kalven, 
in addition, described Repouille‟s actions as „merciful‟ due to his child having been 
„horribly deformed‟: there is no attempt to establish that the child was suffering 
intolerably and/or irredeemably. In addition, as stated previously, Fletcher‟s views on 
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sterilization were questionable to say the least, and they were shared, to a large degree, by 
Kalven. Kalven states in his article that compulsory sterilization of the „mentally ill‟ and 
„mentally disabled‟, at the time of writing (1956) existed in some form in „about 26‟ of 
the U.S. states, with thirteen of these also requiring the sterilization of criminals.
474
 That 
more of these laws targeted the mentally ill and disabled than they did criminals, 
demonstrates strikingly that the purpose of the laws must have been eugenic, as opposed 
to punitive. Though little has been written on this, it beggars belief that such obviously 
widespread fear that illnesses and impairments could be transmitted to future generations 
had no bearing upon the way in which living people with these illnesses and impairments 
were regarded. Kalven himself cites the inefficacy of sterilization laws, and their lack of 
impact upon the gene pool, as the chief reason why they are not of great eugenic 
importance.
475
 It is disturbing that the effects of sterilization upon the people who have 
actually been sterilized go unmentioned.
476
 
 As regards memories of the Nazi genocide, it is unclear whether Fletcher‟s book 
concerns itself with these or not. Kalven does, and his comments, though brief, are 
telling. He remarks, „Euthanasia for a social purpose is the easiest to reject flatly, even if 
we did not have the benefit of the Nazi example‟.477 Clearly, the „example‟ of the Nazi 
„euthanasia‟ programme should sound a note of caution, but what, precisely? For those 
seeking further information about the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme, Kalven recommends 
the article „Euthanasia in the Hadamar Sanatorium and International Law‟. The author, 
Maximilian Koessler, was a member of the Vienna Bar until 1938, and joined the New 
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York Bar in 1946.
478
 Knoessler‟s article concerns the trial of Alfons Klein et al (the 
Hadamar Trial), which heard the case of Russian and Polish workers, supposedly 
suffering from incurable tuberculosis, who had been taken to Hadamar by the Nazis and 
killed – where the Nazis had previously killed disabled people.  
 As stated above, Kalven uses his reading of Knoessler‟s article to support his 
opinion that the Nazi example makes it easy to reject any possibility of „euthanasia for a 
social purpose‟, but it is not at all clear what such a thing would mean. One can infer, 
from Kalven‟s article, that he is alluding  to the hypothetical widening of the boundaries 
of „euthanasia‟ towards persons who are not dying, and who may not themselves be 
suffering – or, in other words, to the deleterious effects upon society which this might 
potentially have.
479
  However, as Kalven himself remarks, many of the most important 
cases of „mercy-killing‟ in the United States, most notably that of Repouille, involve the 
killing of a person who did not and could not consent, and who was not even dying.
480
 It 
seems probable that Kalven‟s reference to „euthanasia for a social purpose‟ is derived 
from a short passage in Knoessler‟s article in which the motivation of the Hadamar staff 
for the killing of the supposedly tubercular Eastern workers is discussed:  
 
„It is more plausible that the desire to abate the nuisance of an unproductive burden, rather 
than any humanitarian idea, was instrumental in the application of „euthanasia‟ to Eastern 
workers who had become physically unfit for work. After all, this was the leading idea of 
Hitler‟s euthanasia policy even in its application to Germans‟.481  
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From this passage, it may be seen that, based upon his reading of Knoessler, Kalven had 
decided that the Nazi „euthanasia‟ policies were founded upon a utilitarian desire to 
dispose of those who cost society money whilst failing to make any meaningful 
contribution towards it. It will be remembered that Leo Alexander‟s interpretation of the 
Nazis‟ motives was strikingly similar. 
 This section has dealt with relatively early post-war debates about „euthanasia‟ in 
both England and Wales, and the United States. I have shown that, at this period, direct 
„mercy-killings‟ were really the only form of „euthanasia‟ which the respective legal 
systems encountered, medical technology not having progressed sufficiently far to have 
resulted in problems such as the ethics of keeping alive patients who were in irreversible 
comas or persistent vegetative states. As we shall see, these matters would result in the 
acknowledged opening-out of the „euthanasia‟ debate, to the point where any member of 
society might come to be affected by them. At the same time, other cases, which 
invariably attract less attention, demonstrate that the underlying questions which the topic 
of „euthanasia‟ presents – the value of different lives, and the possibilities for making 
them fulfilling – are circumvented rather than solved. 
 
The 1960s and 1970s: A Different Form of ‘Euthanasia’ 
 
The U.S. „euthanasia‟ movement itself was actually going rather badly by the early 
1960s, and membership of the Euthanasia Society of America had dwindled to only 325 
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by 1962.
482
 Ian Dowbiggin states that one reason for this was that, by the late 1950s, the 
arguments of people like Yale Kamisar – equating the decision to legalize „euthanasia‟ 
with the first step on the slippery slope down to the entire Nazi genocide - had caused the 
U.S. „euthanasia‟ movement to become very defensive.483 As has been discussed 
previously, this may not have been because there was any great feeling that „euthanasia‟ 
in itself could be alarming, but rather due to fears that, once legalized, it could snowball, 
having potentially disastrous effects which would be very difficult to check. In addition, 
1962 saw the indictment in Germany of three ex-Nazis for their participation in the Nazi 
„euthanasia‟ programme – an event which was widely reported in the United States 
press.
484
 In terms of debates about „euthanasia‟ in the United States, the most fertile time 
during this period was the very end of the 1960s, until the mid-1970s. Part of the reason 
for this was that during the period 1969-1976, thirty-six bills for the legalization of 
„euthanasia‟ were introduced into the legislatures of twenty-two states.485 Of these, thirty 
dealt with passive „euthanasia‟ (such methods as the withdrawal of food and fluids, and 
of artificial means of sustaining life), and the remaining three (Montana, Wisconsin and 
Idaho) also contained provisions for the active (voluntary) termination of life.
486
 
 Through the mere fact that terms such as „active‟ and „passive‟ have now crept 
into the discussion of „euthanasia‟, we can see that the scope of the problem has become 
considerably wider than it had been in the 1950s. I have said that when Yale Kamisar 
wrote his article criticising Glanville Williams‟ The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal 
Law, there was no need for him to spend time on an exhaustive clarification of what 
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„mercy-killing‟ meant, for, at the time he was writing, it was not possible to use medical 
technology to keep alive a person who would previously have died. Thus, „mercy-killing‟ 
or „euthanasia‟ could only have meant active curtailment of life on the grounds of 
suffering.
487
 The 1960s was really the first decade in which the situation became 
markedly less clear-cut. By 1970, those who discussed „euthanasia‟ were pointing out 
that cases could be divided into three categories:  
 
„The first group (Group 1) is composed of individuals suffering from painful and incurable 
terminal illnesses such as cancer and multiple sclerosis, who, by definition, have at best 
months, weeks, or perhaps only days to live … Group II includes those diagnosed as 
defective or degenerate persons … the mentally ill, the retarded, those with gross physical 
defects, and elderly individuals suffering from senility … some … are often being 
sustained by artificial means alone. Group III would include infants and young children 
who suffer from gross mental or physical defects, or perhaps from a combination of the 
two.‟488  
 
It is this „Group III‟ which will be considered now.  
 The types of „euthanasia‟ considered thus far have not been entirely uniform. 
They have encompassed persons who are terminally ill, as well as persons who are 
disabled in some way and will always be so. Nevertheless, what these have had in 
common is that they concern people whose lives have not just begun. This section will 
differ somewhat in that the potential candidates for „euthanasia‟ are not in a position to 
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give or withhold consent for the simple reason that they are too young. By the late 1960s, 
advances in medical technology meant that, increasingly, it was possible to save the lives 
of infants born with severe medical problems. Of course, this was not entirely new, 
having been debated in the United States as early as 1915, in the famous case of the 
„Bollinger baby‟. Nevertheless, the surgery that the „Bollinger baby‟ would have needed 
to keep him alive was not especially complex, but the issue was that, as he would have 
had serious medical problems even after the surgery was complete, it was decided not to 
perform the surgery at all.
489
 As this section will show, this was still a debatable issue 
decades later, but advances in surgical techniques had ensured that the potential scope of 
infants deemed to have a life „not worth living‟ was much wider than it had been at the 
time of the Bollinger case.
490
 As we will see further in the chapter dealing with 
philosophy, it has been suggested that one way of deciding which deformed infants 
should be granted medical help might be a redefinition of the boundaries of personhood. 
For example, one might conclude that infants whose „physical and mental defects are so 
severe that they will never know anything but a vegetative existence, with no discernable 
personality, sense of self, or capacity to interact with others‟ should not be considered to 
be persons.
491
 In relation to this possibility, John A. Robertson, an Assistant Professor of 
Law at the University of Wisconsin, considered the possible relevance of the Nazi denial 
of personhood to non-Aryans.
492
 It is noticeable that this is somewhat different to many 
of the analogies with the Nazi experience which we have encountered in earlier sections 
of this chapter, in that it does not consider Nazi „euthanasia‟ in the light of such phrases 
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as „life not worth living‟ – in fact, the article contains a long section on this topic in 
which the example of the Nazis is not mentioned once.
493
 The author makes the point that 
the Nazis used their denial of personhood against groups on the basis of their race, which 
may be considered to be substantially different from denying the personhood of infants 
who may be unable to develop the potential to assume any personal characteristics of 
their own.
494
 
 It is unclear what Robertson makes of his comment regarding the Nazi denial of 
personhood. Having raised the possibility of its relevance to selective non-treatment of 
disabled infants, he concludes that it would, in practise, be far too difficult to determine 
which infants fulfil the criteria for non-personhood. However, the example of the Nazis 
appears to have been considered in passing, but was not a deciding factor in his 
conclusion. It is, however, clear from other sources of the same period that selective non-
treatment of disabled infants was a widespread phenomenon during this time.
495
 As 
shown in note 55, this was described as a „major social taboo‟. Presumably, the meaning 
of this phrase is that selective non-treatment of disabled newborns was widely accepted 
and practised by the medical profession, but did not happen in the public eye and did not 
generally form the subject of widespread public debate. This situation changed, however, 
in the early 1980s. In 1982, an infant who became known as „Baby Doe‟ was born in 
Bloomington, Indiana, with Down‟s syndrome and an obstructed oesophagus. On the 
basis that they did not want a child with Down‟s syndrome, „Baby Doe‟s‟ parents refused 
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to consent to surgery to remove the blockage from his oesophagus, as a result of which 
the child died six days later from dehydration and starvation.
496
 
 The reason this case is appearing in a chapter concerned with medical, as opposed 
to legal, debates about „euthanasia‟ is simple. An attempt was made to make „Baby Doe‟ 
a ward of court, thus bypassing his parents‟ refusal to countenance either surgery or 
intravenous feeding. Ultimately, however, this attempt was unsuccessful, as the Supreme 
Court of Indiana declined to rule in the case.
497
 Less than two years later, a similar case 
occurred in Long Island, New York. This time, the child in question was a little girl, who 
became known as „Baby Jane Doe‟, and who was born with spina bifida and 
hydrocephalus, in addition to which she had microcephaly and a prolapsed rectum.
498
 The 
case reached the courts due to the actions of a „right-to-life‟ advocate, who sued the 
hospital in order to force them to operate, even though consent had been refused by the 
infant‟s parents.499  
 These cases were extensively debated by legal professionals and academics in the 
United States, and these persons‟ understanding of the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme 
played a role in these discussions. It will be remembered that, on the previous page, 
selective non-treatment of disabled infants was described as a „major social taboo‟. It was 
largely the „Baby Doe‟ and „Baby Jane Doe‟ cases which brought this „taboo‟ into the 
public arena, and which, for a time at least, saw widely publicized efforts to curb the 
practice.
500
 Some legal commentators disapproved of this, and warned that shying away 
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from non-treatment decisions on the basis that they might harm infants who could have 
benefited from treatment if it had been given, represented „the other side of the slippery 
slope‟. In other words, keeping one child alive on the basis that another might benefit was 
„a side disturbingly reminiscent of Nazi experimentation‟. The argument here is that, just 
as victims of human vivisection by the Nazis were subjected to experiments from which 
it was never envisaged that they should derive any benefit, infants with little prospect of 
„meaningful lives‟ were being denied „death with dignity‟ due to a fear that non-treatment 
decisions could cause the deaths of infants whose prospects, after treatment, were likely 
to have been promising.
501
 
 Not all legal scholars were in agreement with this point of view. H. Rutherford 
Turnbull of the University of Kansas was amongst those of the opinion that selective 
infanticide represented the dangers of the well-known slippery slope, not its‟ reverse side. 
He wrote that the „small beginnings‟ of mass-murder in Nazi Germany began with the 
murder of mentally ill and mentally disabled people.
502
 His reference to „small 
beginnings‟, one of the most famous phrases in Leo Alexander‟s famous article, clearly 
denotes at least some level of familiarity with Alexander‟s arguments. Turnbull also 
mentioned the „nazification of some aspects of American medicine‟, although he did not 
explain which particular aspects he had in mind.
503
 He further wrote that „One may 
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choose to recognize our common vulnerability in the line-drawing effort of some 
physicians and ethicists, knowing that, if force against one of us is not cabined, it can 
roam loose against others of us‟.504  
 The „slippery slope‟ argument was also considered by Norman Lund, of the U.S. 
Court of Appeal. Lund noted that, in the light of the Nazi experience and of revelations 
concerning selective infanticide in the United States, what he termed the argumentum ad 
hitlerem has been a particularly tenacious one in the ongoing debates about 
„euthanasia‟.505 Although Lund‟s sole source for his information about the Nazi 
„euthanasia‟ programme is, of course, Leo Alexander, he does give more consideration 
than most writers we have encountered to what the „slippery slope‟ might really mean. 
According to him, there are two interpretations which are used. Firstly, some 
commentators announce that as some policy or other was used by the Nazis, and as the 
Nazis were evil incarnate, other societies must avoid at all costs the implementation of 
similar policies.
506
 As we shall see particularly in the philosophy chapter, this accusation 
is rebutted by showing that the Nazi policy was significantly different from the modern 
policy under discussion. The second use of the argumentum ad hitlerem, in Lund‟s view, 
is to warn that „Policy X was adopted by the Nazis, and we should reject the policy in 
order to avoid taking what could be the first step towards Nazism‟.507 As has been shown, 
this second approach is the one which has primarily been taken by U.S. legal scholars and 
legal professionals in their discussions of the „euthanasia‟ problem. 
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 The truth of this is shown by the 1981 case of Dr Leonard Arthur. Dr Arthur was 
accused of the attempted murder of a newborn baby boy, John Pearson. The baby had 
been rejected by his parents on the basis that they did not want a child with Down‟s 
syndrome. Though there have been quite a number of subsequent cases of doctors put on 
trial for killing their patients, Dr Leonard Arthur was the first physician since John 
Bodkin Adams to have faced such a charge. The two cases are superficially similar, in 
that both involved eminent physicians who faced charges of causing fatal harm to their 
patients. In some respects, though, these cases could not have been more different. For 
example, as indicated above, the Bodkin Adams case caused widespread fascination, and 
as lurid rumours circulated about the supposed extent of the defendant‟s activities, and 
the trial judge expressed fears about the possibility of the jury‟s being biased by hostile 
media coverage, it may be said that there was not a groundswell of support for John 
Bodkin Adams. In some respects he was regarded as a Harold Shipman-type figure.
508
 By 
contrast, the most famous statement of the R .v. Arthur case may very well be that which 
appeared on the front page of The Times on Friday, November 6, 1981, when Leonard 
Arthur was acquitted: „Women cry „Thank God‟ as Dr Arthur is cleared‟.509  
 As is so often the case in this area, the Arthur and Adams cases both revolved 
around the question of duty of care, and of the doctrine of acts and omissions. In the 
former case, the John Pearson‟s right to life was found to be limited by the extent of the 
duty of his parents and doctors not to kill him or allow him to die.
510
 Leonard Arthur was 
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originally accused of murder - to prove this it would have to be shown that he intended to 
cause John Pearson grievous bodily harm. It was, however, clear from Arthur‟s case 
notes that the sole outcome he had intended was the death of the child.
511
 During the trial, 
however, the defence‟s pathologist was able to show that the victim, John Pearson, died 
from inherent birth defects, such as congenital defects of the lungs, and not as a result of 
the defendant‟s actions. Thus the charge against Arthur was changed from that of murder 
to one of attempted murder.
512
 After a deliberation of some two hours, Dr Arthur was 
unanimously acquitted.
513
  
 The reason for the acquittal is the subject of some speculation. The 
presiding judge, Farquharson J, instructed the jury that they needed to answer two 
questions: Firstly, were they convinced that Dr Arthur‟s prescription for John Pearson 
amounted to the taking of active steps to ensure that the latter would die, with the 
intention of bringing that about? Secondly, if they were sure of this, were they also 
convinced that the steps taken by Dr Arthur amounted to attempted murder?
514
 Clearly, in 
view of the acquittal, the jury chose to answer both of these questions in the negative. In 
so doing, they returned a verdict which left accepted medical practices effectively 
unquestioned.
515
 It also gave rise to some legal inconsistencies.
516
 The almost exact 
contemporary of the Arthur case was Re. B (A Minor) [1981] 1 W.L.R. 1421, CA, in 
which Alexandra, another baby born with Down‟s syndrome, was made a ward of court 
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after her parents, refused their consent to an operation to remove an internal blockage – 
the operation being necessary to save Alexandra‟s life.517 One important similarity 
between the cases, however, is the unquestioning respect which the respective courts 
afford to the parents‟ decision that their child should not live. The decision of John 
Pearson‟s parents was obviously accepted, but in Re. B., the Court of Appeal judge, Lord 
Justice Dunn, described Alexandra‟s parents‟ choice as „one which everyone accepted as 
entirely responsible‟.518 It seems from these cases that the one constant is the 
unquestioning acceptance of a decision made by new parents who may well be very 
upset, in shock, lacking in knowledge of the impairment with which their new baby has 
been diagnosed, and in no real position to lay their hands on a great deal more. Evidence 
of the continuance of this trend is somewhat anecdotal, but I quoted figures at the 
beginning of this chapter showing the extremely high incidence of termination when pre-
natal diagnosis of Down‟s syndrome or spina bifida has taken place. It would be 
important to be able to discover the full circumstances around all these decisions. How 
much information about the „condition‟ did parents receive? Did such information come 
in part from relevant organisations (e.g. Mencap), or was it provided by the parents‟ 
doctor? How did members of the medical profession treat the parents? How were their 
questions handled? Of course, new parents today will have access to all sorts of online 
support and information which would simply have been unthinkable in the early 1980s. 
Nevertheless, were the parents of John Pearson and baby Alexandra made aware of such 
support as was available? If not, would its presence have made a difference? All these 
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questions will be equally valid when we come to our next section, in which the killing of 
disabled children by their parents will be considered. 
The mid-1980s saw the pivotal U.S. case of Elizabeth Bouvia, which I referred to 
in my introductory chapter. Though this says nothing about the Nazi „euthanasia‟ 
programme, it does, as I remarked in my introduction, speak volumes about the attitudes 
to impairment current at the time. Paul Longmore has shown how Bouvia‟s request to die 
was treated as a rational response to her quadriplegia, despite the fact that the personal 
blows she had sustained would have resulted in any non-disabled person being swiftly 
treated for understandable depression.
519
 Even more importantly, Bouvia had made a 
great deal of progress in establishing a productive and fulfilling life for herself: her 
efforts were scuppered by an illegal refusal to assist her to achieve her goals, as well as 
the very real threat that she would lose much-needed benefits by marrying, or by gaining 
even a poorly-paid job.
520
 
 At the time of the Bouvia case, voices such as that of Paul Longmore were very 
much in the minority. As Adrienne Asch has written: 
 
„in a world that asserted the value of life for everyone, regardless of health status, people 
with disabilities might be no more likely than any other segment of the population to 
consider ending their lives‟.521 
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The 1990s 
 
The 1990s saw changes in the way U.S. legal scholars thought about the relevance 
or otherwise of the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme.  This next section will demonstrate 
that, while warnings of involuntary slides down the „slippery slope‟ were very much in 
evidence, this period saw the first real attempts by legal scholars to investigate recent 
historical research into the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme, as opposed to relying 
unquestioningly upon sources which had been produced decades earlier.  
In the earliest part of the 1990s, the book which had a great deal of influence upon these 
debates was Robert Jay Lifton‟s „The Nazi Doctors: A Study in the Psychology of Evil’, 
first published in 1986. This book has been disparagingly described by Michael Burleigh 
as „Psychohistory over coffee and cake with mass-murderers‟.522 Nevertheless, the 
reliance placed upon it by United States legal scholars considering the problem of 
„euthanasia‟ is clear. For example, Stephen A. Newman, professor of Law at New York 
Law School, made use of it in an article entitled „Euthanasia: Orchestrating the Last 
Syllable of Time‟.523 In this article, Newman considers, amongst other things, the 
question of whether or not the legalisation of „euthanasia‟ would have „untoward 
consequences that society ought to avoid by means of a blanket prohibition‟.524 This is, of 
course, exactly the question which other U.S. legal scholars have been asking for 
decades. As has been shown, this is very much due to their reliance upon Leo Alexander. 
Newman, however, injects something new into the debate. His use of Lifton‟s work 
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means that he is equipped with a greater degree of knowledge of the Nazi „euthanasia‟ 
programme than was possessed by many of his predecessors. In particular, it is striking 
that we have previously encountered, from U.S. legal scholars, no mention or discussion 
of the racial elements of the Nazis‟ policies. Newman, however, uses Lifton‟s book to 
demonstrate that the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme was part of a „biomedical vision‟, and 
its rejection of individual rights in favour of those of the collective was just part of the 
Nazi vision of Aryan superiority and racial purity.
525
 This interpretation is refreshing, but 
it does give rise to a new problem. Namely, whereas previous commentators had 
considered „euthanasia‟ and the „slippery slope‟ argument to be a question of whether or 
not „euthanasia‟ might lead to undesirable consequences for originally unintended targets, 
focusing upon Nazi racism does, as we shall see later with Peter Singer, give rise to a 
disinclination to consider the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme as having any relevance to 
current debates, when „euthanasia‟ is being advocated, but with no obvious racial 
connotations. 
Lifton‟s book was also made use of by legal scholars discussing the withdrawal of 
hydration and nutrition from incompetent (adult) patients. Withdrawal of vital 
sustenance, whether it be nutrition and hydration, respiration or all three, was clearly a 
by-product of the advances in medical technology which allowed physicians to keep alive 
patients who would previously have died, and who still might never regain 
consciousness. Such cases were first brought to public attention in the United States in 
the mid-1970s, with the famous case of Karen Quinlan, who fell into a coma, and whose 
parents successfully petitioned the New Jersey Supreme Court to rule that their daughter 
should be taken off the respirator which was thought to be keeping her alive. At the time, 
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discussions of the case of Re. Quinlan, in which any possible connection with Nazi 
policies was discussed, were very traditional in scope. In other words, a legal 
commentator would raise the issue of Nazism and the „slippery slope‟, and then proceed 
to take his or her position on either the side of those who were concerned about the 
possibility of a slide down such a slope, or on the side of those who had no such 
worries.
526
 
By the early 1990s, however, it seems that many legal scholars were relying upon 
Lifton‟s book, rather than Alexander‟s article, for their understanding of the Nazi 
„euthanasia‟ programme. For example, in 1990, the case of Nancy Cruzan came before 
the Supreme Court of Missouri. Like Karen Quinlan, Nancy Cruzan was in persistent 
vegetative state, having sustained very severe brain damage as a result of a car crash. 
Unlike Quinlan, Nancy Cruzan did not need a respirator, requiring only artificial 
hydration and nutrition.
527
 There has, however, been disagreement amongst legal scholars 
as to whether decisions to withdraw nutrition and/or artificial respiration in some way 
make memories of the Nazi experience particularly pertinent, or whether differences 
between contemporary U.S. society and Nazi Germany are sufficiently strong to render 
such concerns superfluous. For example, writing about the Nancy Cruzan case, 
Professors Susan R. Martyn and Henry J. Borguignon of the University of Toledo 
College of Law, used Robert Jay Lifton‟s book to support their view that allowing Nancy 
Cruzan to die was an ethical decision, and one which, on the basis of previous U.S. case 
law, should not give rise to fears of a slide down the „slippery slope‟. According to 
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Martyn and Borguignon, „the ultimate worry that a surrogate decision-maker might end 
another‟s life too soon carries with it is the weight of the „Nazi Albatross‟: the fact that 
mass executions of Jews by Germany were preceded by Nazi euthanasia programs 
designed to end „life unworthy of life‟.528  
It is not entirely clear what the authors mean by this. Do they, in common with 
most of the legal commentators previously discussed, mean that no-one must ever be 
allowed to choose the time at which someone else should die, when that person is not 
competent to make such a decision for him or herself, as this might have alarming 
consequences for members of other societal groups? In a footnote, the authors include 
information from Lifton‟s book concerning the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme, but it is 
unclear what purpose this is intended to serve. The authors then cite a large number of 
U.S. legal cases purporting to show that the difference between refusal of treatment and 
direct killing is well-established in U.S. law.
529
 
The beginning of this chapter contained a remark concerning the relative simplicity of 
cases of „euthanasia‟ in the period prior to the great advances in medical technology 
which made it possible to prolong the lives of people who would otherwise have died. 
One of the most influential of these developments was that of artificial respiration, 
hydration and nutrition. Though this development did not result in a legal case until 1993, 
British legal scholars had been discussing the problem ever since the seminal US case of 
in re Quinlan in 1976.
530
 In the early years, it would seem that such discussions centred 
on the Quinlan case itself, as opposed to consideration of how English law might resolve 
                                                 
528
 Susan R. Martyn and Henry J. Bourguignon, „Coming to Terms with Death: The Cruzan Case‟, 42 Hastings Law Journal (1990-
1991), p.844. 
529
 Ibid, pp.144-145. 
530
 Huxtable, p.117. 
 232 
similar problems.
531
 One article that did address this question stated that „there is now 
general agreement that a doctor need not provide, or continue to provide, artificial 
ventilation for a patient whose brain is damaged to an extent which prevents a return to 
consciousness‟.532 Furthermore, „there is no good reason for the courts to differ from this 
consensus‟.533 Not only that, but it is evident from Skegg‟s article that, in 1978, this had 
already been established medical practice for over a decade.
534
  Indeed, the term 
„persistent vegetative state‟ was coined in 1972.535 Given the existence of such a simple 
consensus, and one apparently of such long standing, one might ask why it was 
considered necessary, in 1993, to bring to court the case of a PVS patient on the point of 
having his artificial sustenance withdrawn.  Why was the case not resolved in what had 
clearly become a customary manner? One possible answer may be that the patient‟s 
physician, Dr Howe, was advised by a coroner to whom he mentioned the possibility of 
withdrawal of treatment that he would be at risk of prosecution if he withdrew artificial 
hydration and nutrition from his patient. That patient‟s name was Tony Bland. 
Tony Bland was a seventeen-year-old football fan who had sustained catastrophic 
injuries in the Hillsborough Stadium disaster of 1989. His lungs were crushed and 
punctured, interrupting the flow of oxygen to his brain and leaving him in a persistent 
vegetative state.
536
 Bland‟s immediate family (his parents and sister), wished to terminate 
his life support, having heard numerous medical opinions stating that no improvement in 
his condition was possible (as his higher brain had effectively liquefied), and feeling 
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instinctively that he would not wish to be kept alive in his current state. By 1993, when 
the case reached the House of Lords, the Court of Appeal had held that Airedale N.H.S 
Trust, which brought the case, might lawfully (a) discontinue all life-sustaining treatment, 
including artificial hydration, nutrition and ventilation, and might (b) „lawfully 
discontinue and thereafter need not furnish medical treatment to the patient except for the 
sole purpose of enabling the patient to end his life and die peacefully with the greatest of 
dignity and the least of pain, suffering and distress‟.537 The case reached the Lords 
because this decision was appealed against by the Official Solicitor, Bland‟s guardian ad 
litem, who „in doing so fulfils his traditional role as the voice of those who, for reasons of 
incapacity, cannot speak for themselves, ensuring that their interests do not go by default 
because of their involuntary silence‟.538  
 The legal discussion of the Tony Bland case makes it clear that, although this 
particular problem had not previously come before the English courts, it was seen as an 
extension and test of the law relating to acts and omissions. Thus, it was in some respects 
a decision in keeping with the cases that had gone before it. Some of these cases were not 
from the English courts, but from other common-law jurisdictions such as the United 
States. For example, lacking English precedents concerning a physician‟s legal position 
were he or she to discontinue life-sustaining treatment, the Law Lords used the U.S. case 
of Barber v. Superior Court of State of California (1983) 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 as the basis 
for their decision that as Tony Bland could no longer benefit from his treatment (though 
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technically alive, he was totally insensate) the doctors could not breach the duty of care 
which they had previously owed him by discontinuing his treatment.
539
 
 Practice also differed from theory, however. In his 1978 article, P.D.G. Skegg 
asserted that while the withholding of artificial respiration would be an omission, the 
withdrawing thereof once it had been started would be an act, because the switching-off 
of the ventilator would require voluntary physical movement.
540
 In the Bland case, by 
contrast, the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration was considered to be an 
omission. It was compared with the administering of a lethal injection, which Lady 
Justice Butler-Sloss described as „an external and intrusive act committed by an outsider‟. 
The distinction between acts and omissions is of great importance in English law. An 
omission can only give rise to criminal responsibility if there is a duty not to omit the act 
in question.
541
  
 The House of Lords in Bland resolved this problem in the following way: it was 
decided that Bland‟s doctors no longer had a duty of care towards him. Further, he was 
being kept alive artificially, as without the treatment he was given, he would long ago 
have died of the injuries he sustained at Hillsborough.
542
 Finally, the court held that 
Bland‟s human dignity was being violated by his treatment: „in the extraordinary case of 
Anthony Bland, we think it more likely that he would choose to put an end to the 
humiliation of his being and the distress of his family. … Anthony Bland is a person to 
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whom respect is owed and we think it would show greater respect to allow him to die and 
be mourned by his family than to keep him grotesquely alive‟.543 
 In some respects it would be difficult to dispute Lord Justice Hoffman‟s 
description of Anthony Bland‟s situation as „extraordinary‟, although the continuing 
march of medical technology would presumably mean that such cases would become less 
unusual.  Where, however, does this leave cases which, as even cursory reading shows, 
continue to be so common that they could clearly not be regarded as „extraordinary‟? In 
the Bland case, Lord Justice Hoffmann expressed the view that Tony Bland‟s situation 
was entirely separate from that of a conscious person: „There is no question of his 
[Bland‟s] life being worth living or not worth living because the stark reality is that 
Anthony Bland is not living a life at all. None of the things that one says about the way 
people live their lives – well or ill, with courage or fortitude, happily or sadly – have any 
meaning in relation to him. This in my view represents a difference in kind from the 
conscious but severely handicapped person‟.544 This remark would suggest that in the 
case of such a person, the legal profession would spare no effort in showing their 
commitment to the inherent value of human life. This is, however, not the case.  
A significantly different use is made of Lifton‟s text, by John M. Dolan, of the 
University of Minnesota. He recounts the case of an elderly man with Alzheimer‟s, 
whose son instructed the attending physician that „no heroic measures‟ should be used to 
save his father. The physician interpreted this as an instruction to withdraw artificial 
nutrition and hydration, an action which led to the death of the patient.
545
 Dolan makes 
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clear that this is, in his view, not just a „first step‟ onto the „slippery slope‟, but in fact 
something which might have occurred in Nazi Germany: „It tells us a great deal about the 
physician that he regards providing food and water to a severely disabled person a „heroic 
measure‟…which found its natural home in the Third Reich, where it was routine to refer 
to severely disabled and chronically ill persons as „ballast lives‟, „husks‟, and useless 
eaters‟.546 Using Lifton as his source, Dolan points to the so-called „starvation-houses‟ 
established by Hermann Pfannmueller at Eglfing-Haar for the eradication of numbers of 
his patients. He states that Pfannmueller‟s murderous „initiative‟ was both more and less 
radical than the withdrawal of nutrition and fluids from comatose patients. It was more 
radical, since Pfannmueller‟s victims were conscious, and almost all of them were 
capable of feeding themselves. It was also less radical, because „inmates at the 
Hungerhauser did receive some nutrition in the form of potatoes, yellow turnips, and 
cabbages cooked in water. The motto of the Hungerhauser was, „we give them no fat, 
then they go on their own‟‟.547 
Whatever one may personally make of this argument, there is no denying that it is 
a particularly interesting one. It is really the first time that those in the U.S. legal 
profession debating this issue have focused at all on the experiences of the victims of the 
Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme, instead of simply writing in abstract terms about „small 
beginnings‟ and „slippery slopes‟. It could, in addition, hardly be denied that those who 
have used Lifton as their source have succeeded in gaining more information about the 
programme than those who used sources such as Alexander and Ivy. Dolan is clearly 
appalled that a physician should be willing to allow a patient to die of starvation and 
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dehydration, and equates this with what he has read of „euthanasia‟ under the Nazis. The 
question of whether inflicting this upon conscious human beings in pursuance of a state 
policy of annihilation, is morally equivalent to a case by case decision made for  
incompetent patients who may be unaware of what is happening, is an extremely 
pertinent and important one. In any event, Dolan‟s concerns inject a much-needed 
reminder of the human effects of „euthanasia‟ which has, it seems, often been obscured 
by more abstract issues. 
 Dolan brings us to our next section; namely, the interest which was paid, in the 
mid-to-late 1990s, to the book Die Freigabe der Vernichtung lebensunwerten Lebens, or, 
The Permission to Destroy Life Unworthy of Life. Originally published in Leipzig in the 
1920s, this book was written by Karl Binding, a distinguished lawyer, and Alfred Hoche, 
a professor of psychiatry. It is widely considered to have been instrumental in Hitler‟s 
interest in the implementation of „euthanasia‟.548 In 1995, an English translation of this 
book was produced and published by two professors of philosophy at Clark University. 
During the next two years or so, it was widely promoted and discussed in the journal 
Issues in Law and Medicine. Frustratingly, however, there is no explanation of what 
motivated the translators‟ decision to translate and publish the book when they did. 
Perhaps more importantly, the editor-in-chief of the journal Issues in Law and Medicine 
contains no explanation of his decision to publish the entire text in an issue of his 
journal.
549
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 Nevertheless, it is safe to assume, from the attention which the book received in 
this journal, that it was considered to have some bearing on current discussions about 
„euthanasia‟ in the United States. But what sort of bearing might this be? A couple of 
years previously, the above-mentioned John Dolan referred to Binding and Hoche‟s tract 
in his article on the withdrawal of nutrition and hydration from comatose patients. In 
particular, he regards with alarm the attempts by some in the United States of the 1990s 
to redefine the concept of „personhood‟, in order to justify the legal decisions to withdraw 
life-sustaining treatment from patients such as Karen Quinlan and Nancy Cruzan. In this 
regard, he states that Binding and Hoche took the same approach, „assuring us that the 
individuals whose destruction they advocate are not persons‟.550 
 Interest in Binding and Hoche amongst U.S. legal scholars does not appear to 
have been particularly long-lasting, petering out after 1997. Nevertheless, it does 
demonstrate that the 1990s was the decade in which these commentators started really 
trying to learn more about the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme, and relying more upon 
recent research, as well as investigating texts which were considered to be amongst the 
most important of those by the Nazis‟ ideological forebears.  
Interest in the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme amongst U.S. legal scholars grew, 
rather than waned, during the course of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. 
This may be regarded as being due, in no small degree, to the greater complexity of the 
debates, particularly since the 1960s. This „greater complexity‟ has been occasioned very 
much by developments and advances in medical technology. Despite this greater interest, 
it was not until the 1990s that the debates began to receive injections of new perspectives 
based upon a familiarity with new research into the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme. It is 
                                                 
550
 John M. Dolan, „Death by Deliberate Dehydration and Starvation‟, see note 76 for full details. 
 239 
still not entirely clear what the impetus actually was for this greater degree of interest, 
and this desire for new, more modern insights into the Nazi programme.  
 This chapter also showed that, generally speaking, case-law occasioned a far 
greater degree of debate than abstract legal developments, whose influence was seen as 
being rather more hypothetical. Cases of „mercy-killing‟ seemed to engage the minds and 
imaginations of legal scholars in a way that more abstract issues could rarely achieve. 
This phenomenon was probably aided by the tendency of famous cases, such as those of 
Karen Quinlan and Baby Doe, to become large-scale national debates.  
 One of the most striking findings of this chapter was how limited U.S. legal 
scholars were in their choice of sources regarding the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme. 
Despite staggering developments in medical technology, and thus in the scope of possible 
candidates for „euthanasia‟, the legal commentators remained stuck, until the 1990s, in 
arguments motivated by their reading of Leo Alexander‟s „Medical Science Under 
Dictatorship‟. This meant that, whatever happened to move the „euthanasia‟ question 
forward, legal commentators approached the problem in terms of asking whether or not 
some development or other could be considered to be the first step on the „slide down the 
slippery slope‟. The drawback of this was that it prevented the scholars from considering 
the wisdom or otherwise of the steps themselves. Perhaps even more crucially, this 
approach discouraged real discussion of what the „lessons‟ of the Nazi experience (if 
there were any) should be. Was contemporary U.S. society so different from Nazi 
Germany that there were no realistic grounds for believing that the Nazi experience was 
at all useful in contemporary discussions of „euthanasia‟? Or should all society‟s be, in 
the light of the Nazi experience, scrupulous about regulating their own conduct to ensure 
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that nothing they do could possibly have any connection, however slight, to what took 
place in Nazi Germany? This chapter has shown that one of the effects of their reliance 
upon Leo Alexander‟s views was that U.S. legal commentators regarded the Nazi 
„euthanasia‟ programme in worryingly abstract terms. It was only when they began to 
rely on more recent sources that this attitude began to change.   
The killing of sick or disabled people by their own relatives is not a post-war (and 
probably not even a modern) phenomenon. However, the problem came to the attention 
of the legal profession during the formulation of what was to become The Homicide Act 
of 1957. This Bill, which was not blessed with universal approbation, provided for the 
first time for a defence of diminished responsibility to a charge of murder. The reason for 
this, explained the legal scholar Glanville Williams, was „to save the judge from having 
to pass a formal sentence of death in a case of insanity outside the M‟Naughton Rules… 
and to give a measure of recognition to mental abnormality short of insanity‟ – a sentence 
of death by hanging being at this time the result of most convictions for murder in 
England and Wales.
551
 A verdict of diminished responsibility would turn a charge of 
murder into a conviction for manslaughter, enabling the judge to impose the punishment 
that he regards as being most appropriate.
552
 Though this defence was not designed 
specifically for cases of so-called mercy-killing, legal journals and subsequent newspaper 
reports make clear that the defence was used liberally in this type of case.
553
 Williams 
cites „a sad case where an affectionate father killed his idiot son‟ and was sentenced to 
                                                 
551
 Glanville Williams, „Diminished Responsibility‟, journal details to be confirmed. In her article „Diminished Responsibility: A 
Layman‟s View‟ (The Law Quarterly Review, vol. 76, April 1960, pp.224-239), Baroness Wootton of Abinger makes a distinction 
between capital and non-capital murder. Though she does not expand upon the distinction, it is clear that a murder conviction was not 
always followed by a death sentence.  
552
 Williams, p.41. 
553
 For example, Glanville Williams‟ article cited above mentions that „where the facts invoke the sympathy of the jury, as in mercy-
killing, a verdict of diminished responsibility may be returned with little assistance from the experts‟ (page 46).  
 241 
twelve months imprisonment, his plea of diminished responsibility having been accepted 
by the judge.
554
 Richard Huxtable tells us that the defence of diminished responsibility is 
still being used for cases of „mercy-killing‟. It would appear, however, to be nothing 
quite so much as a smokescreen, enabling judges to demonstrate „compassion‟ for the 
perpetrator of a „mercy-killing‟, whilst not really confronting the problems which such 
cases do, or rather should, expose. The „Nuremberg Medical Trial and the Wider World‟ 
chapter showed that Glanville Williams‟ book The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law 
was openly supportive of involuntary „mercy-killing‟ for „defective‟ children. The case 
referred to by Williams is paralleled by the 1960 case of Major George Ernest Johnson, 
who gassed to death his infant son, who had Down‟s syndrome, referred to at the time as 
„mongolism‟. It is clear from the judgement in this case that the victim‟s impairment was 
regarded by the judge as an irreversible tragedy which entirely explained his father‟s 
decision to take his life:  
 
„No right-thinking person could feel other than the greatest sympathy when you and your 
wife found that she had the misfortune to give birth to a mongol child. I accept that what 
you did was done without thought for yourself but out of compassion for the child and the 
fact that you were solicitous for your wife‟s welfare‟.555  
 
One of the most striking features of this case is the way in which it was reported, 
based on the words of the prosecuting barrister, Mr John MacGregor. Here, the victim of 
the crime, three-month-old David Ernest James Johnson, is referred to overwhelmingly as 
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„it‟: „A mongol was a child destined all its life to be to all intents and purposes an idiot. It 
might be able to clean and feed itself, and perhaps read or write in a limited way, but that 
was the most that could be hoped for‟. Despite the child‟s apparently questionable human 
attributes, Major Johnson very kindly „baptized it himself‟, as this had not previously 
been done.
556
    A case the following year, in which a prison officer killed his mentally 
disabled eleven-year-old daughter, Patricia, reports the defendant‟s motive as „„Trishie‟ 
was destined for a mental hospital – unable to talk or feed herself, poor little soul‟.557  
 As Richard Huxtable has pointed out, cases of this nature are routinely described 
as „unique‟, (or sometimes, for good measure, as „uniquely tragic‟).558 In addition, as in 
the case of Bernard Heginbotham, the trial judge will also state explicitly that the verdict 
does not set a precedent. However, it is clear from even a cursory glance at these cases 
that an unspoken precedent is being set. Courts are clearly anxious to show that they are 
considering each case as „an individual tragedy‟, but in doing this in such a formulaic and 
predictable way, they are in fact simply burying their heads in the sand. Issues that 
should, and, indeed, must be aired are buried under a heap of platitudes. Such issues 
would include, for example, the views of the victim about his or her own life (as opposed 
to merely leaping to the conclusion that the case requires tacit endorsement of the 
perpetrator‟s conduct). Also of importance would be questions about how both the victim 
and the perpetrator interacted with the wider society: could the perpetrator access 
sufficient support (e.g. respite care)? What exactly was the perpetrator‟s attitude to the 
victim, and to his or her particular circumstances? For example, as we will see now, over 
the years there have been a significant number of cases of „euthanasia‟ of persons – in 
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particular children - with various impairments. One of the most recent of these is the 
killing by his father of Jacob Wragg, a ten-year-old with Hunter syndrome in 2005. 
This type of familial homicide is, as we have seen, persistent. Despite this, it is 
little discussed in legal debates, and I have not managed to locate any mention of it in 
legal journals. It was, however, widely reported in the newspapers, and gave rise to a 
considerable amount of public discussion. The facts of the case were that Jacob‟s father, a 
former soldier, suffocated him with a pillow. There was never any question that Wragg 
senior had carried out this act – he telephoned the emergency services afterwards and told 
them what he had done.
559
  Despite this, he was cleared of murder and found guilty of 
manslaughter on the grounds of diminished responsibility – as the alert reader will recall, 
the same approach to such cases was taken as far back as the 1960s. Like other cases of 
this nature that have been considered in this chapter, this was described by the judge, Mrs 
Justice Rafferty, as „exceptional‟. What a lot of „exceptional‟ cases there have been over 
the years. Mrs Justice Rafferty highlights two important aspects of the reaction of legal 
professionals to such cases. Firstly, the rather vaguely expressed view that Jacob must 
have been suffering acutely and/or his condition put an intolerable strain on his parents – 
making their decision to kill him entirely understandable: „I have no doubt she [Mrs 
Wragg] was complicit. Had I concluded otherwise I should have formed a harsher view. I 
accept that you would not have taken Jacob‟s life had you, for a moment, thought that she 
disagreed with what you were to do. All who listened must have wondered at the 
remorseless strain Mary bore lovingly and bravely during the ten years she dedicated to 
Jacob – as you concede you did not so consistently do‟.560 It is easy to see that Mrs 
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Justice Rafferty believes that the „strain‟ of caring for Jacob (practical examples of which 
are not given) was enough to make the killing an understandable, logical decision. 
Despite this, Mrs Justice Rafferty also wants to assure the court that, despite being a 
logical decision agreed upon by both parents, this decision was not logical at all: „This 
was not a mercy-killing but a deed done by a man suffering from diminished 
responsibility. The sentence is two years imprisonment suspended for two years. One 
begins to wonder if Mrs Justice Rafferty is familiar with George Orwell‟s novel 1984. 
That work contains a phenomenon called „doublethink‟ – the ability to hold two 
completely contradictory views at exactly the same time. 
The case of Jacob Wragg fails to work even on a logical level. Far more 
importantly, it is far from being „exceptional‟. Instead it falls into line behind other, 
similar cases, stretching back decades. In doing so it, like them, fails to recognize that the 
victim of the crime is a human being who has been murdered, instead sympathizing with 
the perpetrator and endorsing his conduct. In taking this approach it also ignores wider 
social factors without which the crime might not have happened at all. 
My aim in this chapter was not to provide an exhaustive survey of important legal 
developments in „euthanasia‟ law. Instead, I wished to prove a point. As this chapter has 
shown, the public face of this debate has moved on a great deal throughout the decades – 
from relatively straightforward questions concerning the ethics of direct killing, to 
debates over ending the lives of comatose persons and those in a persistent vegetative 
state, and more recently, to the „assisted suicide‟ of compos mentis adults. Despite this 
apparent progress, this chapter has shown that many of the most fundamental questions – 
which would surely have a bearing on the rest of the debate – still go unanswered.  This 
 245 
led on to questions concerning the faith which is placed by the courts in the rectitude of 
decisions made by parents or other family members who may stand sorely in need of – 
but may not have received – emotional support and practical help. In addition, this 
chapter has shown that the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme has had considerable bearing 
upon legal discussions of „euthanasia‟ in the United States, but that this has not been the 
case to nearly such an extent in England and Wales,  It is also clear that the situation as 
regards killing by laypeople is significantly different in the two jurisdictions. Whilst early 
US cases such as Repouille do involve victims who lived at home with their families, this 
quickly changes to debates which take place in a much more medicalized environment. 
By contrast, England and Wales still sees cases of purely domestic „euthanasia‟. Of 
course, US cases like Cruzan and Quinlan are mirrored by  English law examples such as 
the case of Tony Bland. However, as this chapter has demonstrated, the ethical-legal 
problems and the ways of dealing with them are relatively similar in both countries. 
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Chapter Five 
 
„The Expression of a Rational Moral Principle’: 
‘Euthanasia’ and Disability in Bioethical Debates 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In his book The End of Life: Euthanasia and Morality
561
 the U.S. philosopher James 
Rachels mounted a refutation of remarks made by one Patrick J. Buchanan, a 
speechwriter to President Reagan. Speaking about the case of Baby Jane Doe, which will 
be discussed later in the chapter, Buchanan stated that, once the decision had been made 
that some lives were, in his words, „unworthy of legal protection‟, we would have 
„boarded a passenger train on which there are no scheduled stops between here and 
Birkenau‟. Buchanan further asked:  
 
„Once we accept that there are certain classes…whose lives are unworthy of legal 
protection, upon what moral ground do we stand to decry when Dr Himmler slaps us on the 
back, and asks us if he can include Gypsies and Jews?‟.562  
 
Rachels‟ criticism of Buchanan‟s remarks was robust, and he stated bluntly that „Any 
distinction between Baby Jane Doe‟s „life‟ (or lack of it), expresses a rational moral 
principle, whereas Dr Himmler‟s prejudices do not‟. Particularly in recent years, 
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individuals and groups from within the disability movement have challenged the idea that 
these ideas about „life-worthiness‟ are actually rational. As outlined in the introduction, 
and as exemplified throughout this study, disability studies scholars have identified two 
closely interconnected reasons for the entrenched and gloomy views of life with 
impairment which are so frequently on display. As discussed, these are, Michael Bury‟s 
theory that questions involving „the body‟ are seen as being self-explanatory, and the 
view advanced by Colin Barnes and others, that the history of institutionalization has 
created a persistent gulf between impaired and non-impaired people‟s perceptions of life. 
As we will see as the chapter progresses, bioethicists often support their case (for 
selective infanticide, for example) by referring to out-of-date sources regarding the 
difficulties of life for an impaired person. I argue that this enthusiasm for discounting the 
effects of helpful assistive technologies is part of this phenomenon – an unwillingness to 
consider that they could really make a difference. 
  Rachels‟ comment above exemplifies both the central issue of this chapter (and 
of this whole enquiry), and harks back to the views expressed by the Tribunal in the 
Nuremberg Medical Trial Judgement. As will be remembered, the NMT judges‟ only 
concern was that – even when it was totally non-consensual – „euthanasia‟ should not be 
used as a euphemism for racial murder. The Tribunal‟s forthright willingness to make 
this point made it clear that, in their view, this was the only danger which „euthanasia‟ 
could present. In this chapter, we will see a similar enthusiasm amongst ethicists for 
asking – and giving answers to – fundamental questions about the value of different lives. 
As we shall discover, many ethicists are – for one reason or another – prepared to state 
openly that no-one really believes that all lives have the same value, and that shying away 
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from this fact is an example of contemptuous intellectual timidity. Perhaps the most well-
known example of the conflict between ethicists, who feel free to discuss these topics, 
and the general public, who may in a sense sometimes be accused of „shooting the 
messenger‟ when such problems are raised – is the case of Peter Singer, and the so-called 
„Singer Affair‟. This is what we shall discuss first, and it will be shown that the 
widespread public alarm which Singer‟s views often cause amongst the general 
population was in no way mirrored in philosophical circles, where Singer‟s views are not 
particularly controversial. It will be shown that there has been little discussion of Singer‟s 
views as such, with philosophers evincing far more interest in comparative side-issues, 
such as whether or not Singer‟s expectation that he should enjoy totally unlimited 
freedom of speech was a legitimate one. Having laid the groundwork in this way, the rest 
of the chapter will show how well-established discussion of life-and-death problems has 
been in philosophy for a number of decades. This in itself may help to explain Singer‟s 
anger at the protests he encountered from people outside his academic field. Perhaps most 
importantly, we will also see that, although philosophers were not interested in discussing 
the question of the Nazi analogy in relation to Peter Singer‟s views, they have in fact 
discussed it extensively amongst themselves. These discussions began decades ago, and, 
though they have grown in scope as new medical technologies make different forms of 
„euthanasia‟ possible, but the concerns expressed in the arguments themselves have, in 
some respects, not really altered a great deal. Such differences as are apparent relate 
largely to such questions as: is killing still wrong when the end of biographical life 
precedes the end of physical life? What implications does this have with regard to 
newborns that are considered to have no prospect of living a biographical life? Why does 
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the public tend to regard infanticide with revulsion, whilst clearly condoning abortion for 
the same congenital conditions for which some philosophers advocate selective 
infanticide?   This chapter will focus primarily on the use which ethicists have made of 
„the Nazi analogy‟ in relation to cases which have actually occurred, whether they be 
cases of infanticide, of the killing of older, terminally ill people, or of patients in comas 
or in persistent vegetative states. Nevertheless, a significant number of thinkers have 
considered the use of the Nazi analogy in relation to general questions concerning the 
ethics of artificially ending life, rather than expressing views on how (in)applicable the 
analogy might be to one or other particular types of „euthanasia‟. We shall begin with an 
overview of these debates, as the issues they raise can often be illuminating, and will 
provide a valuable introduction to the various problems which will, in later sections of 
the chapter, be taken up by other scholars and applied to particular themes or cases. 
 It should be emphasized here that the question of the „euthanasia‟ of people with 
terminal illnesses which do not affect their cognitive ability (for example, motor neurone 
disease or cognitive ability) has not simply been ignored by me. As will become 
apparent, the overwhelming majority of philosophers who have considered this issue – in 
particular, the utilitarians, by whom these debates have generally been led – have 
attached great importance to the question of the actual or potential cognitive abilities of 
persons subjected to what the philosopher James Rachels refers to as „non-voluntary 
euthanasia‟. We will see that Rachels and Peter Singer in particular state that there is 
simply no point preserving someone‟s biological life once the capacity for what Rachels 
refers to as a „biographical life‟ has been irretrievably lost, or alternatively is held to 
stand little chance of ever developing at all. 
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Another important issue, as far as the philosophers we will meet in this chapter 
are concerned, is that of benignity versus malignity of intention. We will be considering 
the so-called „Singer affair‟, and we will see that, though Peter Singer had a number of 
reasons for objecting to the accusation that he was a „Nazi‟, one of these was his 
insistence that his ideas would, if put into practice, serve to prevent needless suffering. 
Thus, he argues, my ideas are benign, where the Nazis‟ clearly were not. This is a point 
echoed both by Singer‟s supporters, and by other utilitarian philosophers. It is an 
argument rejected by the non-utilitarian philosopher Philippa Foot.  
As we have identified a point of contention between utilitarian and non-utilitarian 
philosophers, the next sections will discuss the question of why utilitarians hold such 
radical views on questions of life and death, and also why they are so prominent in the 
field of bioethics. 
 
Utilitarianism, Individual Sacrifice, and Selective Infanticide 
 
Willingness to sacrifice the innocent for the „greater good‟ is an accusation which has 
long been made against utilitarian philosophers by those who do not share their beliefs.
563
 
It has also been said that, unlike other branches of moral philosophy, utilitarianism views 
as praiseworthy a (supposedly) self-evidently wrong act, if that wrong act will increase 
the sum total of happiness.
564
 This distinguishes utilitarianism from, say, Kantian ethics, 
in which, even though clashes between the requirements of different duties may 
sometimes lead to wrongful acts, those acts are not, in themselves, condoned. They are 
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certainly not praised.
565
 The preceding section of this chapter, which dealt with the so-
called „Singer Affair‟, hinted that there might be some correlation between Singer‟s 
specifically utilitarian stance on the one hand, and his willingness to countenance 
selective infanticide on the other. This correlation is particularly evident when Singer is 
considering infanticide on the grounds of a mild or correctible disability. This section will 
now demonstrate that this type of attitude is particularly prevalent amongst utilitarian 
philosophers. Particularly as regards selective infanticide, this is the case even when such 
philosophers have stated that they share the disquiet of non-utilitarian philosophers when 
confronted with cases of killings carried out for motives which are solely or largely 
utilitarian in nature. For example, the utilitarian philosopher and bioethicist Jonathan 
Glover has written: „In Crime and Punishment, Dostoevsky gives Raskolnikov‟s reasons 
for murdering an old moneylender. Among these are that she is a blight on the lives of 
others and that she is not particularly happy herself. When reading the novel (or when 
thinking in real life), few of us can be comfortable with the apparently utilitarian view 
that such considerations may make it permissible (or even obligatory) to kill someone‟.566 
This statement is very much at odds with the discussion of infanticide which is to be 
found in the relevant chapter of Glover‟s book Causing Death and Saving Lives.567 Here, 
Glover writes that  
 
„The parents, especially the mother, are likely to be greatly distressed by the killing of their 
baby…But, where the abnormality is sufficiently serious, this may be less terrible than 
having to live with their child and bring him up. It is an unpalatable truth that appeals to 
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side-effects can sometimes be among the strongest arguments for infanticide. And this can 
be further increased by taking into consideration the interests of any other children in the 
family, either those already in existence or those who will be born later…Where the 
handicap is sufficiently serious, the killing of a baby may benefit the family to an extent 
that is sufficient to outweigh the unpleasantness of the killing (or the slower process of „not 
striving to keep alive‟).568   
 
The chapter opens with a number of quotations from newspapers, books and journals 
published between 1970 and 1975. These quotations, in their different ways, serve to 
illustrate how widespread Lorber‟s views were during this period. In addition, they show 
the widespread public and professional acceptance that genuine difficulties could best be 
„solved‟ by the killing of the person considered to be causing them.569 These quotations 
also lay the foundations for Glover‟s own support for infanticide under certain 
circumstances, which in turn is also based upon his position as a utilitarian philosopher. 
Glover believes that infanticide should be a viable option in the case of infants whose 
impairment is „sufficiently serious‟ – although the only attempt he makes to define the 
term is to refer to Dr Lorber‟s descriptions of his spina bifida patients and his motivations 
for developing his „selective treatment‟ policy.570 Glover believes that the perceived 
effects of a disabled child upon its family are of particular importance because, unlike an 
adult, a baby can neither understand the concept of death nor express a desire to continue 
living.
571
 So, this is Glover‟s justification for taking „side-effects‟ into account. 
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The most vociferous supporters of the selective infanticide of disabled infants 
have been those whose philosophy is explicitly utilitarian – namely, Singer, Glover, 
Harris and Rachels. These four philosophers are not linked solely by their utilitarian 
beliefs, but also by the fact that they may be regarded as being amongst the principal 
actors in the relatively new field of bioethics. In fact, it has been argued that bioethics can 
be defined as „medical ethics as conceived and practised by philosophers working in the 
utilitarian tradition‟.572  Surprisingly, perhaps, writers who are themselves both utilitarian 
philosophers and bioethicists in fact make little or no mention of the importance of 
utilitarianism to their chosen field of study. For example, John Harris describes bioethics 
in far more general philosophical terms: „In short, bioethics investigates ethical issues 
arising in the life science (medicine, health care, genetics, biology, research, etc.) by 
applying the principles and methods of moral philosophy to these problems‟.573 This 
statement makes it clear that bioethics as a discipline has, potentially, a very wide-
ranging applicability. It is not concerned solely with debates about „euthanasia‟ 
(including infanticide). Nevertheless, such questions of life and death understandably 
preoccupy many writers. Those opposed to utilitarianism identify the denial of 
personhood which utilitarian bioethicists such as Glover, Singer and James Rachels use 
to justify their support for infanticide (and also for the killing of some older people) as 
one of utilitarian bioethics‟ most dangerous, and most worrying, aspects. 
 
 
 
Nazism, Utilitarianism, and the Slippery Slope 
                                                 
572
 Anne Maclean, The Elimination of Morality: Reflections on Utilitarianism and Bioethics (London/New York: Routledge, 1993), 
p.1. 
573
 John Harris (ed.), Bioethics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p.4. 
 254 
 
  
 It will probably not be very surprising that these general discussions centre on the well-
known „slippery slope‟ argument, and the philosophers we will encounter in this section 
generally confine themselves to asking whether or not it is true that a path which begins 
with „euthanasia‟ will inevitably slide into genocide. Whilst not all philosophers dealing 
with „slippery slope‟ arguments are expressly concerned that the end result would be 
behaviour which the Nazis would recognize and approve of, it is rare that these 
philosophers make no mention of the Nazis at all, particularly when discussing the 
„slippery slope in conjunction with „euthanasia‟.574  For example, in a book published in 
1974, Marvin Kohl, a professor of medical ethics at the University of Virginia, 
questioned the rectitude of Yale Kamisar‟s famous endorsement of Leo Alexander. 
Kamisar had written:  
 
„The apparent innocuousness of Germany‟s „small beginnings‟ is perhaps best shown by 
the fact that German Jews were at first excluded from the programme. For it was originally 
conceived that „the blessing of euthanasia should be granted only to [true] Germans‟. 
 
 This statement appeared in Kamisar‟s famous 1958 article arguing against 
„euthanasia‟.575 
Kohl must attach some degree of importance to Kamisar‟s article – had he not 
done so, it is unlikely that he would have discussed it at all. However, he profoundly 
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disagrees with Kamisar‟s conclusions. The basic reason for his disagreement is one 
which we will encounter many times during this chapter: namely, the Nazis‟ actions were 
malevolent, whereas in Kohl‟s view, latter-day advocates of „euthanasia‟ are 
overwhelmingly motivated by a desire to minimize suffering and maximize kindness.
576
 
Moreover, writes Kohl, to speak of a „slippery slope‟ in relation to „euthanasia‟ as 
practiced by the Nazis, is to misunderstand the nature of the programme. In Kohl‟s view, 
it  
 
„was not the result of a slide, but was rather the direct consequence of the Nazis‟ political 
ideology – an ideology which rested upon the principle that if proper political authorities 
believed killing could serve the greater good of a true Germany, then those in question not 
only were expendable but ought to have been sacrificed for the greater good‟.577  
 
Here, we can see that Kohl understands the Nazis‟ „euthanasia‟ programme as 
forming part of a brutally utilitarian, national political project requiring the sacrifice of 
anyone whose death would profit the state.
578
 This leads Kohl into a discussion of two 
potentially interrelated topics – utilitarianism and benevolence, which will be discussed 
in more detail throughout the course of the chapter. As the following section of the 
chapter will show, support for the selective infanticide of disabled infants is particularly 
strong amongst utilitarian philosophers, such as Peter Singer, Jonathan Glover, and James 
Rachels. Kohl points out that there are various different theories of utilitarianism, and 
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remarks that, in this regard, reference to the Nazis carries validity only when „euthanasia‟ 
is advocated solely or largely upon economic grounds by those who  
 
„[A]rgue that there is a need to save the young from the great cost of those who are 
irremediably ill and to save the general public from staggering and unnecessary medical 
expense, adding that euthanasia legislation „might save the country a few billion dollars a 
year‟‟.579  
 
To Kohl, „this approach generates fear and, to a degree, warrants the parade of 
Nazi horrors‟.580 Though Kohl does not say exactly why he believes that utilitarian 
justifications for euthanasia are particularly deserving of comparisons with Nazism, one 
may assume that his opinion is, at least in part, based on well-known Nazi propaganda 
posters, films, and even school mathematics questions, in which attention is drawn to the 
amount of money spent on the „congenitally ill‟, and to the lack of any return which 
society can supposedly expect as a reward for its expenditure. For Kohl to view matters 
in these terms makes him in many ways diametrically opposed to James Rachels, whose 
views on the case of „Baby Jane Doe‟ opened this chapter. Rachels‟ comments were not 
specifically directed towards the amount of money which would be needed to treat „Baby 
Jane Doe‟, but he was quite clear that his assertion that „Baby Jane Doe‟ had no life, and 
no possibility of one, expressed, as he put it, a „rational moral principle‟, and that no 
further discussion of the matter was required. 
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Rachels‟ confidence in the „rationality‟ of his views makes one suspect that he is 
not overly concerned with whether or not his ideas about „Baby Jane Doe‟s‟ future (or 
about „euthanasia‟ in general) were particularly benevolent. As we shall see later in the 
chapter, this suspicion is borne out by closer investigation. Nevertheless, the need to 
support „euthanasia‟ when it is done out of kindness is of concern to Kohl, who argues 
that it would be entirely wrong completely to prohibit „euthanasia‟ on the basis that, even 
if recommended for the best and kindest of reasons, „merciful killing must somehow slide 
into political and ethnic savagery‟.581 Instead, Kohl argues that truly benevolent 
euthanasia, which aims to make society a kinder place, should be encouraged, as it is the 
exact opposite of what the Nazis, „who were neither kind nor merciful‟ did.582  
The philosopher Anthony Flew broadly concurs with Kohl‟s ideas on the general 
inapplicability of the Nazi analogy in relation to contemporary debates about 
„euthanasia‟. Like Kohl, Flew believes firmly that most of its contemporary proponents 
are motivated overwhelmingly by benevolence, and by the desire that people should be 
able to avoid unnecessary suffering.
583
 In addition, Flew asserts that  
 
„the Nazi atrocities…were in fact not the result of any such reform, but were the work of 
people who consciously repudiated the whole approach to ethics represented in the 
argument of this present essay‟.584  
 
This is essentially the same argument as that advanced by Marvin Kohl – namely that the 
Nazis were concerned only with sacrificing „useless‟ people for the benefit of the Volk, 
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whereas contemporary advocates of „euthanasia‟ are not concerned with benefiting the 
state, but, out of respect and compassion for individual people, wish to build a society in 
which no-one who is suffering without hope of recovery need simply carry on until death 
finally arrives, but can be helped to take his or her own life when he or she feels that the 
time has come to do so. 
It is rather disappointing that the many other contributors to this book did not 
actually respond to each other‟s essays; nevertheless, Flew was by no means the only 
contributor to consider the use of the Nazi analogy in relation to debates about 
„euthanasia‟. A physician, David A. Clark, was able to remember the Nuremberg Medical 
Trial and its aftermath. Clark describes that  
 
„there it was shown that men with medical degrees had co-operated in mass 
extermination of the mentally handicapped, in sterilization of the mentally ill, in obscene 
and indefensible lethal experiments on human beings and, later, in the mass extermination 
of those deemed by the Nazis as unworthy to live.‟585 
 
 The effect of these revelations upon the international medical community was 
that „all of us were reminded how necessary restraints were, and there was a widespread 
tightening-up of medical ethical codes‟.586 We saw in a previous chapter that the post-war 
years did see a significant reassessment of medical agreements, as well as the drawing-up 
of the Nuremberg Code. We also saw that these various documents (most notably the 
Nuremberg Code) did little or nothing to tackle the issue of „euthanasia‟.  
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None of the other contributors to the volume in question mention having a 
particular link to the Nuremberg Medical Trial in the way that Clark does. Neither do 
they claim to have any personal reason to be particularly mindful of the Nazi medical 
crimes and their legacies. Nevertheless, one other contributor, Raanan Gillon, made an 
interesting contribution to the various views expressed in this particular book when he 
listed the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme as one among many images which might be 
conjured up by the word „euthanasia‟: „Hitler‟s hospitals for incurables, human 
„vegetables‟, heart transplantation, thalidomide babies, mentally deficient children, the 
old, the senile and the dying – visions of all these may be evoked by the word 
„euthanasia‟‟.587 Though not overtly expressive of any particular view of Nazi 
„euthanasia‟, this approach is markedly different from that taken by many commentators 
referred to in this chapter (particularly, as we have seen, by utilitarian philosophers such 
as Peter Singer and Jonathan Glover.) Whilst they insisted vehemently that their approval 
of some types of „euthanasia‟ was entirely different from that practised by the Nazis, 
Gillon clearly suggests that Nazi „euthanasia‟ is just as likely as any other form of 
„euthanasia‟ to be borne in mind by people to whom the word „euthanasia‟ is mentioned. 
Gillon draws a clear distinction between euthanasia which has truly been requested by a 
suffering person, and may therefore be assumed to be broadly voluntary, and various 
types of what he refers to as imposed or compulsory euthanasia, which „involves killing 
someone without his desire or request (and often without his knowledge) for reasons 
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which those who do the killing call merciful‟.588 This type of killing, in Gillon‟s view, 
encompasses the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme, but also includes  
 
„a wide spectrum of euthanasia ranging from…the killing of deformed babies or incurably 
sick children, to stopping the special treatment of and drugs for a human being whose heart 
is beating but whose brain is dead, or increasing the dose of painkillers to improve, but 
shorten, the lives of dying patients‟.589  
 
 
The final two contributions from this volume demonstrate both its wide scope, 
and also the complexity of the issues considered therein. (Arguably, they also show how 
the book might have benefited from giving the contributors a chance to respond to each 
other‟s arguments!) Neither the philosopher Luke Gormally nor the organ transplantation 
pioneer Christaan Barnard make any specific mention of the Nazi „euthanasia‟ 
programme, but their diametrically opposed views are nevertheless instructive. On the 
one hand, Luke Gormally questions the distinction which proponents of „euthanasia‟ 
often make between „voluntary‟ and „non-voluntary‟ „euthanasia‟ – making claims to 
justify the former which – in Gormally‟s view – obviously goes some considerable way 
towards making judgements which justify the latter:  
 
„But if it is possible to make such a judgement‟ [regarding whether or not life is 
worthwhile] „and if such a judgement justifies the killing of a human being, what logically 
is to stop the claim that non-voluntary euthanasia is justifiable? If the value of a human life 
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can truly be assessed in terms of function and utility, why should we not kill those whom 
we judge to be useless?‟ 
 
We will see later in this chapter that it is utilitarian philosophers who are amongst 
those most keen to advocate non-consensual „euthanasia‟, particularly when it takes the 
form of infanticide.   Advocating the killing of „those whom he judges to be useless‟ is 
something which clearly makes perfect sense to Gormally‟s co-contributor, Christiaan 
Barnard, who states: 
 
„What makes this [warfare] even worse is that it is not the old people or the cripples or the 
social deviants who are chosen to kill and risk being killed. It is those who are young and 
medically fit…Is it not strange that society should accept this mass killing of healthy young 
people, but if the doctor actively hastens the death of an individual who has reached the 
end of his enjoyable life … people throw up their hands in horror?‟590 
 
This paper was a version of the speech given by Barnard to the Fifth Biennial Conference 
of Right-to-Die Societies, in September, 1984. What is particularly striking about it is 
that, according to many historians both of the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme and of the 
Nazi genocide as a whole, one of the reasons for the growing support for „euthanasia‟ in 
the inter-war period (both in Germany and in other countries) had been the loss of so 
many fit young men in the First World War. [Was Barnard thinking of one particular war 
or of wars in general?]. Such findings by historians would tend to suggest that Barnard‟s 
views might have been scrutinized a little more closely had he made them in a different 
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context. Barnard further states that doctors have a „moral duty‟ to carry out „euthanasia‟, 
which should not be discussed with the patient provided he has signed a declaration on 
admission „giving doctors the right to terminate his life should he become distressingly 
and incurably ill and all the medical resources available to try to alleviate his condition 
have been exhausted‟.591 Thus there is a clear correlation between war and social 
usefulness in Barnard‟s justification for „euthanasia‟. Though he supports what might be 
described as „living wills‟, it is clear that Barnard is also strongly in favour of subjecting 
„the old people or the cripples or the social deviants‟ to „euthanasia‟, whether they have 
ever requested it or not. The line between supporting „voluntary euthanasia‟ on the one 
hand and unilateral decisions that certain types of people are of no value and derive no 
enjoyment from life on the other is often rather obscure. Many opponents of „euthanasia‟ 
cite this as a reason for their opposition. This is what happened in 1989, when the 
philosopher Peter Singer visited Germany, to speak about his support for selective 
infanticide. Infants clearly can neither form nor express a desire to continue living (or a 
wish to die), and Peter Singer‟s opponents recognised that, in supporting their selective 
killing, Singer was clearly arguing that others‟ views of the infants‟ capabilities and 
potential was considerably more important than the views of themselves which the 
infants might take, if they were allowed to live. 
   
 
 
The ‘Singer Affair’: 
 
    
                                                 
591
 Ibid, pp.182-183. 
 263 
The „affair‟ in question began when, in 1989, this controversial utilitarian philosopher 
visited Germany; where he was due to speak at various conferences, on the subject of his 
support for the selective infanticide of some disabled newborns. This invitation followed 
a number of unsuccessful attempts by German professors to teach ethics courses featuring 
Singer‟s book Practical Ethics which, in the event, were so disrupted by protesters that 
they had to be cancelled. A similar fate befell a planned lecture at the University of 
Vienna by Singer‟s colleague (and frequent co-author), the bioethicist Helga Kuhse. The 
1991 International Wittgenstein Symposium, due to be held in Kirchberg, Austria, was 
cancelled in the face of threats that it would be disrupted unless the invitations issued to 
Singer and another participant were withdrawn. Another of the conferences at which 
Singer had been invited to speak was also cancelled. Though Singer managed to speak 
once, at the University of Saarbruecken in summer 1989, this speech also attracted a 
considerable amount of noisy protest.
592
 As regards Singer‟s own attitude towards 
impaired people, one of his most telling remarks is his refusal to countenance the idea 
that the impaired people protesting against him were actually doing so because they 
disagreed with him: 
 
„[S]ome of the able-bodied demonstrators … urgently remonstrated with them not to talk 
to me. The disabled, however, clearly had no power to do anything about the chanting‟.593 
 
This enquiry is not concerned with the reasons that the German public might give 
for choosing to protest against Singer. We are at present only concerned with Singer‟s 
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own justifications for the views he holds. Fortunately, Singer has offered various 
explanations of the ways in which he believes his views differ fundamentally from those 
of the Nazis. Firstly, Singer claims that the Nazis put to death those who they saw as 
worthless to the state; his own ideas involve simple agreements between physicians and 
parents of disabled newborns – a move which would dramatically lessen state 
involvement in such life-and-death decisions.
594
 This theme will be important later in this 
chapter, and it is discussed by many other ethicists, as we shall see. Singer has also used a 
quotation from the historian Michael Burleigh‟s book Death and Deliverance to support 
his assertion that „the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme was not euthanasia at all‟, being 
instead a rather ruthlessly pragmatic measure concerned with the wartime freeing up of 
beds in hospitals by eliminating people who were of no use to the Volk.
595
 Burleigh has, 
in turn, commented on the Singer Affair, and indicated that, though he might consider 
Singer‟s views to be less than savoury, and though he believes that his attempts to 
redefine the concept of personhood contain worrying echoes of some of the Nazis‟ 
intellectual forebears, he maintains that the affair pales into insignificance beside the 
enormities of the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme. In addition, he describes the accusation 
that Singer is a Nazi as „erroneous‟.596 
 This raises one of the questions which this chapter will address. Burleigh‟s 
comments suggest that, as a historian, he wishes to draw a clear line between the Nazi 
genocide itself, and the ideas which may have contributed to it. Burleigh‟s conviction that 
ideas alone are not of paramount importance is demonstrated when he describes the 
denial of personhood and the relativization of contemporary morality as „rather academic 
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issues‟ , which can, he seems to imply, have little impact on the wider society.597 As this 
chapter will show, bioethicists and other philosophers generally take a rather different 
attitude, in which the historical contexts of ideas and events are taken to be of rather less 
importance than that which they are afforded by historians. Nevertheless, it may be rather 
surprising that, as this chapter will demonstrate, the question of the Nazi analogy aroused 
little interest amongst Anglo-American historians during the period of the „Singer Affair‟. 
During this time, and with the exception of Singer himself, most philosophers expressed 
far less interest in the issue than that which it was afforded by the general public, and, in 
some respects, by the media. Singer was, unsurprisingly, stung by the accusation that he 
entertained Nazi-like ideas, and devoted several journal articles to a vigorous refutation 
of the claims that had been made against him. This chapter will show that, right up until 
the present time, philosophers and, most especially, bioethicists, have discussed the 
relevance (or otherwise), of the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme extensively, but not during 
the period of the „Singer Affair‟, when the problem was of so much interest to other 
commentators. 
 Singer himself was evidently angered by the reception which he received in 
Germany, and published articles in which he claimed that his experience proved that the 
principle of academic freedom was becoming seriously threatened in the German-
speaking countries.
598
 He even asserted that, at one point, he felt like a victim of the 
Nazis himself:  
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„At the end of this protest, when I rose to speak, a section of the audience – perhaps a 
quarter or a third – began to chant: „Singer raus! Singer raus!‟ As I heard this chanted, in 
German…I had an overwhelming feeling that this was what it must have been like to 
attempt to reason against the rising tide of Nazism in the declining days of the Weimar 
Republic. The difference was that the chant would have been, not „Singer raus‟, but „Juden 
raus‟.599  
 
This was a evidently a point which Singer considered to be important: in an article 
published in his own journal Bioethics, he wrote,  
 
„Perhaps what really was instrumental in preparing the Nazi path to genocide, and has not 
yet been eradicated in the modern Germany, is not the euthanasia movement at all, but the 
kind of fanatical certainty in one‟s own rectitude that refuses to listen to, or engage in 
rational debate with, anyone who harbours contrary views‟.600 
 
 Similarly, in an article in the Journal of Applied Philosophy, he claimed that:  
 
„There is … a peculiar tone of fanaticism about some sections of the German debate about 
euthanasia that goes beyond normal opposition to Nazism, and instead begins to seem like 
the very mentality that made Nazism possible … Because the Nazis practised eugenics, 
anything to do with genetic engineering in Germany is now smeared with Nazi 
associations. This attack embraces the rejection of prenatal diagnosis, when followed by 
selective abortion of fetuses with Down‟s syndrome, spina bifida or other defects, and even 
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leads to criticism of genetic counselling, and even leads to criticism of genetic counselling 
designed to avoid the birth of children with genetic defects‟.601 
 
 When he was not accusing those Germans who disagreed with him of engaging in Nazi-
like suppression of freedom of speech, Singer found time to mount spirited written 
defences of his position, as well as to produce philosophically-based explanations of why 
exactly the threat posed to bioethics and applied ethics is such a grave one. We shall 
consider these issues in turn, beginning with Singer‟s explanation of why it is wrong to 
refer to him as a Nazi.  
 Singer had already considered this problem some years prior to his experiences in 
Germany, in a book entitled Should the Baby Live? The Problem of Handicapped 
Infants.
602
 Here, Singer discusses the use of the Nazi analogy not simply in terms of his 
own views, but in relation to the debate between John Lorber, a spina bifida surgeon, and 
John Harris, a medical ethicist and moral philosopher, in 1975. This debate will be 
discussed later in the chapter, but for now it is sufficient to say that Singer rejects 
Lorber‟s contention that active killing of a disabled infant who is considered to have a 
poor prognosis will lead to an inevitable slide down „the slippery slope‟ towards Nazism. 
As we saw in the chapter dealing with legal debates in the United States, many 
commentators have been influenced by Leo Alexander‟s article „Medical Science under 
Dictatorship‟, and by Alexander‟s claim that the entire Nazi genocide was made possible 
by the belief that there is such a thing as a „life not worthy to be lived‟. Singer rejects 
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this, based on his reading of comments made by the historian Lucy Dawidowicz to the 
effect that  
 
„These terms and the programs they stood for were integral parts of Nazi racism…derived 
from a theory about the ultimate value of the purity of the Volk…This health had no 
bearing on individual health, on family health, even on public health, or the health of 
society‟.603  
 
On this basis, Singer concludes that  
 
„[W]hen the Nazis talked of „a life not worthy to be lived‟, they meant that…it did not 
contribute to the health of that mysterious racial entity, the Volk. Since our society does not 
believe in any such entity, there is no real prospect that allowing active euthanasia of 
severely handicapped newborn infants would lead to Nazi-style atrocities‟.604  
 
In the same book, Singer also used the prevalence throughout history of the desire to 
avoid the existence of people whose lives are „not worth living‟ as a justification for why 
such ideas could not be equated with Nazism:  
 
„unless we are prepared to prolong such lives‟ [babies born without intestines or without a 
brain] „we must admit that we judge some lives to be not worth living… So if the 
judgement that some lives are not worth living were enough to put us on a slippery slope 
towards Nazism, we would already be well down that slope; on the other hand, the fact that 
                                                 
603
 Quoted in ibid, p.94. 
604
 Ibid, p.95. 
 269 
such judgements are so inescapable, and must have been made in every society, should be 
sufficient grounds for doubting Alexander‟s claim that they have anything to do with the 
uniquely abhorrent Nazi policies‟.605  
 
The ethicist Ruth Macklin has pointed out that Dawidowicz‟ remarks that Nazi terms 
such as „euthanasia‟ „do not have our meaning‟ tells only half the story, indicating as it 
does that, in „our‟ society, the word „euthanasia‟ has only one meaning; a meaning, 
moreover, which Dawidowicz apparently regards as so obvious that she feels no 
obligation to state what it actually is
606
    In the second edition of Practical Ethics, which 
was published in 1993, Singer reiterated this view, and made some additional comments 
which indicate the extent to which his views on infanticide are underpinned by his 
utilitarian philosophy. In his opinion, the selective infanticide which he envisages 
presents no dangers to the rest of society:  
 
„There has been no suggestion that doctors who begin by allowing severely disabled 
infants to die from pneumonia will move on to withhold antibiotics from racial minorities 
or political extremists. In fact legalising euthanasia might well act as a check on the power 
of doctors, since it would bring in to the open and under the scrutiny of another doctor 
what some doctors now do on their own initiative and in secret‟.607  
 
This is reminiscent of the claim made by Jeremy Bentham, the founder of modern 
utilitarianism, that infanticide is less wrong than the killing of an adult, because infants 
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cannot understand concepts such as life and death, and thus will not be able to experience 
anticipatory dread that the same fate may befall them.
608
 Bentham‟s effective toleration 
of infanticide also demonstrates utilitarian philosophers‟ concern for the welfare of the 
wider society, something which this chapter will address further in due course. In 
addition, Singer‟s remarks above about members of racial minorities and political 
extremists make it clear that, presumably in part because of his utilitarian philosophy, it 
has not occurred to Singer that there might be anything morally questionable about a 
blanket – or at least widely tolerated – policy of „allowing severely disabled infants to die 
from pneumonia‟. 
 As was demonstrated above, Singer‟s justifications for the inapplicability of the 
Nazi analogy to his philosophical views are based very much on his reading of the views 
expressed by various historians; they do not have an overtly philosophical basis. This 
supports Michael Burleigh‟s observation that  
 
„Rather surprisingly for a professional teacher of philosophy, he omits the entire 
philosophical background to the Nazis‟ policies, notably the writings of Binding and Hoche 
and their various imitators. There one can easily discover an attempt to relativize prevailing 
morality through reference to ancient or primitive alternatives; the radical redefinition of 
what constitutes a „person‟ as opposed to „beings‟ or „creatures, i.e. the denial of human 
attributes, and the purposive use of analogies with animals‟.609   
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As mentioned above, Burleigh appeared to regard these philosophical ideas as somewhat 
troubling, though of less concern than the practical consequences which might ensue. 
Singer claims that „If acts of euthanasia could only be carried out by a member of the 
medical profession, with the concurrence of a second doctor, it is not likely that the 
propensity to kill would spread unchecked throughout the community‟, to which Burleigh 
comments that „many people might not find this scenario very reassuring‟.610 
Nevertheless, denial of personhood by Singer is clearly of greater interest and concern to 
other philosophers than to a historian like Burleigh. The philosopher Jenny Teichman is 
one of the relatively few philosophers to have considered this problem, and she has 
concluded that „Singer is not a Nazi, he is a personist‟. This is because he extends rights, 
such as the right not to be killed, only to those who meet his definition of personhood, 
which he derives from the philosopher John Locke: „a being with reason and reflection 
that can consider itself as itself, the same thinking being, in different times and places‟.611 
Singer believes that, as small children cannot have this type of awareness, thus: „No 
infant, defective or not, has as strong a claim to life as a person…the only difference 
between killing a normal infant and a defective one is the attitude of the parents‟.612 
Teichman asserts that the doctrine of personism in some ways resembles Nazism because 
the two share a common principle: „that (non-criminal) human beings are of two types, 
those whom it is wrong to kill, and those whom it is all right, or even good, to kill. Nazi 
doctors invented the slogan „life not worthy of life‟, attaching these words to the mentally 
and physically disabled people subjected by the regime to involuntary „euthanasia‟. The 
same label was given to the Jews in the death camps. Now if it weren‟t for the second of 
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these gruesome associations the slogan „life not worthy of life‟ would be a reasonably apt 
sub-title for Chapter 2 of Singer‟s book Practical Ethics.613  According to Teichman, 
however, there are a number of significant differences between Nazism and personism 
which should not be overlooked. Two interconnected points concern the definition of the 
word „person‟, which is, according to Teichman, a rather arbitrary definition, which, 
under the right circumstances, could be changed to, or taken to mean, „Aryan‟ – which is, 
in itself, almost as arbitrary, the only difference being that „personism only targets people 
who absolutely cannot answer back, mainly small children and infants, but also the 
elderly and the comatose‟.614 A further difference, to some degree connected specifically 
to utilitarianism, concerns the intentions of the Nazis, and of Singer‟s philosophical ideas. 
Clearly, the Nazis‟ intentions were malevolent, and Singer says that his are benevolent, 
with the ultimate goal of avoiding suffering, which is the cornerstone of utilitarian 
thought. However, as Teichman explains, purity of intention can make no difference to a 
utilitarian, for „intentions divorced from their probable effects are neither good nor bad. 
Intentions are good if and only if they tend to lead to actions which in turn lead to 
desirable results, and bad if and only if they tend to lead to actions which have 
undesirable results‟.615 This is called consequentialism.616  
 An alternative, and much more positive, view of Singer, places less emphasis on 
his utilitarianism, and more on his position as a revisionary practical ethicist. In the view 
of the philosopher Dale Jamieson, an ethicist of this persuasion who confined himself to 
reproducing commonplace moral beliefs, or who clarified the range of views on a 
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particular subject without expressing a definite preference for any of them, would 
certainly not court controversy, but would probably not make a useful contribution to 
philosophy either. Jamieson, however, provides no discussion of the problem of Singer 
and the Nazi analogy, except to remark that „physical assault is no way to treat a guest, 
especially when much of the guest‟s extended family was murdered in your country by 
your parents and their compatriots‟.617 We can see here that Jamieson, a Singer supporter, 
is making no attempt to consider the Nazi analogy as such, but rather remarking that, due 
to the persecution to which a number of Singer‟s family members were subjected at the 
hands of Germans, both he and his views ought to have been treated with significantly 
more courtesy by his German auditors – apparently regardless of the nature of the ideas 
which Singer might actually espouse. This chapter has shown that, as far as many other 
philosophers are concerned, the question of the possible applicability of the Nazi analogy 
to Peter Singer‟s ethical theory would appear to be simply rather uninteresting, and 
worthy of little discussion. This view is mirrored in books other than that edited by Dale 
Jamieson and quoted above, which specifically discuss Singer and his philosophy. For 
example, Hyun Hochsmann‟s On Peter Singer makes no mention of the problem.618 
Susan Lufkin Krantz does mention Nazi ideas in relation to Singer and his philosophy, 
but in a far more general sense. For her, the danger that Singer‟s philosophy poses is that 
he seeks to subordinate human beings to an allegedly „higher‟ principle, „in which the 
human is displaced by the sentient as the criterion of being a bearer of moral value‟. If 
this were to occur, „whatever principle we pick, if we go beyond the ethical regard for 
human beings as such, we will end by subordinating human concerns to the principle. For 
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instance, the Nazis notoriously subordinated individual human welfare to the grand 
project of promoting the Aryan race‟.619 Krantz is, of course, speaking generally about 
Peter Singer‟s ethical theory and not about his ideas on „euthanasia‟ and infanticide. 
Nevertheless, her remarks are particularly pertinent because, as a large part of this 
chapter will show, many pro-euthanasia writers claim that, in supporting „euthanasia‟, 
they are supporting „individual human welfare‟, and not subordinating it to an idea (as the 
Nazis did). Thus, in their own eyes, they are polar opposites of the Nazis. 
This section has shown that, although some philosophers have considered the 
justification (or lack thereof), of accusing Singer of holding Nazi-like views, they have 
generally been far more concerned with other, arguably less interesting questions, such as 
whether or not Peter Singer was justified in expecting totally unfettered access to public 
platforms. This section also demonstrated that, hovering around the edges of the Singer 
debate was the question of how far Singer‟s views on selective infanticide from his 
utilitarian philosophy. This question will be addressed in more detail presently. Firstly, 
however, we are going to embark upon a short discussion of the widespread support for 
selective infanticide amongst Anglo-American physicians. This is important, as it will 
show that the questions about infanticide which have been considered by philosophers 
have been of great practical relevance. Interestingly, we will also see that there is a strong 
measure of agreement on the issue between physicians on the one hand and utilitarian 
philosophers on the other, with both of these groups being willing to state that, under 
certain circumstances, selective infanticide can be the „least worst‟ option to consider, 
and can even be desirable. It will be shown, however, that whilst physicians who support 
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selective infanticide do so based upon their professional experience, philosophers‟ 
support has a much more overtly ideological foundation.  
 
 
 Selective Infanticide 
 
 
One may find numerous sources referring to the prevalence of both active and passive 
infanticide in classical antiquity, but modern infanticide seems to have attracted little in 
the way of either public or scholarly attention until the early 1970s.
620
 In 1973 in the 
United States, Raymond Duff and A.G.M Campbell of Yale published an article 
concerning selective treatment of neonates, 
621
 a practice which, though hardly new, had 
previously been conducted „behind closed doors‟. In Britain in 1975, John Lorber, a 
pioneering spina bifida surgeon, described the practice of selective non-treatment of 
infants with spina bifida, which he had spearheaded, beginning in Sheffield in 1971.
622
 
This policy was motivated by the improved survival rates (but still with severe 
disabilities and health problems and significant risk of premature mortality) which new 
surgical techniques had caused. Lorber pioneered a policy which aimed to create a 
situation where „no infant should be denied good treatment if he had a chance of 
surviving with only moderate handicaps‟.623 Nevertheless, Lorber openly admitted that 
„the main aim of selection is to…avoid treating those who would survive with severe 
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handicaps‟.624 So Lorber drew up a list of criteria which would enable an expert to 
determine, on the first day of life, whether an infant should be operated upon to close the 
lesion on its back, or whether it should merely be cared for until death, with such basic 
measures as feeding on demand, and the administration of analgesics, sedatives and anti-
convulsants if needed, but with no antibiotics given to fight infection, and no tube-
feeding or resuscitation.
625
 This led to an exchange of views between Lorber and the 
bioethicist John Harris, in which the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme was discussed. Harris 
formulated a reply to Lorber‟s 1975 article, while Lorber subsequently offered a rejoinder 
to Harris‟s remarks. Lorber‟s original concerns, with regard to the Nazi analogy, were 
that active euthanasia should not be allowed to replace non-treatment, and that 
„euthanasia‟ should in particular never be legalized, as it would be impossible to prevent 
its abuse by the unscrupulous. Lorber claims that „there have been plenty of horrific 
examples of this in the past, especially in Hitler‟s Germany‟.626 Lorber does not elaborate 
on this remark, so it is difficult to know what sort of possible abuses he has in mind. In 
his reply to Lorber‟s article, Harris is quite clear that there is no analogy at all between 
the measures described by Lorber, and the actions of the Nazis, simply because Lorber‟s 
policy is designed to ensure that no child should survive with extremely severe problems 
meaning that life would be composed of suffering and little else. By contrast, „under the 
Nazis euthanasia was simply one way of exterminating those morally or politically 
beyond moral consideration‟.627 In Harris‟s view, „If we do not cry „Nazism‟ it is simply 
because there is no analogy and we know that all concerned are concerned only about the 
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welfare of their patients‟. This statement is echoed in a 1979 article by the 
aforementioned Campbell (of the University of Aberdeen) and Duff (of Yale University 
School of Medicine). Here, Campbell and Duff offer guidelines for the course of action to 
be taken in the case of infants with „gross malformations or distressing terminal 
illnesses‟.628 Like Lorber, Duff and Campbell take the view that the level of treatment 
which the child receives should be based upon its perceived prognosis – i.e. not 
necessarily upon the probability of the child‟s death. In their view, these options are: (a) 
maximum treatment, which should be pursued when the child‟s prognosis is good; (b) 
limited treatment, concentrating on alleviating the child‟s suffering rather than 
prolonging its life; and (c) withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment in order that the child‟s 
life should not be artificially extended.
629
 In this article, Duff and Campbell make no 
specific mention of the Nazi analogy in relation to „euthanasia‟. Nevertheless, they end 
their article with a warning that only doctors and parents of „defective‟ or dying neonates 
should be allowed to decide that discontinuation of an infant‟s treatment is the most 
appropriate course of action to take. Like Lorber, Duff and Campbell believe that it is the 
parents and physicians alone who can make such a decision, because they „care most for 
the patient and must bear the consequences‟.630 They warn that decisions of this nature 
must never be placed in the hands of the state, for fear that a patient‟s death would be 
sought for „minor difficulties or for the good of society or for the convenience of the 
family.
631
 Though the grounds for these concerns are not expressed in the article, the 
accompanying reference is to Leo Alexander‟s article „Medical Science Under 
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Dictatorship‟. From this, one may infer that, in the opinion of Duff and Campbell, dire 
(but unspecified) consequences are likely to ensue if „discontinuation of treatment‟ 
decisions are taken by anyone who is not immediately connected with the families who 
are going to be affected by them. 
We have seen already that John Lorber‟s „selective treatment‟ policy towards 
neonates with spina bifida was motivated largely by perceived problems that had arisen 
in the years since medical technologies had become sufficiently sophisticated to save the 
lives of such infants who would, in former times, have had little or no chance of survival. 
Duff and Campbell recognised that this was the case not just where spina bifida was 
concerned, but with regard to a whole range of illnesses and impairments which 
paediatricians were likely to encounter in their professional lives.
632
 The improved 
survival rates for children with illnesses or impairments led many physicians and ethicists 
to put forward the view that a child‟s own prospects might sometimes justifiably be 
sacrificed for the good of its family. In other words, if a child was likely to be left with 
severe problems if treated, medical professionals should consider the supposed good of 
the child‟s family above that of the child itself. This would entail giving the child a level 
of care designed to make it relatively comfortable, but which aimed for its death, rather 
than to enable it to leave hospital and continue living. Campbell and Duff regard this 
situation as an outcome which some parents and physicians may choose:  
 
„They [parents] may seek the death of the child to obtain relief from their suffering; the 
tensions of caring for a handicapped child, and their anxieties about the future…Having 
major commitments to understandably competing interests, [they] cannot accept the 
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situation and conflict and disruption will result if it is forced upon them. What may be 
unifying, constructive and fulfilling for one family may be extremely destructive to 
another. Parents have varying capacities for giving unstinting, unselfish continuous care 
even to normal infants. They may be unable to cope with the increased physical and 
emotional demands of caring for the abnormal.‟633  
 
That a child‟s life can be ended for the good of its family is a situation which, under 
certain circumstances, Duff and Campbell clearly countenance. This view is also echoed 
by Lorber, whose „selective treatment‟ policy was designed to take into account not only 
an infant‟s probable degree of residual disability, and need for future treatment, but also 
its family situation:  
 
„The problems created by a severely affected child often have disastrous effects on family 
life. A large proportion of the mothers are on tranquilising drugs and more need them. 
Young parents age prematurely through constant anxiety and recurrent crises. The 
upbringing of brothers and sisters suffers. Some families break up. Perhaps worst of all, 
because severely affected infants were „saved‟, many more potentially normal lives never 
started because their parents did not dare to have other children‟.634  
  
 
One might point out that a „severely affected child‟ would not actually „create‟ any of the 
problems to which Lorber alludes. They would arise very largely from lack of support for 
the child and its family. It is striking that neither Duff and Campbell, nor Lorber, appear 
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to consider this, or to regard these problems as being even moderately remediable by 
efforts which do not entail lethal consequences for the person who is supposedly 
„causing‟ them. This problem has been identified by many disability studies scholars: 
 
„For the past three decades, scholars and activists in disability have argued that the 
problem of disability was … one of denial of civil, social and economic rights and not 
one of biology and health. Yet the attitudes towards disability and the assumptions about 
the impact disabled people have on families and society that abound in medicine and 
bioethics all compel those scholars and activists to assert that the first right of people with 
disabilities is a claim to life itself, along with the social recognition of the value and and 
validity of the life of someone with a disability‟.635 
  
The attitude that a disabled infant is seen as a problem to be solved rather than as 
a human being, is even more marked in the writings of philosophers (specifically 
utilitarian philosophers) of the 1970s and 1980s. The role of the Nazi analogy in 
discussions of infanticide from the 1970s onwards has been rather mixed, with 
many ethicists scornfully rejecting the „Nazi‟ accusation out of hand. By contrast, 
John Lorber expressed concern that both the legalisation of „euthanasia‟ and any 
practice of the active killing of newborns might perhaps have the alarming effect 
of brutalising those who carried out any killings, or alternatively of giving them a 
„taste‟ for killing. John Harris rejected this concern, arguing that it was quite clear 
to everybody involved in these life-or-death decisions that they were being taken 
for the good of a patient and his or her family, and that the Nazis never thought of 
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„euthanasia‟ as a benefit to the persons to whom it was applied. Jonathan Glover 
strongly favoured selective infanticide but, as we shall see presently, his only 
discussion of the Nazi analogy comes when he is considering the problem of 
withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration. As the second section of this 
chapter showed, Peter Singer also rejects any analogy with the Nazis in relation to 
his views on „euthanasia‟. We will now, however, encounter James Rachels, a 
U.S. philosopher whose ideas in many respects resemble those of Peter Singer.
636
 
Rachels goes further than Singer, however. As we have seen, the idea that some 
lives are not worth living is uncontroversial in the field of medical and bio-ethics. 
In his book The End of Life: Euthanasia and Morality, published in 1986, Rachels 
acknowledged this, and stated that, contrary to what some might believe, this did 
not constitute „some insidious new thought which, once admitted, will lead us into 
unimaginable wickedness‟.637 As we saw at the beginning of the chapter, Rachels 
subsequently remarked: „our distinction between Baby Jane Doe‟s „life‟ (or lack 
of it) and other, fuller human lives expresses a rational moral principle, whereas 
Dr Himmler‟s prejudices do not‟.638 
 So, Rachels is, in effect, stating that, in life, it is entirely logical to make a 
distinction between the relative „worth‟ of different lives. To do so is, in fact, often 
necessary. This is not, in Rachels‟ opinion, a new idea which should cause widespread 
alarm. It is dangerous only if, as under the Nazis, it begins to encompass prejudices 
regarding the supposedly disparate „value‟ of the lives of persons of different races. This 
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is an idea which, it will be remembered, was expressed in by the Tribunal in the 
judgement of the Nuremberg Medical Trial. 
 There are, however, significant grounds for suspecting that both Singer and 
Rachels have chosen to draw attention to particular real-life cases to justify a pre-existing 
enthusiasm for selective infanticide, rather than using opposing cases equally in order to 
make their respective discussions of the merits and demerits of selective infanticide as 
comprehensive as possible. With regard to Peter Singer, this suspicion is intensified when 
one notices that he pays greater attention to the case of „Baby Andrew‟ than he does to, 
for example, that of „Baby Doe‟. This is probably partly due to the greater availability of 
sources concerning the former case. For example, after the death of „Baby Andrew‟, his 
mother published a diary which she had kept during the months in which the doctors 
attempted to save his life.
639
 There is no indication that „Baby Doe‟s‟ parents took a 
similar course of action. Nevertheless, it does seem that Singer exerts himself to advocate 
only one side of this particular argument. With regard to James Rachels, this behaviour is 
even more marked. „Baby Jane Doe‟ was another U.S. infant, born in 1983 with spina 
bifida and associated hydrocephalus, as well as microcephaly – an abnormally small head 
indicative of mental retardation. Rachels uses the rather grim medical prognosis given to 
„Baby Jane Doe‟ to conclude that she was „lacking a life, or even the possibility of one‟, 
and that  
 
„[I]f her existence were prolonged by surgery, she would remain alive for perhaps twenty 
years. But this is not, by itself, important…Merely being alive does one no good unless it 
enables one to have a life…We are told that she would lack the mental and physical 
                                                 
639
 Robert and Peggy Stinson, The Long Dying of Baby Andrew (Boston: Little, Brown, 1983). 
 283 
abilities to engage in even simple human activities; she would not be capable of normal 
associations with other people, of being curious about the world and having that curiosity 
satisfied, of enjoying the things that people enjoy. It would not, in short, be a human life, in 
any sense other than that she would be a member of the biological species who is alive‟.640   
 
The problem with this is that „Baby Jane Doe‟s situation subsequently changed 
dramatically. Six months after refusing to allow surgery to close her spina bifida, „Baby 
Jane Doe‟s parents reversed their decision. Her lesion had healed, and tough skin 
protected it from infection. After their daughter had been fitted with a shunt to relieve the 
pressure on her brain caused by hydrocephalus, her parents were allowed to take her 
home. Four years later a reporter interviewed her parents, and found that the little girl 
(now named Kerri-Lynn) could not walk, but was attending a special school and 
interacting with other children.
641
 
 Rachels‟ The End of Life was published in 1986. Thus, its publication preceded 
that of the interview with „Baby Jane Doe‟s parents. Nevertheless, Rachels could have 
investigated the story to see whether it really suited his own views as ideally as he 
imagined. That he did not do so, would tend to suggest that he was not interested in 
„Baby Jane Doe‟ herself, but only in using what turned out to be a very small part of her 
story to support views which he already entertained, but which, in this case at least, did 
not reflect reality very accurately. In addition, Rachels‟ discussion of the „Baby Jane 
Doe‟ case leads him on to a more general exploration of the so-called „slippery slope‟ 
argument, and the applicability or otherwise of the Nazi analogy to questions of modern 
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„euthanasia‟. As Peter Singer was to do some years later in his book Practical Ethics, 
Rachels states that „the meaning of Nazi „euthanasia‟ can be understood only in the 
context of their especially virulent kind of racism‟. To support his claim, Rachels quoted 
from comments made by the historian Lucy Dawidowicz at a conference on the Proper 
Use of the Nazi Analogy in Bioethics, which had been held at the U.S. Hastings Center in 
1976.
642
 By utilising Dawidowicz‟ description of the malevolent racism which she claims 
as the impetus for the „euthanasia‟ programme, Rachels is able to make the following 
claim:  
 
„Contemporary proponents of euthanasia advocate mercy-killing in response to the 
patient‟s request. Among the Nazis, there was never any thought of killing as a 
compassionate act for the benefit of suffering … patients … the killings were completely 
involuntary. Where, then, is the analogy with the real euthanasia movement?‟ 
  
One might at this point question Rachels‟ own avowed enthusiasm for some types of 
what he calls „non-voluntary euthanasia‟. We have already seen him confidently declare 
that „Baby Jane Doe‟ would not suffer any real harm from being „allowed to die‟, 
because, in Rachels‟ opinion, she lacked any possibility of developing a real human life. 
To support his ideas, Rachels also uses the case of Repouille, which was discussed in the 
U.S. legal chapter, and the case of Hans Florian, who shot dead his Alzheimer‟s-stricken 
wife through fear of what might befall her were he to predecease her. It is at this point 
that Rachels makes the claim central to his whole argument:  
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„Although this unfortunate woman was still alive, that fact has little significance. The 
critical fact is that, when her husband shot her, her life was already over. He was not 
destroying her life; it had already been destroyed by Alzheimer‟s disease.  Thus he was not 
behaving immorally … If we should not kill, it is because in killing we are harming 
someone. That is the reason killing is wrong. The rule against killing has as its point the 
protection of the victims … This conception leads directly to the conclusion that her 
husband did no wrong. She was not harmed by her husband‟s killing her – indeed, if 
anything, it seems more likely that she was helped‟. 
  
Another, equally important distinction raised by Rachels‟ views is one which has, thus 
far, only been touched upon; namely, the distinction (if there is one) between killing 
someone and „allowing‟ him or her to die, whether that be through withdrawal of 
hydration and nutrition, or through failure to administer life-saving treatment. 
 
Killing, Letting Die, and Benevolence 
 
 The distinction between killing and „allowing to die‟ has, thus far, only really been 
mentioned in passing. Lorber supported the latter, but shied away from the former. 
During the period with which we are concerned (that is to say, mainly the 1970s and 
1980s), „allowing to die‟ was relatively common medical practice, and seemed really to 
cause consternation only when news of its occurrence entered the public sphere (as we 
saw at the beginning of this chapter, with regard to Patrick J. Buchanan‟s concerns over 
the „Baby Jane Doe‟ case, which will be discussed shortly. Philosophers of the period 
were, however, dissatisfied with this situation, feeling that the active killing of the child 
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was a more humane course of action. In the opinion of such thinkers, the benefits of this 
approach would be twofold: the child would be speedily „released from its suffering‟, and 
its parents could return quickly to their former lives and perhaps have more children, 
instead of spending weeks or months devoting all their energies to the needs of one sick 
or disabled child, whose requirements would banish all thoughts of further procreation 
from its parents‟ minds‟. The two main examples of this school of thought (apart from 
Jonathan Glover, whose discussion of this problem does not focus on specific real-life 
cases), are Peter Singer and James Rachels. The main cases which they focus on to 
support their point of view are U.S. cases; namely, those of „Baby Andrew‟, „Baby Doe‟, 
and „Baby Jane Doe‟. 
 Peter Singer uses the case of „Baby Andrew‟ Stinson to demonstrate what can 
happen when an infant with a poor prognosis is the subject of extensive and, often, 
prolonged medical treatment in an attempt to save its life. „Baby Andrew‟ had been born 
at only twenty-four weeks, in December, 1976, and lived for almost six months. 
However, he spent all that time in hospital, receiving intensive treatment, against the 
wishes of his parents.
643
  
 Singer‟s main criticisms of this course of action are twofold. Firstly, that 
Andrew‟s survival prevented his parents having any more children – this is a point made 
by Andrew‟s mother in a diary she kept which was later published. Singer also raised the 
possibility that, even if Andrew lived, he would have significant residual „disabilities‟.644 
The claim with regard to „residual disability‟, and also the reference to the possibility that 
the existence of a sick or disabled child would interfere with its parents‟ plans to have 
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more children, lead Singer on to a discussion of the „Baby Doe‟ case. This took place in 
Bloomington, Indiana, in 1982, and concerned a baby born with Down‟s syndrome and 
an associated blockage of the oesophagus. Though this defect was easily operable, the 
baby subsequently died of starvation and dehydration because his parents did not want a 
child with Down‟s syndrome.645 We saw previously that the idea that a child could be 
sacrificed for the supposed good of its parents and its current, or even hypothetical, future 
siblings was, in medical ethics of this period, widely accepted. Singer also is prepared to 
countenance it, saying: 
 
„A couple considering whether to terminate a pregnancy when the fetus has been diagnosed 
with Down (sic) syndrome is in a similar situation to the Stinsons…It is implausible that 
the choice between one life and another does not enter the minds of many parents with 
disabled newborn infants …We know that once our children‟s lives are properly underway, 
we will become committed to them; for that very reason, many couples do not want to 
bring up a child if they fear that both the child‟s life and their own experience of child-
rearing will be clouded by a major disability‟.646   
 
As we have just seen, the philosopher James Rachels‟ views on life and death, and on the 
point at which life ceases to be meaningful, are nothing if not robust. This being so, it is 
unsurprising that Rachels sees no real distinction between killing someone and „allowing‟ 
that person to die. As shown above, Rachels uses three cases to explain his support for 
what he terms „non-voluntary‟ „euthanasia‟. Of these, two (Repouille‟s son and Hans 
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Florian‟s wife) involve the direct killing of the victim, whilst one (that of Baby Jane Doe) 
involved non-treatment of the baby‟s medical problems (such as the open spina bifida on 
her back) in the expectation that she would quickly succumb to infection and die. The 
fact that Rachels has used these three rather different cases to illustrate the same point 
would indicate that he makes no distinction between active and passive killing, preferring 
to rely upon his own judgement that the victim of the killing was not really a victim, 
having already lost, or being permanently unable to acquire, what Rachels terms „a 
biographical life‟:  
 
„I have argued or implied that killing (or deliberately allowing to die, which, in my view, is 
morally the same thing (my italics) would not be wrong in a variety of cases: the case of 
Hans Florian‟s wife, the case of Repouille‟s son, the case of Baby Jane Doe, and the cases 
of persons in irreversible coma. None of these are examples of patients who request death, 
(but) I would favour removing legal penalties for killing in these cases…Where a person‟s 
biographical life is over, or where there is no prospect of a biographical life, there is no 
point in insisting that biological life be preserved‟.647   
 
Apart from anything else, this statement makes it clear that, to Rachels, the deciding 
factor in whether or not life is worth preserving is that of cognitive ability, whether actual 
or potential. In the case of Mrs Florian, for example, as well as that of Baby Jane Doe and 
of Repouille‟s son, what mattered was not the length of time which their lives were likely 
to last, but the level of awareness they were likely to have and, thus, the question of 
whether or not they could have lives which Rachels considered meaningful. As they 
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could not, it did not matter to Rachels how or when they died – the question of the Nazi 
analogy having been discarded long ago as being applicable only in cases of killing 
motivated by a virulent racist ideology. Other philosophers have emphasised the 
importance of their own benign intent when rejecting any suggestion that the Nazi 
analogy might be applied to their own ideas. As a believer in a „virulent racist ideology‟ 
would evidently not be motivated by compassion or benevolence, it is easy to see the link 
between these two ideas. For example, in his 1993 work Life’s Dominion, Ronald 
Dworkin considered the question of the Nazi analogy and its potential applicability to the 
approval of selective abortion of disabled foetuses. It is intriguing that, unlike, say, Peter 
Singer, he chose to discuss a practice which (at least on the face of it) would appear to be 
considerably more common and accepted than the somewhat more controversial issue of 
selective infanticide. Peter Singer has written in many of his books that were he to apply 
his justifications for selective infanticide to mounting arguments in favour of selective 
abortion, the majority of the population would agree with him, and his views would 
attract little controversy, if any.
648
  By contrast, Dworkin does not explain why he chose 
to concentrate on selective abortion in preference to selective infanticide. Nevertheless 
he, like many other philosophers, is certain that benignity of intent is the single most 
important reason why it is unjust to invoke the spectre of Nazism in relation to 
contemporary debates about the abortion of disabled foetuses.  H.J. Glock, a philosopher 
from the University of Reading, also considered the problem of intentionality (Singer‟s 
vis-à-vis those of the Nazis). His remarks came in response to those of Jenny Teichman, 
which we encountered earlier in the chapter, and were published in a later issue of the 
Journal of Applied Philosophy. However, just as Teichman herself regarded the „Nazi‟ 
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accusations made against Singer as something of a side-issue, so Glock only responds to 
her assertions in a footnote of his article. The only point which relates specifically to 
Singer and the Nazi analogy is Glock‟s contention that Teichman‟s claim that intentions 
cannot matter to a utilitarian is redundant, given that Teichman herself is not a utilitarian. 
Consequently, argues Glock, she must consider Singer‟s motives, and „acknowledge that 
they are morally superior to those of the Nazis‟.649  Glock fails to explain the precise 
basis upon which Singer‟s motives are superior to those of the Nazis. However, it is 
unsurprising that all the philosophers in this chapter who support a departure from 
traditional ethics (in terms of, say, selective infanticide have insisted strenuously on the 
purity of their motives. This insistence means that the debates themselves invariably get 
stuck in something of an impasse. Interdisciplinary, bioethical debates about infanticide 
have often been precipitated by medical advances which make it possible, but, in the 
view of some professionals, undesirable to safeguard the lives of persons who would 
previously have died. Such arguments often hinge upon concerns for the patient‟s 
welfare, and questions about whether he or she would want to live on in, for example, a 
persistent vegetative state. In the case of disabled neonates, the question of whether 
killing (or „allowing to die‟) an infant who is thought to have little prospect of a fulfilling 
life, has been one in which the applicability (or otherwise) of the Nazi analogy has been 
discussed. We saw earlier in the chapter that, in the Lorber-Harris debate of the mid-
1970s, John Lorber expressed concern that the active killing of neonates would lead to 
the brutalization of those called upon to do the deed. This idea was roundly rejected by 
John Harris, who insisted that all those involved in these kinds of life-or-death decisions 
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were focused solely on the welfare of the infant and its family. This benevolent intent 
made comparisons with the Nazis ludicrous. The philosopher Philippa Foot considered 
these problems too, in an article published in the same year as Glover‟s Causing Death 
and Saving Lives. As a non-utilitarian philosopher, it is perhaps not especially surprising 
that Foot‟s views differ markedly from those of Singer and Glover. She believes that, in 
the case of the infanticide of a disabled infant, it may be quite proper to invoke the Nazi 
analogy, because it may be that the infant is being killed for reasons which have little or 
nothing to do with its perceived prognosis.
650
 In Foot‟s view, this is particularly true with 
regard to infants born with Down‟s syndrome and easily correctible additional problems 
such as blockages of the oesophagus. She argues that such infants are perfectly capable of 
living contented lives, and that their medical prognosis can never be described as 
„wretchedly bad‟.651 Indeed, she also cites the work of Professor R.B. Zachary to show 
that, contrary to the views expressed by Lorber, Glover, and Singer, it would be wrong 
simply to assume that a person with even very severe spina bifida can have no quality of 
life at all. 
652
 Foot concludes that, in most cases of the active or passive infanticide of 
disabled infants, pessimistic medical predictions concerning an infant‟s future „quality of 
life‟, doctors are actually thinking not of the infant, but of the ease with which any 
difficulties can be avoided by leaving it to die. This, to Foot, is „not a matter of 
euthanasia except in Hitler‟s sense‟.653 She supports this by means of a quotation from 
Hannah Arendt‟s Eichmann in Jerusalem. Arendt relates a memorandum which 
Eichmann received from an S.S. man stating that, as Jews in the coming winter could no 
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longer be fed, it might be more humane actively to kill those incapable of work before the 
winter arrived.
654
 We saw at the beginning of this chapter that the philosopher James 
Rachels rejected any suggestion that the Nazi analogy could be relevant to subsequent 
debates, because the Nazis‟ prejudices were not based on reason – unlike, apparently, 
Rachels‟ own ideas about the „quality‟ of Baby Jane Doe‟s future life. Foot rejects such 
ideas, and clearly regards the readiness to assume that a disabled infant‟s life is valueless 
as another form of prejudice. In addition, it is noteworthy that, unlike many other 
philosophers, Foot makes no mention of the Nazis‟ malevolent intentions towards the 
victims of the „euthanasia‟ programme – her comment that the infanticide of the vast 
majority of disabled infants „is not euthanasia except in Hitler‟s sense‟ makes it clear 
that, though contemporary killing of individual disabled infants might entail a different 
degree of malevolence, the Nazi analogy is still applicable.  
Controversies concerning the „euthanasia‟ of comatose patients and of those in a 
persistent vegetative state (PVS) are similarly closely connected to developments in 
medical technology. PVS was first described as a sequel of brain damage only in 1972, 
and said to be caused by extensive damage to the cerebral neo-cortex, but with the brain 
stem remaining intact. The effect of this was to render the patient unable to respond to 
stimuli, unable to speak or (presumably) to understand, unable to express emotion and 
incapable of cognitive function, but apparently awake.
655
 This is rather different from 
being in a comatose state, which is described as „a state of unnatural, heavy, deep and 
prolonged sleep, with complete unconsciousness and slow, stertorous, often irregular, 
breathing, due to pressure on the brain, to the effect of certain poisons, or to other causes, 
                                                 
654
 Ibid. 
655
 „Euthanasia: Death, Dying and the Medical Duty: A Series of Expert Reviews‟, British Medical Bulletin, vol.52 (2), (April, 1996), 
p.266. 
 293 
and frequently ending in death‟.656 Sometimes, however, the terms seem to be used 
interchangeably, at least by non-specialists.
657
 The philosopher Philippa Foot wrote in 
1977 that the dictionary definition of „euthanasia‟ as „a good death‟ had perhaps failed to 
keep pace with developments in medical technology, which include deaths such as that of 
Karen Quinlan under the heading of „euthanasia‟. This is despite the fact that, in such a 
case, death is presumably not an evil, but neither can it be seen as a positive good.
658
 This 
question is of great concern to Foot, who writes that in ensuring that death is for the good 
of the one who dies, or at least that it is „no evil‟, we are „refusing to talk Hitler‟s 
language‟.659 Foot bases her ideas on Leo Alexander‟s famous article „Medical Science 
under Dictatorship‟, and particularly on Alexander‟s famous claim that „In truth, all those 
unable to work and considered non-rehabilitable were killed‟.660 This leads Foot to 
advocate the drawing-up of „Living Wills‟, and to state that, though „charity does not 
demand that strenuous measures are taken to keep people alive‟ when they are in a 
similar situation to Karen Quinlan, to kill such people cannot be described as 
„euthanasia‟, as there is no suffering. 
 Jonathan Glover‟s aforementioned book Causing Death and Saving Lives 
considers the use of the Nazi analogy in relation to the „euthanasia‟ of comatose and PVS 
patients. As we have seen, Glover strongly supports the idea that, under certain 
circumstances, life will not be worth living, and that, furthermore, „in these rare cases 
[where] the undiluted act of killing may not be a wrong act, but the act of a decent and 
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generous person…we should respect rather than condemn someone who manages to do 
it‟.661 Glover approaches the „use of the Nazi analogy‟ question through a discussion of 
Gitta Sereny‟s 1974 book Into that Darkness: From Mercy Killing to Mass Murder. In 
this book, Sereny reported that Franz Stangl, who became the commandant of Treblinka, 
had honed his homicidal talents during the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme, before being 
considered sufficiently proficient to take charge of the killings at a much larger death 
camp.
662
 Glover‟s reading of Sereny‟s book convinces him that  
 
„Franz Stangl was not the kind of person you might easily find working for the National 
Health Service‟. Furthermore, „any profession contains some people who are callous, 
unscrupulous or too willing to obey orders of the established authorities. The lesson of the 
German experience is a political one: not to allow power to pass to a government under 
which that kind of doctor will be at home. We need not draw the over-simple moral that, 
because of what the Nazis did, doctors should be encouraged to leave the respirator on 
beyond the point where life is worthwhile‟.663  
 
Here, Glover is advancing an argument which is diametrically opposed to that given by 
Foot. In Glover‟s opinion, any potential danger from a resurgence of Nazi-like practices 
comes from individual doctors who might be callous in their attitude towards their 
patients, or who might have to great an enthusiasm for following dubious orders given to 
them by „the authorities‟. By contrast, Foot believed that the idea that it was acceptable to 
kill disabled infants or to leave them to die was part of a more general underestimation of  
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their worth and potential  – and was, as a result, more insidious, as it was not noticed or 
challenged in the same way as the attitude of one individual might be. One can say, 
however, that in Foot‟s opinion, the Nazi analogy is less pertinent in the case of PVS and 
comatose patients than it is in that of disabled infants. The reason for this seems to be that 
Foot feels that infants who are killed or left to die are robbed of their potentiality. 
Comatose and PVS patients, on the other hand, are seen as having no potentiality: 
„Perhaps charity does not demand that strenuous measures are taken to keep people in 
this state alive, but euthanasia does not come into the matter…when someone is, like 
Karen Quinlan, in a state of permanent coma‟.664     
 In his book Life’s Dominion: An Argument about Abortion and Euthanasia, the 
philosopher Ronald Dworkin considers the problem of the „euthanasia‟ of PVS patients, 
but in relation to another famous U.S. case. Nancy Cruzan had been left in a persistent 
vegetative state following a car crash in 1989, and her parents took the hospital where she 
was being cared for to court in an attempt to order them to withdraw Cruzan‟s feeding 
tubes.
665
 As we saw in the „infanticide‟ section of this chapter, Dworkin‟s discussion of 
the Nazi analogy is considerably less exhaustive than Philippa Foot‟s. Nevertheless, it is 
noteworthy that, unlike Foot, Dworkin seeks to draw a clear line between „loathsome 
Nazi eugenics‟ on the one hand, and any and all actions of persons living in a modern 
liberal democracy on the other. The reasoning behind this appears to be similar to the 
claims by Peter Singer and some of his supporters to the effect that his desire that his 
recommendations should lead to a reduction in suffering – in other words, that his 
professed benevolence was sufficient to render him the polar opposite of the Nazis, who 
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were, clearly, malevolent. Dworkin follows a similar line of thought. In his view, the 
potential damage in „forcing people to live‟ is much greater than any that might be 
brought about by legalizing „euthanasia‟:  
 
„The … familiar „slippery slope‟ argument: that legalizing euthanasia in even in carefully 
limited cases makes it more likely that that it will later be legalized in other, more doubtful 
cases as well, and that the process may end in Nazi eugenics. That argument also loses its 
bite once we understand that legalizing no euthanasia is in itself harmful to many people – 
then we realise that doing our best to draw and maintain a defensible line, acknowledging 
and trying to guard against the risk that others will draw the line differently in the future, is 
better than abandoning these people altogether. There are dangers both in legalizing and 
refusing to legalize; the rival dangers must be balanced, and neither should be ignored‟.666  
 
 Dworkin regards a complete rejection of „euthanasia‟ to be a far greater threat than the 
potential danger that once legalized, „euthanasia‟ might be used in questionable cases. 
Unlike Foot, Dworkin clearly believes that, for some seriously ill or comatose people, 
death is evidently preferable to continued existence, and that no further investigation of 
the matter is required. With specific reference to the use of the Nazi analogy, Dworkin, 
like Singer, Glover and others, emphasize the benevolence of their own views in contrast 
to the malevolence of those of the Nazis. To Foot, the question of benign versus malign 
intent does not seem to be of any importance, as we saw in the „infanticide‟ section of 
this chapter.     
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Conclusion 
 
As this chapter has shown, it is no simple matter to disentangle all the various uses to 
which the Nazi analogy has been put in Anglo-American philosophical debates about 
„euthanasia‟. One thing is clear, however; namely, the dividing line between utilitarian 
and non-utilitarian philosophers. This chapter has demonstrated that it is utilitarian 
philosophers who are most willing to state that traditional views concerning the sanctity 
of life are outdated, and drastically in need of revision. When confronted with the 
argument that such revisions run the risk of bringing modern society to the point of 
endorsing practices which the Nazis might recognize and regard with approbation, 
utilitarian philosophers rely on two main arguments. These are, firstly, the argument 
made by Lucy Dawidowicz to the effect that accusations of Nazism would only ever be 
applicable in the case of a virulently racist society in which everything was done for the 
benefit of an entity similar to that of the Volk. Secondly, utilitarian philosophers also 
argue that their own intentions are entirely benevolent, and that, as such, to equate their 
ideas about „euthanasia‟ with those of the Nazis is simply insulting.  
 Arguments about the „euthanasia‟ of entirely compos mentis persons with terminal 
illnesses were, as stated in the introduction, conspicuous by their absence from this 
chapter. This is due to the emphasis placed by so many of our philosophers upon the 
importance of having a „mental life‟, or at least the possibility of one. There was probably 
also an unspoken assumption amongst philosophers that people, who were ill, but still 
able to make end-of-life decisions for themselves, came under the heading of „voluntary 
euthanasia‟. As such, philosophers tend to discuss them less, particularly with regard to 
discussions about the use of the Nazi analogy.  
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 There was little agreement on the question of whether or not forms of active and 
passive „euthanasia‟ were radically different, or on the question of which of them might, 
in view of the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme, have more in the way of deleterious effects 
upon society as a whole. Here again, utilitarian philosophers (most notably Singer, 
Glover and Rachels) led the way in advocating active killing, as being quicker, more 
definite and decisive, and, allegedly, more humane. On this issue, the utilitarians‟ views 
were diametrically opposed to those of Philippa Foot. Whilst not being greatly alarmed 
by the possibility of withdrawing nutrition and hydration from comatose patients, such as 
Karen Quinlan, Foot stated that the active killing of, or the refusal to treat, neonates with 
such conditions as Down‟s syndrome, was not „euthanasia‟ „except in Hitler‟s sense‟ – in 
other words, killing not for the benefit of the person being killed, but as a subtle form of 
social engineering in which the potentiality of disabled newborns was systematically 
underestimated.. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
This thesis has demonstrated the clash between „traditional‟ ideas about disability and 
impairment, and those based upon the social model of disability  I have established, in 
other words, that debates about „euthanasia‟ in Britain and the United States have long 
been characterized by the enforced absence of the people who are most affected by them, 
and who are most likely to have valid and informed opinions. This approach necessitated 
a marked focus upon the views of people who expressed precisely the views which I 
myself do not advocate. In doing this, I have shown the widespread nature of the views 
which need to be challenged and, particularly in my historians‟, legal and philosophy 
chapters, I have shown how this is beginning to happen. The message of the thesis as a 
whole is very much that there are so many residual problems regarding the questions of 
„euthanasia‟ and „assisted suicide‟ that it is unwise to be too eager to pursue the idea that 
these are simply matters of personal freedom and individual choice. It is noteworthy that, 
for example, two of the most prominent members of the British „right to die‟ debate – 
Debbie Purdy and Sir Terry Pratchett - have both become ill relatively recently. This does 
not mean that their views are not important, or that they would not adhere to them even if 
the tenor of the debate was significantly different. However, as I have shown in this 
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thesis, I do not believe that the attitudes to the „euthanasia‟ programme and its victims 
which were on display at the Nuremberg Medical Trial have previously been analysed as 
closely as they are in this study. The first chapter showed that the prosecution and the 
Tribunal mounted no real challenge to the defendants‟ claims regarding the purity and 
altruism upon which their participation in the programme was based. As Chapter One 
also demonstrates, however, this dismissive attitude was not simply caused by an 
oversight, or a failure to research the exact nature of the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme. 
Instead, what is revealed by the Nuremberg Medical Trial transcript is the prosecution 
team and judges‟ ingrained inability to treat the programme as a case of systematic 
murder. The judgement in particular sends a clear message that – presumably because the 
victims were inmates of institutions – the German state was perfectly entitled to exercise 
the power of life and death over them. 
 This chapter, then, lays the groundwork for the rest of the thesis. The other 
chapters follow the first one in showing how pervasive this „deadly paternalism‟ has 
been, and how it is not confined solely to one particular time period or academic 
discipline. Chapter Two looked at outsiders‟ views of the Nuremberg Medical Trial, and 
this was done by seeing how the Trial was reported in prominent newspapers, as well as 
in medical and legal journals, in both the United States and Britain. By doing this, I 
showed that, during the period it was taking place, the Trial was reported almost 
exclusively as being solely concerned with the prosecution of Nazis who had carried out 
medical experiments upon concentration camp inmates. One could argue that this virtual 
silence leaves us none the wiser about how contemporaries regarded the Nazi 
„euthanasia‟ programme, but I maintain that the silence speaks volumes. Had the 
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journalists reporting from the Trial felt that the „euthanasia‟ programme was 
unequivocally wrong and shocking, presumably they would have highlighted it in their 
reports? Most interestingly, the medical journals consulted for this chapter identified 
various ethical problems brought into focus by the Nuremberg Medical Trial, but these 
were all to do with human vivisection – whether it is right to use data obtained in the 
experiments, for example. One assumes that prominent medical journals may well have 
sent their own representatives to the Nuremberg Medical Trial rather than relying solely 
upon reports gleaned second-hand from newspapers. However they obtained their 
information, it is striking – and somewhat depressing – that their assumptions and 
preoccupations are so similar to those of the journalists reporting from the Trial. The 
legal journals consulted for this chapter show that, whilst legal scholars understood the 
Nuremberg Medical Trial to be solely concerned with human vivisection, they were not 
particularly interested in it, perhaps because they regarded it as being of more relevance 
to the field of medicine. It certainly did not impinge upon their discussions of „mercy-
killing‟ cases of the time, such as the Long case in England and the Repouille case in the 
United States. I argued in Chapter Two that this inconsistency, like those of the 
journalists and physicians, is extremely telling. It is not that the murder of one disabled 
person by, say, a parent is like systematic murder by a state. It is that both, here, are 
characterized by official indifference to the fate of the victim(s), as well as an unspoken 
assumption that the victim has not been deprived of anything by being murdered, and that 
the perpetrator was almost entitled to act in the way that he did. This also lays the 
foundations for Chapters Four and Five, in which the persistence of this paternalistic 
attitude – right up to the present day – was demonstrated.  
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Chapter Three took a slightly different approach, whilst drawing similar 
conclusions regarding the widespread existence of a paternalistic and dismissive attitude 
towards people subjected to „euthanasia‟. Here, I looked at how historians in Britain and 
the United States have written about the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme. My investigation 
went right from the decade or so following the Nuremberg Medical Trial up until books 
published very recently and attempting to integrate study of the Nazi „euthanasia‟ 
programme into the new discipline of disability history. I demonstrated that by far the 
most tenacious view of the „euthanasia‟ programme amongst historians is that which 
ignores every aspect of the programme itself, whilst highlighting the protests against it 
which supposedly brought it to an end, but in fact did not. Chapter Three is also 
thematically linked with Chapters One, Two, Four and Five in that the attitudes of the 
historians who emphasize the protests to the programme rather than the programme itself 
are, in a way, demonstrating a similar kind of „deadly paternalism‟ to that which was so 
evident at the Nuremberg Medical Trial, and which is so evident in legal and 
philosophical debates about „euthanasia‟ In other words, in using the programme solely 
as an example of the possibilities of German resistance to the Nazis, many of the 
historians in Chapter Three seem to be relegating the victims of Nazi „euthanasia‟ to the 
role of „optional extras‟ in German society. Just as the Nuremberg Medical Trial tribunal 
stated that a state may subject certain classes of its citizens to „euthanasia‟, many 
historians appear to follow suit, in their seeming assumption that the „euthanasia‟ 
programme was a dry ethical issue, not a programme of systematic murder of tens of 
thousands of innocent people. Happily, though, Chapter Three ended with a discussion of 
the ways in which disability historians in particular are trying to remedy the situation. 
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They are, of course, benefiting from the work carried out by pioneers such as Michael 
Burleigh and Henry Friedlander, but they are also trying to consider the „euthanasia‟ 
programme from a new perspective. For example, Suzanne E. Evans 2007 book Hitler’s 
Forgotten Victims: The Holocaust and the Disabled offered little new research (although 
perhaps a new way of looking at things) but used the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme for 
clearly-expressed socio-political ends:  
 
„Disability Rights Advocates … established the Disability Holocaust Project with several 
objectives: (1) to shatter the silence that has surrounded the fate of people with disabilities 
during the Holocaust; (2) to heighten public awareness about the current desperate plight of 
people with disabilities; (3) to utilize the shared history of the Holocaust as a vehicle for 
building greater cooperation between organizations of people with disabilities; and (4) to 
relate pre-Holocaust Nazi concepts to pernicious contemporary attitudes and enhance 
awareness of the existing stigmatization of people with disabilities‟.667  
 
Four years earlier, in an article published in the American Historical Review, 
Catherine J. Kudlick of the University of California pointed out that there were few 
books written about the Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme, and that those which were 
invariably took a „medicalized‟ stance, regarding the victims as „poor unfortunates‟ who 
should have been cared for and not murdered, but who were nevertheless not really part 
of mainstream society.
668
 Kudlick further suggests that „a number of factors may explain 
this lacuna, among them perhaps a tacit acceptance that the Nazis may have been right to 
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want to eliminate this particular group of „undesirables‟‟.669 Though this is a shocking 
statement, and perhaps might have benefited from some additional elucidation, it does 
raise a number of questions which modern society often appears to try to circumvent.  
Chapters Four and Five of my thesis highlighted and addressed these questions, 
from the points of view of law (Chapter Four) and bioethics (Chapter Five).  Chapter 
Four considered the legal situation with regard to „euthanasia‟ in both the United States 
and in England and Wales (the Scottish legal system being somewhat different). Instead 
of providing an explanation of exactly what the legal situation is in each country, the 
chapter continued the theme which ran through the previous three chapters. I showed that 
in both countries, but in somewhat different ways, the „law on the books‟ differs 
markedly from „the law in action‟. As Chapter Four demonstrates this is particularly the 
case in England and Wales. Whilst „mercy-killing‟ is supposed to be murder, it has, in 
fact, never been treated as such by English law, particularly when the perpetrator is a 
layperson. In some ways the situation in England and Wales continues to be rather the 
way that that in the United States was described by the legal scholar Yale Kamisar in 
1958: „[A] high incidence of failures to indict, acquittals, suspended sentences and 
reprieves‟.670  
Chapter Five considered the place of „disability‟ in bioethical debates, and it in 
this final chapter that I embarked upon a discussion of how the Nazi analogy has been 
used, both by bioethicists themselves, and by those who disagree with them – although 
the question of the Nazi analogy had also been raised in the legal chapter, owing to the 
interest taken in it by US lawyers and legal scholars. In this chapter we discovered that 
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many of the most prominent bioethical philosophers are also utilitarians, but that there is 
a clear ideological divide between utilitarians (such as Peter Singer and Jonathan Glover), 
and non-consequentialists (such as Philippa Foot).  Utilitarian beliefs have led those 
philosophers who hold them to the idea that traditional adherence to the „sanctity‟ of life 
is outdated, and should be replaced by more reasonable and rational values. In particular, 
bioethicists claim that no-one really believes that all human lives are of equal value, and 
that there must be an overt acceptance of this, rather than the current situation in which 
the law says one thing and does another. In a sense, the utilitarian philosophers‟ focus on 
legal standards not having kept pace with contemporary morality tallies with the findings 
in my legal chapter. However, whilst the utilitarian philosophers conclude that this 
dichotomy means that the „old ethic‟ needs replacing, I argued that the philosophers have 
reached this conclusion only because, like so many others, they are embarking upon a 
discussion of „euthanasia‟ (including the infanticide of disabled newborns) without 
paying any attention to the views of people who would have been affected by such a 
measure, had it existed when they themselves were born. In short, then, this thesis 
addresses „a question which should enter into the issues‟, but has really been prevented 
from doing so until very recently. 
This thesis demonstrates, above all, that the tenor of the debate, the important questions 
which it asks, and the scope of participation in the debate as a whole are all in dire need 
of significant change. Every chapter demonstrated the existence of paternalistic and 
stereotypical attitudes regarding disability and disabled people. I did also show – most 
notably in the „historians‟‟ chapter – that these attitudes are beginning to change, thanks 
in no small part to the contributions made by disabled people themselves. For example, it 
 306 
strikes me that one problem that many historians may have had when writing about the 
Nazi „euthanasia‟ programme is that they have assumed that the victims thereof were 
suffering primarily from their impairments. As discussed in my introductory chapter, as 
well as at relevant points in my other chapters, the reason for this is most likely to be due 
to deeply ingrained ideas that external factors make no difference to an impaired person. 
This is one reason why the „euthanasia‟ programme has not been considered to be „the 
same‟ as any other systematic killing programme. I hope that, by challenging this 
attitude, I and others will be able to help move the debate on into new territory. After all, 
the knowledge that a disabled person is a full human being, not just a physical 
manifestation of various medical problems, is clearly essential to all aspects of the 
„euthanasia‟ debate, and also to so many debates in so many other areas of society – 
indeed, so many different areas of life itself. 
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